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Chapter 1
Introduction1
This thesis is a collection of papers that use survey data to analyze expec-
tations about macroeconomic variables and the way these expectations are
formed. Since inflation expectations are probably the most relevant expecta-
tions for understanding macroeconomic dynamics and certainly for analyzing
and conducting monetary policy, some parts of the thesis focus exclusively
on the formation and dynamics of inflation expectations while most of the
parts are covering a broader range of macroeconomic expectations.
The papers should be seen as contributions to applied econometrics al-
though in some cases they do also add to the literature on the methodological
side. Foremost, the papers provide ample empirical evidence on various is-
sues related to survey data on macroeconomic forecasts from an international
point of view. They contribute to a literature that has been very much US-
centric in the past. Not only do all papers look at various countries, but
they also use – for the most part – disaggregate data on individual forecasts
that have not been used in the literature before. In addition, we go beyond
the existing literature with respect to the analysis of the determinants of
dispersion of forecasts. Besides, in some cases the papers innovate in the way
survey data are used in empirical analyses.
The work of this thesis is mainly connected to three streams of the eco-
nomic literature. First, the part of the thesis that analyzes the properties
of the survey data, which is used for the further analysis, connects to the
literature that deals with the evaluation of rationality of observed forecasts
(Chapter 2). Second, the part of the thesis, which tests empirically the va-
lidity of a certain type of model for the formation of inflation expectations
1I would like to thank Pia Pinger very much for valuable help in putting together
the final version of this thesis. In addition, I would like to thank all colleagues and the
audience of various presentations for their valuable comments that helped to improve the
papers collected in this thesis.
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and inflation dynamics, connects to the literature on inflation determination
in the New Keynesian Framework (Chapter 3). Finally, the part of the thesis
that analyzes the behavior of the dispersion of forecasts relates to the emerg-
ing literature that deals with higher moments of expectations and issues of
uncertainty (Chapter 4).
In the next two sections of this introduction, we briefly review important
issues of the first and second streams of the literature.2 We collect these
reviews in the first chapter of the thesis to avoid repetitive references in the
later sections.3
1.1 Survey-Data
The main purpose survey data have been used for is the assessment of the
performance of forecasters that provide publicly available forecasts. The
foci of papers on this evolve around the following issues: Are professional
forecasts efficient and unbiased? Are forecasts obtained by averaging a set of
independent forecasts superior to single forecasts? Are predictions obtained
from survey data sets better than those obtained from simple benchmark
models?
Regarding the first question, influential contributions assessing the ef-
ficiency of fixed horizon forecasts were made among others by Keane and
Runkle (1990); Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987), and Zarnowitz and Braun
(1993). Test on efficiency using fixed event forecasts usually follow the ap-
proach introduced by Nordhaus (1987). Modifications to this approach tak-
ing into account the special covariance structure of the panel survey data are
presented among others in Davies and Lahiri (1995); Harvey et al. (2001);
Loungani (2001), and Isiklar et al. (2006). The study presented in Section 2.3
falls into this category. The overall conclusion from existing studies is that
most forecasters are not rational in the strict sense. While in the majority
of cases the forecasts are found to be unbiased, they mostly do not seem to
be efficient, i.e. forecasters tend to not use all information that is available
when making their predictions.
Second, studies assessing consensus forecasts, i.e. pooled forecasts, usu-
ally find that they outperform single forecasts in terms of forecast precision.
Batchelor (2001) for example finds that the consensus forecast provided by
Consensus Economics outperforms the forecasts published by the Interna-
2The Volume of literature on dispersion of forecasts is still relatively small and we
relate our research to this literature in Chapter 4 below.
3Though we try to minimize those repetitions to a minimum, in some cases they cannot
be avoided completely to enable readers to understand the individual sections of this thesis.
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tional Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for most of the variables,
countries, and samples considered in their paper. A good overview of the rea-
sons and the theoretical background of the superiority of consensus forecasts
is given by Hendry and Clements (2004).
Finally, most studies show that forecasts published by professional fore-
casters are often outperformed by very simple or even naive forecasting meth-
ods - especially for longer forecasting horizons. A nice recent contribution on
this issue is the paper by Isiklar et al. (2006), in which the authors show that
even the forecast performance of the consensus forecast decreases rapidly in
most cases when the forecast horizon increases and is outperformed by naive
forecasts already for very moderate forecast horizons.
Another field of research in which survey data sets offer a valuable input to
take economic theory to the real world is the literature that it concerned with
questions about why forecasters disagree on the future at all. The studies
presented below in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 add to this stream of literature.
The most prominent potential explanations for the dispersion of forecasts
are the limited information processing capacity of agents (see e.g. Sims, 2003),
the behavioral approach (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, 2003),
or the sticky information approach (Mankiw and Reis, 2002). Branch (2004)
develops a model in which agents have to choose a predictor function from
a set of costly alternatives since they are assumed not to have the capacity
to grasp the true structure of the economy.4 Using a panel household survey
data set the author finds that the data support a model in which agents
use a specific predictor function and switch to another prediction method
only infrequently. The model is at odds, however, with the fact that agents
seem to have a ’genetic’ bias towards specific predictor functions that is not
justified by the functions’ performance. Ehrbeck and Waldmann (1996) use
a survey data set on interest rate predictions to falsify a theoretical model
of ’strategic forecast bias’ in which agents are assumed to have additional
factors affecting their loss function rather than simply aiming at minimizing
the expected squared forecast error. Lamont (2002) shows on basis of a survey
data set of forecasts on real GDP growth for the US that reputation issues
are a likely factor that makes forecasters tend to more extreme predictions,
which deviate from the respective rational forecast.
Finally, survey data have been used to estimate macroeconomic relation-
ships that are explicitly formulated in terms of expectations of future vari-
ables as for instance the forward looking and hybrid New Keynesian Phillips
4Other papers that derive theoretical models of why forecasters might rationally choose
to publish diverging forecasts include Brock and Hommes (1997); Laster et al. (1999);
Branch and Evans (2006).
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Curve (see e.g. Gali and Gertler, 1999) or models based on the sticky infor-
mation approach by Mankiw and Reis (2002). By using directly observable
expectations in the estimation of such models, it is possible to circumvent
difficulties (and to some degree arbitrariness) resulting from the application
of instrumental variables or GMM estimation techniques. Examples of this
literature include among others Carroll (2003) and Paloviita (2005). The
results of Sections 3.1 and 3.2 below add to this strand of literature.
1.2 Inflation Dynamics
The understanding of how inflation is determined is probably one of the
most crucial issues of macroeconomics and surely the most important issue
in monetary policy. The way how inflation dynamics evolve has major impli-
cations for the conduct of monetary policy as a stabilization instrument for
the macroeconomy.
The current modeling standard for analyzing monetary issues is the New
Keynesian Model (NKM) also known under the label New Neoclassical Syn-
thesis Model.5 Its main features are that i) prices are not entirely flexible
which causes nominal rigidities, ii) firms act in a monopolistically competi-
tive environment, and iii) agents’ behavior is usually forward looking (Gali,
2008). Especially the last feature brings about a prominent role for expec-
tations to play in the NKM. Most importantly, in the modeling of inflation
expectations about future inflation are usually the key factor.
In its most simple form, the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) can
be written as
pit = βEt(pit+1) + γy
∗ + ut , (1.1)
where pit denotes inflation, Et is the expectation operator, and y
∗ is a measure
of excess demand, usually proxied by an output gap or unemployment gap
measure. ut is a cost push shock that affects inflation in an idiosyncratic
fashion.
In the traditional Backward Looking Phillips Curve (BLPC) it was as-
sumed that inflation expectations were a function of past inflation. Conse-
quently, (1.1) could be written as
pit = βα(L)pit + γy
∗ + ut , (1.2)
where now α(L) is a lag polynomial. Following for instance Sims (1980)
or Calvo (1983) the concept of rational expectations gained importance in
5See Woodford (2003) for a comprehensive overview about this type of model.
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macroeconomics during the 1980s, and the BLPC was criticized for being not
consistent with optimizing (i.e. consumption or profit maximizing) behavior
of economic agents. Under the assumption of rational expectations, we can
write inflation expectations as
Et(pit+1) = pit+1 + et , (1.3)
where et denotes the one-step-ahead expectation error made at time t which is
independently distributed across time under that assumption. Consequently,
(1.1) can be written
pit = βpit+1 + γy
∗ + ut + βet . (1.4)
This equation for the inflation dynamic is consistent with a framework, in
which monopolistically competitive firms set their prices according to the
well known staggered mechanics a` la Calvo (1983), or alternatively with a
setup where the introduction of price adjustment costs leads firms to adjust
their prices only infrequently (Rotemberg, 1982).
Now, one of the key issues is how to model inflation dynamics in such a
way that the model generates a degree of inflation persistence that is com-
parable to the degree which is observed empirically. The problem with the
– from a theoretical point of view appealing – pure forward looking Phillips
Curve (FLPC) in (1.4) is that it fails exactly along this dimension.
To bring in line the dynamics implied by the NKM and the inflation
persistence observed in reality, various alternatives have been proposed in
the literature. The hybrid Phillips Curve (Gali and Gertler, 1999) has gained
a lot of attention in recent years in the theoretical and empirical work on
inflation dynamics. Its functional form can be written as
pit = δ
fpit+1 + δ
bpit−1 + γy∗ + ut + δfet , (1.5)
where δf and δb are the relative weights attached to the forward looking and
the backward looking component respectively. It is usually derived from the
ad-hoc assumption that there is a certain fraction of firms that use a rule
of thumb and set their future prices based on their most recent inflation
observations (Gali and Gertler, 1999).6
Recently, Mankiw and Reis (2002) have proposed a different concept to
model inertia in inflation dynamics. They abandon the idea of sticky prices
6There have been attempts recently to derive more persistence of nominal and real vari-
ables in the NKM in a more rigorous manner from optimizing behavior of economic agents
by adding additional market frictions – especially to the labor market models (see among
others Christoffel and Linzert, 2005; Walsh, 2005; Krause and Lubik, 2007; Lechthaler
et al., 2008).
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and introduce the notion of sticky information instead. In their model firms
are able to adjust prices continuously whereas they update their information
set only infrequently; this behavior can be explained by the existence of costs
for acquiring information (Reis, 2006a,b). Mankiw and Reis (2002) assume
that each period, only a fraction λ of firms gathers the up-to-date information
about the current state of the economy and re-computes and adjusts the
optimal path of future prices. The remaining (1 − λ) firms continue using
their previous plans and thus set prices based on outdated information. The
firm’s probability of information updating is exogenously determined and
independent of its price adjustment history. Under this assumption Mankiw
and Reis derive the following formulation of the SIPC:
pit =
λα
1− λy
∗
t + λ
∞∑
j=0
(1− λ)j Et−1−j
(
pit + α∆y
∗
t
)
+ εt, (1.6)
where the parameter α measures the sensitivity of the optimal relative price
to the current output gap and depends on the structure of the economy (e.g.
on preferences, technology, and the market structure parameters).7 Note
that in contrast to the FLPC where current expectations for future inflation
matter and to the BLPC where past inflation matters, in the SIPC what
matters for determination of inflation rates are past expectations of current
inflation.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis is structured in the following way. In Chapter 2, we present a
comprehensive analysis of the properties of the Consensus Economics survey
data set that is used in most parts of the thesis and that has been specifically
compiled for the studies presented in this thesis. Specifically, we present some
information about the survey’s background and some basic information about
the coverage of the data set in Section 2.1 and 2.2. In Section 2.3, we present
a formal analysis of the rationality properties of the forecasts included in the
data set.
In Chapter 3, we present two studies that use survey data to provide
empirical evidence in favor of the sticky information concept for describ-
ing inflation (expectation) dynamics. In Section 3.1, we show that a sticky
information model for the expectation formation process of households fits
7The parameter α can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of real rigidity, see
e.g. Ball and Romer (1990).
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European data well. In Section 3.2, we show that in a partial equilibrium
setup the SIPC fits observed inflation dynamics well.
In Chapter 4, we present different studies that contribute to the analysis
of dispersion of expectations. In Section 4.1, we compare different methods to
extract a measure of dispersion from fixed event forecasts. In Section 4.2, we
use the method that we find to perform best to extract dispersion measures
for forecasts in the G7 countries and use these to analyze the determinants
of dispersion. Chapter 5 summarizes the main findings of the thesis and
discusses possible extensions.
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Chapter 2
The Consensus Survey Data
Set
This section is devoted to the description of the data set, the Consensus
survey data set, that we use most during the empirical analysis presented in
this thesis. First, we present some very basic information about the data set
including some background about the way the data is collected. Second, we
elaborate on the size of our sample. Finally, in Section 2.3, we investigate the
rationality properties of the forecasts contained in the data set. We present
both tests for unbiasedness and tests for efficiency of individual and average
forecasts.
2.1 Background of the Survey
Most of empirical work presented in this thesis is based on survey data col-
lected from a data set provided by Consensus Economics1. Each month,
starting in October 1989, the London-based firm Consensus Economics polls
major economic organizations like important investment banks or research
institutes about their predictions for the most common macroeconomic vari-
ables.2 Since most of the panelists are located in the country they are fore-
casting upon, country-specific expertise is guaranteed. Initially conducting
the surveys only for the G7 countries, Consensus Economics meanwhile pro-
vides forecasts for more than 70 countries from over 700 panelists. Data sets
1We will describe what additional data we use in the respective subsections.
2Variables included in the survey are: Real growth of gross domestic product (GDP),
real growth of private consumption, real growth of industrial production, consumer price
inflation (CPI), short and long term interest rates, changes in the real effective exchange
rate, real growth of fixed investment, the unemployment rate, the current account balance,
and a few other macroeconomic variables.
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are available for the categories G7 and Western Europe, Asia Pacific, Eastern
Europe and Latin America.3
In line with the most widely communicated type of forecasts in the me-
dia, the participating institutions are asked to state their predictions for the
annual averages of specific variables for the current and the subsequent cal-
ender year rather than a forecast for the development over a fixed horizon of
time. There are also such fixed horizon forecasts available from Consensus
Economics,4 but the data summarized and analyzed here solely consist of
monthly observations on the first mentioned type of forecast, the so called
fixed event forecasts. A big advantage of the data set is, that estimates
are comparable across countries as well as panelists. This is ensured by the
survey procedure; Consensus Economics uses the same selection procedure
across countries and publishes its survey for all countries simultaneously in
the second week of each month.
Since the surveys by Consensus Economics have been conducted for a
relatively short period of time only, few scientific work has utilized its data.5
In addition, there has been not much work presented in the literature that
makes use of the full (disaggregated) information that is contained in the
Consensus data set - presumably since coding the full data set is quite a
cumbersome task.
2.2 Sample Issues
Our sample from the survey by Consensus Economics contains the forecasts
for the G7 countries starting in October 1989 and ending in October 2006.
This means we are able to work with a maximal time series dimension of 205
observations. During the sample period some breaks occurred with respect to
the definition of variables which the panelists had to report on. In the United
Kingdom inflation was traditionally measured by the growth rate of the retail
3In the studies presented in this thesis, we concentrate on data for the G7-countries
or even only those data for the four largest European countries.
4Once a quarter Consensus Economics procures forecasts for a fixed time horizon of
four quarters.
5Other prominent survey data sets on macroeconomic forecasts that are widely used
in macroeconomic research include the Survey of Professional Forecasters collected by
the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia (see http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/ for
more information) that is used in section 4.1 below, the corresponding Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters conducted by the ECB (see Bowles et al. (2007)), the Livingston
survey (see Curtin (1996) for details), the household survey of the European Com-
mission (more information at http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/indicators/
businessandconsumersurveys_en.htm), and the Michigan Survey of Consumer Expec-
tations and Behavior (see Curtin (1996) for details).
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price index (RPI). In May 1997 the relevant index changed to RPIX, which
is the RPI excluding mortgage interest payments. A second change for this
series is dated to January 2004 when the target changed to the CPI. Other
target changes where those from GNP to GDP. For the US this took place in
January 1992, for Japan in January 2000, and for Germany in January 1993.
The shift from West-German data to data for re-unified Germany took place
in June 1997.
As time passed, a number participating institutions suffered bankruptcy,
others were acquired, and some merged with other participating panelists.
Using synergy effects many newly formed companies closed one of their for-
mer research facilities. Other panelists joined the panel of forecasters later
in the sample period. Therefore, the number of participating institutions
varies across time. Some of the panelists are also listed under varying names
in the publications of Consensus Economics. We connected series that refer
to the same panelist. In addition, we tried to merge series of two panelists
whenever they are related because one of them came to existence due to
a merger or acquisition involving the other panelist. We have also checked
the individual expectations, which substantially differ from others and made
sure they correctly reflect the figures in the hard copy reports from Consen-
sus Economics.6 Besides, for each respondent some observations were linearly
interpolated when a single observations was missing and both adjacent obser-
vations were available and equal to each other. Typically, less than 10 percent
of observations were gained by this procedure. Eventually, this leaves us with
an average of 46 panelists per country. The highest numbers are counted for
the United Kingdom (57) and the USA (56) whereas fewest forecasters took
part in the survey for Canada (29). However, through the varying length of
individual time series, the overall numbers of panelists in each country do
not translate directly into the number of predictions observed in each month
which means that we are facing an average cross-section dimension that is
far smaller. It turns out that there are substantial differences between the
G7 countries. While the average size of the monthly cross-section is fairly
comparable between Germany (27.0), the UK (29.5) and the US (25.9) there
is a huge gap to that of Italy, Canada and France, where the sample contains
only an average of 13.6, 15.0 and 17.7 panelists respectively.
6For instance three observations for inflation forecasts for Japan in February and March
2002.
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2.3 Rationality of Forecasts7
If we use the Consensus survey data set for the estimation of various eco-
nomic models below, we should test whether the expectations expressed in
the forecasts of the data set fulfil basic properties that we can expect macroe-
conomic expectations to have. If the properties of this specific data set on the
contrary showed substantial deviation from what is usually found for other
data sets, that would question the general interpretability of our results (for
instance from Chapter 3 or Section 4.2). Therefore, we present an assessment
of the basic properties of the forecasts in this section. As a side effect, by
using this large amount of disaggregate data on individual macroeconomic
forecasts we are able to provide much broader evidence on the properties of
macroeconomic forecasts than has been available in the literature so far.
One weak point of the empirical literature on survey data is that there
is only a limited number of non-US data sets, which provide information on
forecasts. Consequentially, existing evidence is predominantly based on US
data. Notable exceptions are Harvey et al. (2001), who analyze a set of se-
lected individual forecasts for the UK from the Consensus data set, Gallo
et al. (2002), who analyze the evolution of macroeconomic forecasts for the
US, the UK, and Japan, Bowles et al. (2007), who analyze the performance
of forecasts summarized in the Survey of Professional Forecasters conducted
by the European Central Bank, Isiklar et al. (2006) or Ager et al. (2009), who
use data from the Consensus data set on forecasts for a set of industrialized
countries, Timmermann (2007), who analyzes the performance of IMF fore-
casts from the World Economic Outlook for various countries, and Batchelor
(2001), who compares the forecasts made by the IMF and the OECD to pri-
vate sector forecasts. However, all the existing international studies, with the
exception of Harvey et al. (2001), make exclusive use of consensus forecasts
rather than analyzing individual forecasts. This part of the thesis is written
to fill this gap by covering forecasts for all G7 countries.
Our results are based on an approach that is commonly used in the litera-
ture to model the structure of macroeconomic forecasts. This literature dates
back to early contributions by Ball (1962), Mincer and Zarnowitz (1969),
Figlewski and Wachtel (1981), or Nordhaus (1987), who introduced the basic
model framework for analyzing fixed event forecasts.8 Fixed event forecasts
refer to the case that a forecaster constructs a sequence of forecasts over time
7Large parts of this section of the thesis are based on a paper that I wrote jointly with
a co-author (Dovern and Weisser, 2008).
8Pesaran and Weale (2006) and Smant (2002) present nice summaries of the com-
monly used approaches. The latter contribution also provides an overview about the most
prominent survey data sets that are used in empirical research on forecast efficiency.
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for the same event (such as an annual figure for a macroeconomic variable).
The data we are using below is of this type. A couple of more recent contri-
butions have made proposals to improve the econometric approach for testing
rationality of such large panels of fixed event forecasts. These include Keane
and Runkle (1990) and Batchelor and Dua (1990), who introduce the analy-
sis in a panel framework using the Generalized Methods of Moments (GMM)
method, or Davies and Lahiri (1995), who develop the analytic framework
for analyzing three dimensional panels of survey data which makes the use of
information along all dimensions possible. To make our results comparable
to existing studies, we follow the approach suggested by Davies and Lahiri
(1995) and recently used by Clemens et al. (2007) and Ager et al. (2009) very
closely and suggest only minor modifications.
Using this model framework we test whether the forecasts provided by
the panelists of the survey are unbiased and efficient. Assuming that fore-
cast accuracy is the only objective of a forecaster and that her loss function
is symmetric and increasing in the forecast error, these two properties are
necessarily a feature of a rational forecast. Since the work by Pigou (1927)
or Keynes (1936), it is widely accepted that expectations and forecasts play
a crucial role in all kinds of economic dynamics. Muth (1961) introduced
the notion of rational expectation, which has since played a central role in
economic thinking. So, although in a strict sense the concept of rational
expectations does always refer to model-consistent expectations in economic
theory, we believe that it is important for econometricians to analyze ob-
served forecasts to check whether they show at least the basic features of
“rational” expectations.
It should be noted, however, at this point that there are also arguments
against the assumption that published forecasts reflect true expectations and
should, thus, be rational if made by rational agents. Some of the cases
against this assumption are the following. First, forecasters might seek to
maximize public attention. If this is the case, an unbiased forecast is not
optimal anymore, since the utility of the forecaster depends on more than
one argument (Laster et al., 1999). Second, forecasters might produce so-
called “intentional” forecast in some situations (Stege, 1989). A forecaster
could, for example, predict a specific event to provoke a policy action that
actually prevents the realization of the event. Third, Forecasters might have
asymmetric loss functions (Capistran and Timmermann, 2006). They could,
for example, have different weights concerning a possible over- or underesti-
mation of an outcome. We believe, however, that these arguments are not
particularly strong a priori. We, therefore, abstract from them and start this
analysis from the hypothesis of rational forecasts, which are unaffected by
these issues.
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Figure 2.1: Structure of Survey Data
 
Notes: The figure shows a schematic representation of the timing of a sequence of forecasts
made by one forecaster for two consecutive years.
2.3.1 Model
The Consensus data set is a panel data set and contains so-called fixed
event forecasts. Since due to this structure it exhibits a special correlation
structure, it is important to give a clear picture of the nature of the data
before moving to the description of the tests that we are going to use.
The panel possesses a three dimensional structure of the kind introduced
in Davies and Lahiri (1995). For each country and variable we have a NTH-
vector of forecasts for T years made by N forecasters with forecast horizons
ranging from one month to H months
F = [f1,1,H , f1,1,H−1, . . . , f1,1,1, f1,2,H , . . . , f1,T,1, f2,1,H , . . . , fN,T,1]
′ . (2.1)
In other words, for each year we collect a sequence of H forecasts from each
forecaster, starting H months before the year ends and ending in the last
month of the respective year. Figure 2.1 shows a schematic diagram of the
data structure. This structure will be of importance later on when we derive
the correlation between different forecast errors.
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Following Davies and Lahiri (1995), we assume that the forecast error for
each forecast can be decomposed into three different parts9
ei,t,h ≡ At − fi,t,h = φi + λt,h + ²i,t,h , (2.2)
where At denotes the realization of a variable for year t. The first error term
φi is the individual bias of the forecasts made by forecaster i. The second
error term λt,h is common to all forecasters and reflects the occurrence of
macroeconomic shocks that hit an economy between the date at which the
forecasts are made and the end of year t. Following the literature, we assume
that these shocks are cumulated over the h months in an arithmetic way, so
that the error term can be written λt,h =
∑h
k=1 ut,k. We assume that ut,h is
distributed with a zero mean and a variance of σ2u. Since ut,h and ut+1,h+12
occur at the same point in time, they will be correlated (Davies and Lahiri,
1995).
Modeling of Individual Errors10
The third error term ²i,t,h refers to the forecaster specific error component of
the forecast error. The literature proposes two alternative ways to model this
error. On the one hand, it can be seen as an independently and identically
distributed (iid) shock. This is the view taken for the estimation in Davies
and Lahiri (1995). On the other hand, Davies and Lahiri mention that one
could assume that over time each forecaster receives a flow of private informa-
tion on the outcome. Under this assumption, one can model the individual
error as ²i,t,h =
∑h
k=1 ηi,t,k, where the ηi,t,k are distributed with mean 0 and
variance σ2i . Again, ηi,t,k and ηi,t+1,k+12 have a non-zero correlation, since
these information shocks occur at the same point in time.
It is clear that the two model variants for ²i,t,h have very different impli-
cations. In the first case, the individual errors are assumed to be a white
noise process, while in the second case they are assumed to follow a random
walk for each target year t. In the first case, there would be no correlation
between consecutive individual errors, while in the second case the autocor-
relation would be very high and decaying only slowly for higher distances
between two forecast errors for the same target year. Intuitively, the second
model is much more appealing: Consider a forecaster whose forecast is above
the consensus forecast in one month. Isn’t it very likely that he is going to
publish an above-average forecast also in the following month? That is, it is
9To enhance readability of the formulas we suppress an index referring to a specific
variable throughout the following sections.
10This subsection is based on a note that I wrote (Dovern, 2009a).
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very strange to believe that individual forecasts fluctuate randomly around
the consensus forecast without any persistence. Rather a forecaster is likely
to be persistently more optimistic or pessimistic than the average for some
time. This behavior would be better captured by the second model that
implies a high autocorrelation of the individual errors.
Eventually, choosing from the two alternatives is a matter of empirical
facts. In our data set, the estimates of the individual errors, say ²ˆi,t,h, show a
fairly high degree of autocorrelation. The empirical autocorrelation functions
are usually declining slowly and approach zero only after twelve month or so.
We have formally, investigated this issue using the GDP forecasts for the G7
countries. We propose to assess which model is more in line with the em-
pirical evidence by looking at the empirical autocorrelation function (ACF)
of ²ˆ(i, t, h) and by testing implications of the two models. Under the first
option the autocorrelation should be 0 for all lags. Under the second option
the series of ²ˆ(i, t, h) for each target year is a unit root process (effectively
a random walk) and the autocorrelation function declines only slowly as the
lag increases.
Figure 2.2 shows the estimated average ACFs for all countries together
with a confidence band of +/− two standard deviations (computed across all
forecasters for each country). It is evident for all cases that the idiosyncratic
errors are highly persistent. This persistence is highest in Canada and low-
est in Germany and Italy. Though this visual inspection suggests that the
modeling of the idiosyncratic errors as accumulation of iid shocks is more
appropriate than the alternative, it is better to also look at additional formal
tests.
Table 2.1 shows the summary of results for ADF tests for unit roots in the
data and the test for zero autocorrelation. Row 1 contains for each country
the average estimated first order autocorrelation and its standard deviation;
the values are quite high - ranging from 0.71 for Italy to 0.79 for Canada.
In all of the individual cases we can reject the hypothesis that the series
have zero autocorrelation which would be implied by the iid option. Row
3 contains for each country the average test statistic of the ADF tests and
its standard deviation; the values range from -5.11 for UK to -6.40 for Italy.
In all of the individual cases we can reject the hypothesis of a unit root
based on a critical value of -2.87 on a 5% confidence level. Thus, none of the
two models, which are proposed in the literature to model the idiosyncratic
part of the forecast error of fixed event forecasts, are truly consistent with
the data. Still, we can make use of Bayesian information criteria to judge
which of the two models is preferred by the data. Row 5 shows the average
across forecasters of the Bayes Factor obtained for the random walk model
against the white noise model under flat priors, i.e. the prior belief that both
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Figure 2.2: Autocorrelation Functions of Idiosyncratic Forecast Errors for GDP
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Notes: The line in the middle is the average estimated autocorrelation function across
forecasters. The two outer lines are upper and lower confidence bands calculated by using
two times the standard deviation of the autocorrelations across all forecasters.
models are equally likely a priori. The values are all above 1 indicating that
among the two alternatives one would, on average, clearly favor the random
walk model against the white noise model to describe the idiosyncratic errors.
Effectively, there is not one single case for which the white noise model would
be preferred.
So, while we have to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in the individ-
ual errors for virtually all cases, we usually prefer the second model against
the first model based on Bayesian information criteria.11 Against this back-
ground, we think there are good reasons to modify the model used by Davies
and Lahiri (1995). Hence, we will model the individual error components ac-
cording to the assumption that forecasters receive private information which
are accumulated over time.
11We expect results for other variables to follow the results for the GDP forecasts closely.
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Table 2.1: Tests of Alternative Models for Idiosyncratic Forecast Errors for GDP
Germany Canada France Italy Japan UK US
Avg. Autocorrelation 0.73 0.79 0.75 0.71 0.75 0.78 0.73
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.1) (0.06) (0.08) (0.1)
Avg. ADF-Statistic -5.96 -5.3 -5.84 -6.4 -5.55 -5.11 -5.67
(1.58) (1.1) (1.43) (2.07) (1.31) (1.41) (1.29)
BayesFactorRW 1.42 1.65 1.43 1.36 1.45 1.61 1.38
(0.22) (0.2) (0.24) (0.19) (0.19) (0.44) (0.27)
# Forecasters 29 14 17 11 13 30 22
Notes: Numbers are calculated across all forecasters for each country. Numbers in paren-
thesis denote the corresponding standard deviations across forecasters. The correspond-
ing critical value for the individual ADF tests on a 5% confidence level is -2.87.
Test of Unbiasedness
Testing the unbiasedness of forecaster i is equivalent to testing whether φi = 0
in (2.2). We can examine this hypothesis by testing the zero restriction on
the elements of Φ = [φ1, . . . , φN ]
′ in
e = A− F = Φ⊗ iTH + λ+ ²︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ν
, (2.3)
where e is the vector of stacked forecast errors, A is given by iN ⊗ (A+ ⊗ iH)
with A+ = (A1, A2, . . . , AT )
′ and iTH , iN and iH are vectors of ones of di-
mension TH, N and H respectively.12 λ and ² are vectors of length NTH in
which we stack the appropriate λt,h and ²i,t,h respectively.
Now, while a simple OLS regression gives consistent point estimates for
the bias, we cannot base our inference on the OLS standard errors, since the
elements of ν are clearly not iid due to the special correlation structure caused
by the structure of the panel data set. Davies and Lahiri (1995) show that it
is neither diagonal nor homoscedastic. Recalling that due to our assumption
about the individual errors our specification differs from their model, we
formally have the following elements of Σ = E[νν ′] for two forecasters, say i
and j:
Cov (νi,t1,h1 , νj,t2,h2) = Cov
(
h1∑
k=1
ut1,k +
h1∑
k=1
ηi,t1,k,
h2∑
k=1
ut2,k +
h2∑
k=1
ηj,t2,k
)
(2.4)
Cov(νi,t1,h1 , νj,t2,h2) =

min{h1, h2}
[
σ2u + σ
2
i
]
if i = j, t1 = t2, h1 = h2
min{h1, h2 − 12}
[
σ2u + σ
2
i
]
if i = j, t1 = t2 − 1, h2 ≥ 12
min{h1, h2} σ2u if i 6= j, t1 = t2, h1 = h2
min{h1, h2 − 12} σ2u if i 6= j, t1 = t2 − 1, h2 ≥ 12
0 else
12The operator ⊗ denotes the Kronecker Product.
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Clearly, the different non-zero cases deserve some more explanation. The
forecast errors ν are correlated across several dimensions. First, they are
correlated within the maximum forecast horizon H since λt,h and ²i,t,h are
the accumulation of period-specific shocks; this refers to the first case shown
in (2.4). Second, the forecast errors are correlated between subsequent years
since the forecast horizons are of overlapping nature; this refers to the second
case shown in (2.4). Finally, the forecast errors are correlated across different
forecasters, since forecast errors are produced at the same time and are all
subject to the same subsequent aggregate shocks summarized by λt,h; this
refers to the third and fourth case shown in (2.4).
Given Σ, the covariance matrix of the Generalized Methods of Moments
(GMM) estimator is given by
V ar(Φˆ) = [(IN ⊗ iTH)′(IN ⊗ iTH)]−1 [(IN ⊗ iTH)′Σ(IN ⊗ iTH)] [(IN ⊗ iTH)′(IN ⊗ iTH)]−1
(2.5)
and can be used to derive valid t-statistics for testing φi = 0. Naturally, Σ is
not observed and has to be replaced by a consistent estimate, say Σˆ, before
computation of the test statistics is possible.
Though Σ has a complicated pattern, it depends only onN+1 parameters,
namely σ21, . . . , σ
2
N and σ
2
u. Davies and Lahiri (1995) propose to obtain a
consistent estimate by first estimating these N + 1 parameters and then
replacing the parameters in Σ by the corresponding estimates. We will follow
this approach. Note that an estimator of φi is simply given by the average
forecast error of forecaster i and that we can estimate the two other parts of
the forecasts errors by
λˆt,h =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(
At − fi,t,h − φˆi
)
(2.6)
and
²ˆi,t,h = At − fi,t,h − φˆi − λˆt,h . (2.7)
We can obtain estimates for the unknown parameters as the estimated
coefficients from the following regressions:
λˆ¯ λˆ = σ2u κH + ωλ (2.8)
²ˆ¯ ²ˆ = (IN ⊗ κH)σ2 + ω² , (2.9)
where κH = iT ⊗ [H,H − 1, . . . , 1]′ and σ2 = [σ21, . . . , σ2N ]′. Clemens et al.
(2007) and Ager et al. (2009) show how the problem simplifies when N = 1.
Essentially, all terms that refer to the individual component of the forecasting
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errors vanish if one assumes that there simply is no “private” shocks in this
setup with one agent only (Ager et al., 2009) or if one models these “private”
shocks like we do – so that they become observationally indistinguishable
from the aggregate shocks (Clemens et al., 2007).13
Test of (Weak) Efficiency
For testing the efficiency of the forecasts, we use the concept of weak-form ef-
ficiency that has been originally proposed by Nordhaus (1987). The concept
starts from the notion of strong efficiency of forecasts which requires that
all information, which has been revealed at the time a forecast is made, is
taken into account during the forecasting process. In other words: If a series
of forecasts is strongly efficient, it would have not been possible to improve
the forecast performance by using any information available also to the fore-
caster. Since the amount of potentially relevant information is immense and
any selection for an empirical analysis would be ad-hoc,14 Nordhaus (1987)
proposes to restrict the relevant information set to lagged values of the fore-
casts themselves. He shows that under weak form efficiency the revisions
of forecasts should be uncorrelated under certain assumptions. It should be
intuitively clear that for efficient forecasts the current forecast should not
reveal any information on future revisions – or as Nordhaus states (p. 673):
If I could look at your most recent forecasts and accurately say,
“Your next forecast will be 2% lower than today’s”, then you can
surely improve your forecasts.
Against this background, weak-form efficiency of a sequence of forecasts
can be formally tested using an equation of the form
ri,t,h = βi ri,t,h+k + ξi,t,h , (2.10)
where ri,t,h is defined as fi,t,h−fi,t,h+1, k ≥ 1, and ξi,t,h is the error term. The
hypothesis of weak-form efficiency implies βi = 0; a consistent estimate of βi
can be obtained by the OLS estimator treating ξi,t,h as white noise. But again
– due to the special structure of the fixed event forecasts – the covariance
13Ager et al. (2009) analyze consensus forecasts with this N = 1 setup by noting that
the individual errors should cancel out in the aggregate. This is true, however, only when
the consensus forecast is based on a large sample of panelists. For small panels, one gets
components of the covariance matrix of the aggregate error that reflect the aggregated
variance of the individual errors. Hence, when the consensus forecast is based on a small
number of panelists, treating the former as an N = 1 case does bias the estimated variances
and covariances downward leading to too many rejections of unbiasedness (or efficiency).
14Not to mention the problem of constructing large data sets with real-time vintages.
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matrix of ξ =
[
ξ1,1,H−(k+1), . . . , ξN,T,1
]′
, say Ξ = E[ξξ′], is non-diagonal and
heteroscedastic.
To derive the exact form of Ξ, we first note that, using (2.2), we can
re-write the forecast revisions as
ri,t,h = fi,t,h − fi,t,h+1 = λt,h+1 − λt,h + ²i,t,h+1 − ²i,t,h = ut,h+1 + ηi,t,h+1 .
(2.11)
Now, it is evident that under the Null hypothesis βi = 0 we obtain the
following expressions for the elements of Ξ:15
Cov (ξi,t1,h1 , ξj,t2,h2) = Cov (ut1,h1+1 + ηi,t1,h1+1, ut2,h2+1 + ηj,t2,h2+1) (2.12)
Cov (ξi,t1,h1 , ξj,t2,h2) =

σ2u + σ2i if i = j, t1 = t2, h1 = h2
σ2u + σ
2
i if i = j, t1 = t2 − 1, h1 = h2 − 12
σ2u if i 6= j, t1 = t2, h1 = h2
σ2u if i 6= j, t1 = t2 − 1, h1 = h2 − 12
0 else
(2.13)
Given Ξ, the covariance matrix for the GMM estimator of β can be written
as
V ar(βˆ) =
(
r′+kr+k
)−1
r′+k Ξ r+k
(
r′+kr+k
)−1
, (2.14)
where r+k =
[
r1,1,H−1, . . . , r1,1,(k+1), r1,2,H−1, . . . , rN,T,(k+1)
]′
and β = [β1, . . . , βN ]
′.
V ar(βˆ) can be used to derive valid t-statistics for testing βi = 0. Naturally,
Ξ is not observed and has to be replaced by a consistent estimate, say Ξˆ,
before computation of the test statistics is possible.
To obtain Ξˆ we can use the same method that we used to derive Σˆ. First,
we derive estimates for the single elements of Ξ and replace these elements
in a second step by their estimates to consistently estimate Ξ. Note that the
structure of Ξ is much more simple than that of Σ so that its elements are
simply given by
σˆ2u =
1
T (H − (k + 1))
T∑
t=1
H−(k+1)∑
h=1
(uˆ2t,h+1) (2.15)
and
γˆ2i =
1
T (H − (k + 1))
T∑
t=1
H−(k+1)∑
h=1
(
ηˆ2i,t,h+1
)
, (2.16)
15Note that at this point the assumption of private information for ²i,t,h is crucial
for the result that under weak-form efficiency βi = Cov(ri,t,h, ri,t,h+1) = Cov(ut,h+1 +
ηi,t,h+1, ut,h+2 + ηi,t,h+2) = 0. Under the assumption that the ²i,t,h represent ordinary iid
shocks we would get βi = Cov(ut,h+1+²i,t,h+1−²i,t,h, ut,h+2+²i,t,h+2−²i,t,h+1) = −σ2i 6= 0.
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where uˆt,h and ηˆi,t,h are consistently estimated by
uˆt,h =
1
N
N∑
i=1
ri,t,h−1 (2.17)
and
ηˆi,t,h = ri,t,h−1 − uˆt,h . (2.18)
Given this formal framework, we will now move to the empirical analysis of
the macroeconomic forecasts in the G7 countries.
2.3.2 Results
Individual Forecasts
In this section we present all results concerning the properties of the individ-
ual forecasts. For both – the tests of unbiasedness as well as the tests of weak
efficiency – we include those panelists in the sample who made a forecast at
more than 50% of the possible dates. Thereby, we avoid the influence of
small sample problems which could arise from those panelists that reported
only a few forecasts.16
An additional feature of the data that we have to deal with is given by
the fact that the record of most of the forecasters includes a bunch of missing
values, i.e. the panel is heavily unbalanced. There are two reasons for that.
First, the set of panelists who take part in the Consensus survey changes
continuously. Hence, there are some forecasters that enter the panel at a
later stage, while other forecasters leave the panel after the first part of the
time period covered by our data set. Second, some forecasters do not submit
there forecast on a regular basis, i.e. some of them do not provide their
current forecasts for some of the months. To minimize the reduction of our
data base due to the second issue, we interpolate a missing value in all those
cases, in which a forecast is missing only for one month in a row and the two
adjacent forecasts are equal to each other. Formally, if fi,t,h is missing and
fi,t,h+1 = fi,t,h−1, we set the missing forecast equal to fi,t,h+1.
For the estimation, we follow Davies and Lahiri (1995) and deal with
missing values by simply deleting the appropriate elements in the vectors of
forecast errors or revisions and the corresponding rows and columns in the
covariance matrices respectively. Those compressed matrices can be directly
used in the GMM estimation procedure (Blundell et al., 1992).
16The threshold of 50% is of course arbitrary. Results for the included panelists are,
however, robust to the inclusion of more forecasters in the used sample.
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Unbiasedness
The analysis of the biases present in the individual forecasts reveal some
interesting differences across countries as well as variables. The results are
summarized in Table 2.2.17 In general, most of the individual forecasts are
unbiased. The overall performance is best for the inflation forecasts; only for
France, the UK and the US there are one or two forecasters respectively who
produce biased inflation forecasts. Especially surprising is the good perfor-
mance of inflation forecasts for Italy that underwent a significant transition
from a high inflation regime towards a low inflation regime during the early
sample period. One could imagine that forecasters adjusted only slowly to
this new environment causing forecasts to be biased upwards.
This behavior is actually what can be observed for the inflation forecasts
in the UK, where inflation was also very high at the beginning of our sample
period and declined considerably to low levels in the mid of the 1990s. All
but three panelist, which entered the sample rather late, have overestimated
inflation on average. After all, only 2 out of 30 did so significantly on a 95%
confidence level.
A similar argument applies to the bias that is found for most of the fore-
casts for GDP growth in the European countries. Here, the wide majority of
forecasters overestimate growth on average. This phenomenon is most pro-
nounced in Germany and Italy but applies to a lesser extend also to France.
The same is also true for the forecast for growth of private consumption in
Germany. Batchelor (2007) shows that this kind of bias can be inevitable
in an environment of declining trend growth rates since forecasters have to
gradually learn about the new trend.
A very special picture is given by the combination of forecasts for GDP
growth and for growth of industrial production in the UK. While forecasts
for the former are generally unbiased, the results show strong evidence for
rejecting the hypothesis of unbiased forecasts for the latter forecasts; most
panelist on average overestimate growth of industrial production by about 1
to 1.5 percentage points. This might reflect the fact that although the trend
growth of overall output remained relatively constant over the sample, there
has been a shift of the structural composition of the economy in the UK from
production oriented sectors towards services – especially towards the financial
sector – which had to be learned by the forecasters. A similar phenomenon
can be observed when comparing forecasts on GDP growth for the US, which
are generally unbiased, to forecasts for growth of private consumption in the
US, which tend to underestimate consumption growth. Again it seems that
it has been hard for a large number of panelists to anticipate the gradual
17Detailed results on basis of individual panelists are available on request.
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decline in the saving rate of private households as well as to proper estimate
additional consumption effects of huge increases in household wealth that
was caused by the stock market boom of the late 1990s and the real estate
booms during the time from 2002 until the end of our sample.
In general, we can conclude that biased forecasts seem to be produced in
times of structural changes or gradual developments that have to be learned
by the forecasters; this source for bias in macroeconomic forecasts is also sup-
ported by the results in Andolfatto et al. (2008) who analyze the properties
of artificial forecast generated within a standard dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model. On the contrary, forecasts seem to be unbiased in general
for stable economies without large structural shocks. One example is Canada
where the structure of the economy and the medium term growth trend have
not fundamentally changed since the introduction of inflation targeting in
1991. As a consequence, there is not one single case among all forecasts for
the Canadian economy in which the panelist produced biased forecasts.
Weak Efficiency
For testing weak efficiency of individual forecasts we followed the literature
(Clemens, 1995; Harvey et al., 2001; Isiklar et al., 2006) by setting k in (2.10)
equal to 1. This makes indeed sense, since by the time a new revision is made
each forecaster knows about his most recent previous forecast revision. The
results are summarized in Table 2.3.18
The analysis of the individual forecasts’ properties in terms of weak ef-
ficiency reveals an interesting contrast between the forecasts made for GDP
growth and those for the other variables under investigation. For the major-
ity of forecasts for growth of industrial production and private consumption
as well as for the inflation rate we cannot reject the hypothesis of weakly
efficient forecasts; only few series of forecast show a significant correlation
between proceeding forecast revisions. In those cases, the estimated coeffi-
cient is mostly negative which means that the corresponding forecasters tend
to overreact to incoming news, i.e. they initially revise their forecasts by
an amount that is too large and undo part of this revision during the next
forecasting round.
In contrast, we find more evidence for deviations from weak efficiency for
forecasts of GDP growth in all counties but Italy and Japan.19 The main dif-
18Again, detailed results for all individual panelists are available on request.
19The fact that we find weakly efficient forecasts for GDP growth for Japan is in contrast
to the results of Ashiya (2003), who analyzes the reaction to news of forecasters for GDP
growth in a slightly different modeling framework and based on a different set of private
sector forecasts; he concludes that the individual forecasters tend to significantly overreact
to new information.
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Table 2.2: Bias of Individual Forecasts
Gross Domestic Product
# obs # bias # bias pos # bias neg mean(bias) var(bias) cons biased?
Germany 29 7 0 7 -0.49 0.021 no
Canada 14 0 0 0 -0.27 0.020 no
France 17 4 0 4 -0.40 0.016 no
Italy 11 10 0 10 -0.61 0.002 yes (-)
Japan 13 0 0 0 -0.22 0.042 no
UK 30 0 0 0 -0.25 0.025 no
USA 22 0 0 0 0.23 0.023 no
Inflation
# obs # bias # bias pos # bias neg mean(bias) var(bias) cons biased?
Germany 30 0 0 0 -0.06 0.011 no
Canada 14 0 0 0 0.25 0.028 no
France 17 2 0 2 -0.14 0.021 no
Italy 11 0 0 0 0.20 0.010 no
Japan 13 0 0 0 -0.13 0.011 no
UK 30 2 0 2 -0.20 0.025 no
USA 22 1 0 1 -0.14 0.027 no
Industrial Production
# obs # bias # bias pos # bias neg mean(bias) var(bias) cons biased?
Germany 28 0 0 0 -1.00 0.078 no
Canada 4 0 0 0 -0.93 0.120 no
France 8 2 0 2 -0.98 0.093 yes (-)
Italy 8 4 0 4 -1.53 0.048 no
Japan 13 0 0 0 -1.26 0.089 no
UK 28 22 0 22 -1.40 0.056 yes (-)
USA 21 0 0 0 -0.46 0.077 no
Private Consumption
# obs # bias # bias pos # bias neg mean(bias) var(bias) cons biased?
Germany 29 18 0 18 -0.52 0.039 yes (-)
Canada 14 0 0 0 0.03 0.051 no
France 17 0 0 0 -0.18 0.008 no
Italy 11 0 0 0 -0.40 0.005 no
Japan 13 0 0 0 -0.31 0.012 no
UK 29 0 0 0 0.15 0.033 no
USA 22 10 10 0 0.51 0.019 no
Notes: #obs indicates the number of individual panelists, #bias the number of them which pro-
vides significantly biased forecasts and #bias pos/neg the direction of the biases. Mean(bias)
and V ar(bias) indicate the mean and the variance of the individual biases and cons biased?
provides comparison to the corresponding consensus forecast.
ference, however, is that the estimated coefficients are positive in all but one
of the significant cases. Thus, those forecasts for GDP growth, which deviate
from weak efficiency, show a strong tendency towards forecast smoothing in
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general. This means that forecasters tend to process new information only
slowly which results in positively autocorrelated revisions.20 Also Gallo et al.
(2002) find that forecasters tend to stick to their past forecast even when the
authors control in their study for the most recently observed average forecast
and the dispersion of forecasts. Batchelor and Dua (1992) rationalize such
a forecasting behavior by noting that in reality forecasters might not have a
single objective which is minimizing the expected squared errors. They are
likely to take into account as well that their clients might “mistrust forecast-
ers who make frequent [erratic] revisions to forecasts” (p. 179). The fact that
usually the forecast for GDP growth is the part of a comprehensive macroe-
conomic forecast published by a forecaster, which is most widely anticipated
and discussed by clients or the media, might bring about that it is exactly
this forecast, for which incentive and reputation considerations make fore-
casters deviate most from their true expectations. This would explain why
we find the strong tendency for forecast smoothing only for forecasts on GDP
growth.
Consensus Forecast
In this section, we present the results concerning the properties of the average
forecast, the so-called consensus forecast.21 Average forecasts have been fre-
quently used in empirical research although results based on them should be
treated with caution because of inconsistency problems due to the aggrega-
tion bias (Bonham and Cohen, 2001) caused for instance by not-accounting
for private information (Figlewski and Wachtel, 1981) or the fact that the
aggregation might cancel out deviations from unbiasedness of individual fore-
casters (Keane and Runkle, 1990). We, therefore, present the results based
on average forecasts to compare their properties to those of the individual
forecasts.
Unbiasedness
We can simply use the framework presented in the last section with N = 1 to
analyze the bias of the consensus forecasts. In order to be able to compare the
results for consensus and private forecasts, we start by discussing the results
under the assumption of a homogenous bias across horizons. They are given
in Table 2.4. The estimation outcomes show that for all countries we cannot
20This phenomenon is also known as conservatism in psychology (Phillips and Edwards,
1966; Edwards, 1968).
21Note that all panelists are included in the computation of the average forecast. Hence,
unlike in the analysis of individual forecasts we do not exclude those panelists who reported
less than 50% of all possible forecasts over the entire sample.
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Table 2.3: Efficiency of Individual Forecasts
Gross Domestic Product
# obs # ineff # ineff pos # ineff neg mean(beta) var(beta) cons eff?
Germany 24 9 9 0 0.10 0.007 no (+)
Canada 12 5 5 0 0.13 0.011 no (+)
France 15 9 9 0 0.15 0.014 no (+)
Italy 10 2 2 0 0.05 0.010 no (+)
Japan 10 0 0 0 0.02 0.003 no (+)
UK 26 7 6 1 0.07 0.012 no (+)
USA 21 8 8 0 0.10 0.009 no (+)
Inflation
# obs # ineff # ineff pos # ineff neg mean(beta) var(beta) cons eff?
Germany 26 4 0 4 -0.03 0.009 no (+)
Canada 13 1 0 1 -0.03 0.008 no (+)
France 15 2 1 1 -0.01 0.008 no (+)
Italy 10 1 0 1 -0.01 0.004 yes
Japan 11 1 0 1 -0.07 0.004 no (+)
UK 25 7 0 7 -0.08 0.023 yes
USA 20 4 1 3 -0.05 0.013 no (+)
Industrial Production
# obs # ineff # ineff pos # ineff neg mean(beta) var(beta) cons eff?
Germany 23 6 3 3 -0.03 0.019 no (+)
Canada 2 0 0 0 0.02 0.014 yes
France 7 2 1 1 0.01 0.014 no (+)
Italy 7 3 1 2 -0.01 0.020 no (+)
Japan 10 0 0 0 0.02 0.003 no (+)
UK 24 4 2 2 0.02 0.011 no (+)
USA 20 4 1 3 -0.02 0.013 no (+)
Private Consumption
# obs # ineff # ineff pos # ineff neg mean(beta) var(beta) cons eff?
Germany 27 9 0 9 -0.10 0.009 no (+)
Canada 12 1 0 1 -0.02 0.006 no (+)
France 15 3 2 1 0.02 0.007 no (+)
Italy 10 1 0 1 -0.03 0.006 no (+)
Japan 10 0 0 0 -0.03 0.002 no (+)
UK 24 3 1 2 -0.01 0.010 no (+)
USA 20 2 1 1 0.02 0.007 no (+)
Note: #obs indicates the number of individual panelists, # ineff the number of them which
provides significantly weakly inefficient forecasts and # ineff pos/neg the sign of the estimated
coefficient. Mean(beta) and V ar(beta) indicate the mean and the variance of the estimated
individual coefficients and cons eff ? provides comparison to the corresponding consensus fore-
cast.
reject the hypothesis that the consensus forecasts for inflation are unbiased.
For all other variables the picture is mixed. First, the average forecasts for
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growth of private consumption are biased upwards in Germany while they
are significantly, but only weakly, too pessimistic in the US. For the other
five countries the corresponding forecasts are unbiased. Second, consensus
forecasts for GDP growth are unbiased in all countries but Germany, France
and Italy where they tend to be too optimistic on average. And finally,
the average forecasts for growth of industrial production are biased upwards
in France, Italy, and the UK while being unbiased for the remaining four
countries. These figures broadly reflect the picture given by the individual
forecasts, i.e. in cases where a sizable fraction of individual forecasts was
found to be biased also the consensus forecast is bases.
Table 2.4: Bias of Consensus Forecasts
Germany Canada France Italy Japan UK USA
GDP phi -0.52* -0.28 -0.44* -0.63*** -0.28 -0.24 0.18
t-stat -1.79 -0.90 -1.66 -2.64 -0.67 -0.83 0.62
Inflation phi -0.03 0.23 -0.15 0.18 -0.13 -0.20 -0.13
t-stat -0.19 0.54 -1.09 0.61 -0.99 -1.31 -0.88
Ind. Prod. phi -1.00 -0.91 -1.06** -1.56** -1.35 -1.43** -0.48
t-stat -1.56 -1.52 -1.96 -2.25 -1.28 -2.85 -0.83
Priv. Cons. phi -0.56** 0.04 -0.19 -0.44 -0.36 0.18 0.48*
t-stat -2.24 0.14 -1.07 -1.50 -1.27 0.60 1.87
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denotes rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level,
respectively.
So far we have assumed that bias does not vary with respect to the forecast
horizon. Since it is a reasonable hypothesis that this might be wrong, we
relax the restriction of a constant bias for the average forecasts.22 To do this
robustness analysis, we write the aggregated forecast errors as
et,h = At − ft,h = φh +
h∑
k=1
u∗t,k ,
where now φh is a horizon-specific bias and u
∗
t,k = ut,k + ηt,k. A consistent
estimator for φh is given by φh = 1/T
∑T
t=1 et,h. Note that under the joint
hypothesis that the forecasts are unbiased for all forecast horizons (H0 : φH =
· · · = φ1 = 0), the structure for the covariance matrix of the residuals is equal
to the one in the model with biases across forecast horizons restricted to be
equal to each other.
22Note that we cannot do the same in the analysis of individual forecasts since for the
wide majority of panelists the data sets includes so many missing values that the estimate
for each horizon-specific bias would be based on 10 or even less observations.
PhD-Thesis written by: Jonas Dovern
2.3 Rationality of Forecasts 29
As it is not the central focus of this study, we refrain from tabulating the
results for horizon-specific biases in detail. Instead we give a broad picture
by referring to the sequential test of forecast unbiasedness as introduced by
Ager et al. (2009). The null-hypothesis of this test is that all horizon-specific
biases up to some horizon h are jointly equal to 0 (H0 : φ1 = . . . = φh = 0).
The Wald statistic is given by W = (φh)
′(V ar(φh))−1(φh) and χ2-distributed
with h degrees of freedom. The corresponding F-statistic, which possesses
better small sample properties is obtained by dividing the Wald statistic by
h.
The results are summarized in Table 2.5.23 They show that for most vari-
ables and countries the null hypothesis of joint insignificance of the horizon
specific biases can be rejected for horizons greater than 14 to 16. Noteworthy
exceptions are the forecasts on GDP for Canada, on inflation for Germany
and Italy, as well as the ones on industrial production for France and Japan,
where joint insignificance can not be rejected for any horizon. Furthermore
the test rejects the null hypothesis also for low horizons in some cases. These
are the forecasts on inflation in Canada and France and those for private
consumption for Japan.
Table 2.5: Sequential Test of Forecast Unbiasedness for Consensus Forecasts
Germany Canada France Italy Japan UK US
GDP 15-24 14-24 14-24 15-24 15-24 16-24
Inflation 1-4; 24 1; 14; 15; 19-24 15-24 14-24 14-24
Ind. Prod. 16-24 15-24 24 14-24 16-24
Priv. Cons. 15-24 14-24 15-24 15-24 1-3; 14-24 24 15-24
Notes: Each cell shows the horizons h for which the null-hypothesis of joint insignificance of
biases can be rejected at the 5% level.
Weak Efficiency
The results from the tests of weak efficiency for the consensus forecasts
demonstrate very well that caution is required when working with average
forecast data. In contrast to the setup for the analysis of individual forecasts
we set k = 2 for the analysis of the consensus forecasts (Isiklar, 2005). The
reason is that it is not clear whether each forecaster knows already about
the most recent consensus forecast when a new forecast is produced, since in
the extreme case the forecasts have to be reported two weeks before a new
consensus forecast is published and additionally the production process for
each forecast might last more than a week depending on the institutional
23More detailed results are available on request.
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framework of a specific forecaster. In any case, each forecaster should know
about the average forecast published two months ago.
Table 2.6 shows the results for implementations of the test based on (2.10).
It is obvious that the results taken at face value would lead to completely
different conclusions than those seen in the previous section. Clearly, all
average forecasts except in two cases24 show evidence for forecast smoothing,
i.e. incoming information gets reflected in the average forecast in a very
sluggish way. The effect is indeed most strongly visible for forecasts for GDP
growth also here, but even for variables for which the individual forecasters
tend to overreact to news we find the opposite deviation from weak efficiency
in the consensus forecast (e.g. growth of private consumption in Germany).
Table 2.6: Efficiency of Consensus Forecasts (Without Horizon Effects)
Germany Canada France Italy Japan UK USA
GDP beta 0.49*** 0.27*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.25*** 0.37*** 0.23***
t-stat 7.79 4.31 4.92 5.23 3.94 6.49 3.67
Inflation beta 0.19*** 0.17*** 0.14** 0.06 0.20*** 0.09* 0.23***
t-stat 2.99 3.09 2.23 1.02 3.27 1.66 3.65
Ind. Prod. beta 0.46*** 0.00 0.33*** 0.38*** 0.33*** 0.49*** 0.28***
t-stat 6.94 0.06 5.02 5.46 4.91 8.10 4.67
Priv. Cons. beta 0.32*** 0.17*** 0.24*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.29*** 0.16**
t-stat 4.94 2.71 3.79 3.13 2.82 4.92 2.53
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denotes rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level,
respectively.
Like mentioned already in the previous section it is possible to estimate
horizon specific biases for the consensus forecasts. If we relax the assump-
tion of one single bias for all forecast horizons, this has implications for the
construction of the test on weak efficiency. Namely, the unconditional expec-
tation for a revision is no longer equal to zero under the null hypothesis in
that case, since rt,h = ft,h−ft,h+1 = φh+1−φh+u∗t,h+1. We, therefore, expand
(2.10) by including constant terms for each forecast horizon. Dropping the
index i, the new equation on which we base the robustness check for our
results is
rt,h = βrt,h+2 + φh+1 − φh + ξt,h . (2.19)
The coefficient β can be consistently estimated by regressing the consen-
sus forecasts’ revisions on its second lags and a set horizon-specific dummy-
variables using OLS. An estimate for the variance of u∗t,h+1 can be obtained
24Those are the inflation forecasts in Italy and the forecasts for growth of industrial
production in Canada.
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by regressing the revisions on the set of horizon-specific dummy-variables and
taking the mean of the squared residuals from that regression.
The results that are given in Table 2.7 confirm the evidence presented in
the previous paragraph. The point estimates for the correlations between two
subsequent revisions do not change qualitatively. The maximum difference
between two corresponding point estimates is 0.12 in absolute values.
Table 2.7: Efficiency of Consensus Forecasts (With Horizon Effects)
Germany Canada France Italy Japan UK USA
GDP beta 0.43*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.36*** 0.22***
t-stat 6.94 4.11 4.27 3.78 4.01 6.30 3.55
Iflation beta 0.20*** 0.16*** 0.14** 0.10* 0.19*** 0.06 0.27***
t-stat 3.07 2.98 2.25 1.68 3.22 1.13 4.27
Ind. Prod. beta 0.44*** -0.02 0.30*** 0.28*** 0.35*** 0.37*** 0.27***
t-stat 6.67 -0.37 4.44 4.06 5.28 6.21 4.44
Priv. Cons. beta 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.12** 0.16*** 0.30*** 0.12**
t-stat 3.69 2.71 3.37 1.99 2.55 4.97 1.96
Notes: ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denotes rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level,
respectively.
2.3.3 Discussion of Results
In general, our findings confirm, based on a broad data base, previous results
about rationality properties of macroeconomic forecasts. In addition, we
have already pointed to some interesting particularities across countries and
variables in the previous section. In what follows, we discuss briefly the
relation between the results regarding individual and consensus forecasts and
summarize the findings of the study.
To facilitate comparison, Tables 2.2 and 2.3 also provide information
about the results for consensus forecasts in their last columns. As demon-
strated above, almost all consensus forecasts exhibit characteristics of forecast
smoothing and are, thus, not weakly efficient. It is evident that this holds
even if the wide majority of individual forecasters is weakly efficient. This
phenomenon can be explained by the fact that new information is processed
by some forecasters slower than by others. It results in positive autocorrela-
tion of the revisions of the consensus forecasts. Similar results hold for the
analysis of biases. Naturally, the consensus is unbiased if there are only a
few individual panelists who produce biased forecasts. As soon as there is a
significant fraction of forecasters who report biased forecasts, it depends on
the correlation of their biases whether the consensus will be biased or not. If
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forecasters deviate into both directions from unbiasedness, the biases might
cancel out in the aggregate. This, however, is not the case in our sample.
As already mentioned, forecasters tend to be biased into the same direction
for a specific target variable. Therefore, the consensus is biased if there is a
sizable fraction of biased individual forecasts.
To recapitulate the findings of this section: First, our results confirm that
data on average forecasts should be used with caution since even in a situation
where all individual forecasts are rational the hypothesis of rationality is
often rejected based on aggregate data. Second, we find large difference in
the performance of forecasters across countries and different macroeconomic
variables. Third, among the four kinds of forecasts that we analyze, inflation
forecasts perform best in terms of unbiasedness. Fourth, forecasts tend to
be biased in situations where forecasters have to learn about large structural
shocks or gradual changes in the trend of a variable. Nevertheless, our results
show that forecasts from the Consensus data set have desirable properties
by and large.25
2.4 Concluding Remarks
In this chapter of the thesis, we have presented a characterization of the
survey data set that will be most widely used in the empirical analysis below.
We have elaborated on the background and geographical coverage of the
survey as well as about the available data sample size. In the foregoing
section we have demonstrated that the forecasts included in the Consensus
data set have fairly good properties in terms of unbiasedness and efficiency
which makes us quite confident that they represent true expectations of the
panelists and are distorted by institutional incentive issues only to a marginal
extend.
25There are several dimensions along which the study could be expanded in the future.
For simplicity, we have assumed that the variance of the macroeconomic shocks (λt,h) as
well as the variance of the idiosyncratic forecast error (²i,t,h) decay linearly if h goes to 1.
One could also imagine other (more general) functional forms. As soon as enough longer
time series become available for individual forecasters one could implement the assumption
of a horizon specific bias also in the analysis of individual forecasts. Taking into account
correlations across countries – like Isiklar et al. (2006) do in their analysis of consensus
forecasts – would clearly be desirable. Currently however, this would require too much
computational power for the estimation of the covariance matrices. Finally, it would be
promising to investigate whether the results concerning the inefficiency of the consensus
forecasts could be used to construct some kind of “adjusted consensus forecasts” that are
superior in terms of forecast accuracy.
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Inflation (Expectation)
Dynamics
As discussed in Section 1.2 one of the most crucial questions in macroeco-
nomic theory – especially monetary theory – is how inflation is determined.
Since all competing models describing inflation dynamics attribute a fairly
large role to inflation expectations, it is of upmost importance to understand
how certain economic agents form expectations about the future path of infla-
tion. In the next section, we use the Consensus data set to present empirical
evidence for a model of expectation formation of households that has been
proposed by Carroll (2003). Subsequently, in section 3.2, we use similar data
to estimate the Sticky Information Phillips Curve that has been proposed by
Mankiw and Reis (2002) to describe the aggregate price setting mechanism
in the economy.
3.1 Estimating Expectation Formation of
Households1
Several recent papers (including Mankiw and Reis, 2002, 2006) argue that
sticky information models, in which agents update their information occasion-
ally rather than instantaneously, resolve some puzzles in the output–inflation
dynamics. For example, sticky information models are able to account for
considerable inflation persistence and substantial sacrifice ratios (recession-
ary disinflations) typically observed in the data.
1Large Parts of this section of the thesis are based on a paper that I published jointly
with three co-authors (Do¨pke et al., 2008a).
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Microeconomic foundations for the sticky information paradigm were elab-
orated in Carroll’s (2003) work on the “epidemiological model of expecta-
tions.” Carroll argues that US survey data on inflation expectations are
consistent with a model in which in each period only a fraction of households
adopts inflation forecasts of rational experts. The remaining households find
it costly to update their information and continue using their past expecta-
tions rather than form fully rational predictions. In related work Sims (2003),
Branch (2004) and others provide alternative justifications for models with
agents that do not instantaneously incorporate all available information as
implied by most standard macro models.
While the sticky information approach seems useful for modeling US data,
corresponding evidence for European countries is, to the best of our knowl-
edge, still lacking.2 The analysis presented in this section attempts to fill this
gap by investigating inflation expectation data from four major EU economies
(France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom).
In general, our findings support the usefulness of the Carroll’s sticky infor-
mation model for the description of inflation dynamics in European countries.
We find that household inflation expectations adjust sluggishly to the more
precise predictions of professional forecasters. The average speed of this ad-
justment varies little across the four countries in our sample and is somewhat
lower than that in the US: a typical household updates its inflation expecta-
tions roughly once in eighteen months (compared to once a year previously
found in the US). While this result is quite robust across the two estima-
tion methods, we find that the frequency of information updating in Europe
is somewhat higher for the vector error-correction specification, amounting
to about once a year. Similarly to the US, European households are not
backward-looking: they tend to update their expectations from experts’ ra-
tional forecasts rather than actual past inflation rates. Finally, the estimates
are stable over time: we cannot distinguish any statistically significant dif-
ferences between various institutional settings (e.g., inflation-targeters and
non-targeters).
For policy-makers these results imply that inflation expectations of (Eu-
ropean) consumers are sluggish. Consequently, the channel from household
expectations to actual inflation rates is likely to remain an important source
of inflation persistence even when central banks gain (even) more credibility
(in fighting inflation) and even if expert expectations are rational (in that
they adjust instantaneously to new information).
2The only work testing sticky information models on international data is Khan and
Zhu (2002) and Khan and Zhu (2006). However, these two papers have to adopt restrictive
assumptions to circumvent data limitations and approximate agents’ expectations with
forecasts from a VAR model.
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3.1.1 Model
Carroll (2003) proposes the following model of the transmission of inflation
expectations. The economy consists of two types of agents: experts (profes-
sional forecasters) and households. Experts collect in every period relevant
information on future inflation, make rational inflation forecasts and publish
them in newspapers. Because reading newspapers (or making informed infla-
tion forecasts) is costly, households—in contrast to the standard frictionless
rational framework—choose to update their expectations occasionally rather
than instantaneously. As a result, new information about inflation spreads
slowly across population in the following “epidemiological” way. In each pe-
riod only a randomly chosen fraction λ1 of households follows the latest in-
flation stories and updates its inflation expectations. The remaining 1 − λ1
households stick to their forecasts from the previous period. The evolution of
the (average) household (denoted HH ) inflation (pi) expectation (E) follows:
EHHt pit,t+1 = λ1E
EX
t pit,t+1 + (1− λ1)EHHt−1pit,t+1,
where EHHt pit,t+1 and E
EX
t pit,t+1 denote one-period-ahead inflation expecta-
tions of households and experts (EX ), respectively.
Thus, news about inflation can be thought of as a disease that spreads
slowly across the population, infecting a fraction λ1 of all households in each
period. The calculation outlined in Carroll (2003) leads to a similar equation
formulated for expected one-year-ahead inflation rates collected at quarterly
frequency, which are typically reported in surveys of inflation expectations:
EHHt pit,t+4 = λ1E
EX
t pit,t+4 + (1− λ1)EHHt−1pit−1,t+3. (3.1)
(3.1) holds if (i) inflation follows a random walk process (or households be-
lieve that inflation is a random walk) or (ii) EHHt−1pit−1,t+3 ≈ EHHt−1pit,t+4. Both
of these assumptions are likely to be satisfied in our dataset. As discussed
below, the underlying CPI inflation process in the core European economies
has, indeed, been very persistent recently, warranting the random walk ap-
proximation. In addition, given the high persistence of the inflation process,
there is not much difference between household expectations as of time t− 1
of inflation rates at t+3 and t+4, which, in turn, implies that condition (ii)
is also likely to be met.
3.1.2 Data Issues
To test the model of information diffusion, we need two inflation expecta-
tions series: inflation forecasts of households and professional forecasters.
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The forecasts of households were obtained from the European Commission’s
(EC) consumer survey and those of professional forecasters from Consensus
Economics, a London-based macroeconomic survey firm.3
Household expectations were constructed using the EC survey’s question
6, which asks how, by comparison with the last 12 months, the respondents
expect that consumer prices will develop in the next 12 months.4 Unfor-
tunately, the answers are qualitative rather than quantitative (unlike, for
example, the question on expected inflation in the US Michigan Survey of
Consumer Sentiment). This means that the respondents are asked about
the direction of the expected movement of consumer prices (increase/fall),
not about the exact value of this movement. Consequently, care needs to be
taken when transforming these data into quantitative measures of household
expectations, required to test (3.1). We follow much of the existing litera-
ture (including Gerberding (2001) and Mankiw et al., 2003) in adopting the
Carlson and Parkin (1975) method, which is briefly explained in Appendix
A.
To appropriately rescale the expectations it is necessary to specify a vari-
able that captures the perceived current level of the inflation rate. We exper-
imented with three choices of µ˜t: (i) recursive Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter,
(ii) past inflation, (iii) inflation extracted as fitted values from the regression
of inflation on the past balance statistics from the survey. The recursive HP
filter was calculated using the following quasi-real-time procedure to mini-
mize the well-known end-of-sample problems. For each period, t, we first
forecast the underlying inflation process for the next twelve quarters with an
ARMA model, selected with the Akaike criterion (with the maximum num-
ber of four lags on both AR and MA terms). We then apply the filter on
this artificially extended series (with the HP filter with the usual quarterly
3We only investigate Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom because expec-
tations of professional forecasters from other European countries, such as the Netherlands
and Spain, are not available before 1996. Note that the data used in this section differs
from the data set that is described in Section 2.1 in that the forecasts used here are only
reported as averages across forecasters, they are only collected on a quarterly basis, and
they enable us to directly infer the one-year-ahead forecasts rather than expectations for
the annual averages.
4The exact wording of question 6 of the Consumer Survey of the Joint Harmonised
EU Programme of Business and Consumer Surveys is: “By comparison with the past 12
months, how do you expect that consumer prices will develop in the next 12 months?” For
more information on the survey, see the Commission’s web page, http://ec.europa.eu/
economy_finance/indicators/businessandconsumersurveys_en.htm.
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penalty parameter λHP = 1600). Finally, we set µ˜t equal to the value of the
HP filtered inflation as of time t.5
Figure 3.1 compares expert and household inflation expectations with ac-
tual inflation rates. Most of the time both expert and household predictions
are close to actual inflation. However, sometimes there are rather persistent
differences between expectations and actual inflation. More importantly,
because household and expert expectations occasionally differ quite consid-
erably (such as in the early 1990s in the UK), a closer examination of the
dynamic interaction of both variables is warranted.
3.1.3 Results
The choice of the appropriate empirical strategy depends on the time series
properties of the underlying expectations. If the series are stationary, (3.1)
can be estimated directly using OLS (as in Carroll, 2003). If they are non-
stationary (I(1)) and cointegrated, the model should be transformed into an
vector error-correction (VEC) form prior to estimation.
A number of recent papers investigate the degree of persistence of various
measures of inflation in Europe.6 Although these studies agree that inflation
is a very persistent process, the evidence on its order of integration is less
conclusive. Most papers cited by ECB (2005) reject the null hypothesis
that inflation in large European countries has recently been non-stationary.
In contrast, the recent work of O’Reilly and Whelan (2005) as well as our
preliminary tests (investigating inflation and inflation expectations in the
EU–4 countries) in general do not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root in
inflation.
A potential criticism of our results is that the sample is too short to
allow reliable inference. The fact that we are unable to reject the null may
well result from the notoriously low power of the unit root tests under such
circumstances, rather than the existence of the unit root.
Since the main focus of this paper is not on providing the definitive answer
on the order of integration of inflation (or inflation expectations), we directly
move on to estimating Carroll’s theoretical model and investigating how sen-
sitive its implications are with respect to the stationarity assumptions. We
5Most results reported in the paper hold for all normalizations considered. In particu-
lar, we find that the alternative rescaling procedures typically imply that λ1 is positive and
significant and the summing-up restriction λ1 + λ2 = 1 is met. One result that does not
hold for normalizations (ii) and (iii) is that household expectations are insensitive to past
inflation. This is not surprising because for these two normalizations the past inflation
rate directly enters µ˜t.
6See ECB (2005), Table 3.4, for a summary of the literature on European countries.
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first estimate the Carroll (2003) model in the stationary framework. We then
briefly consider how the results are affected if the non-stationary (VEC) setup
is adopted.
The Stationary Case: The Carroll Model
Before estimating (3.1), we will examine some preliminary evidence on the
relationship between expert and household expectations. Given the interest
in the interaction between the expectations of both professional forecasters
and households, a natural starting point is to ask: Which of the two group
forecasts is (on average) better? And what is the causality between the two
expectations? We provide the answers in the next subsection.
Relationship Between Expert and Household Expectations
First, expert expectations are substantially more precise than household ex-
pectations. The root mean squared errors of expert forecasts are between
15% to 35% lower in Germany, Italy and the UK than for household ex-
pectations. The two expectations are comparably precise in France.7 This
result does not, of course, come as a surprise since households may know
expert forecasts when forming their own expectations. According to the epi-
demiology model, at least some households update their own expectations by
following experts. In addition, in an environment with stable inflation like
that in France in the post-1980s, neither forecast varies much.
Second, we can examine whether expert forecasts Granger-cause house-
hold forecasts. Results are given in Table 3.1; columns 3 and 4 indicate
that lags of expert expectations are typically significant predictors of house-
hold expectations. Household expectations, on the other hand, tend not to
Granger-cause experts. Thus, in all countries, except for Italy we conclude
that the direction of causality goes from experts toward households.8
What Determines Household Expectations?
Having found supportive preliminary evidence for the epidemiological model
of expectation formation, we now turn to direct estimation of the speed of
7This is in line with the findings of Gerberding (2001).
8Admittedly, the p-values on lagged household expectations in expert equations in the
upper right corner of each country-specific panel, which range between 0.08 and 0.15, are
quite low, which may suggest the existence of some feedback from households to experts.
Note, however, that an additional piece of evidence supporting the causality from experts
to households comes from the VEC setup of (3.4) below: While the loading coefficients
in the household equations are, as reported in Table 3.5 below, significant, in the expert
equations they are statistically indistinguishable from zero or have the wrong (positive)
sign.
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Table 3.1: Tests for Granger Non-causality
Eitpit,t+4 = β0 +
∑p
j=1 βjE
EX
t−jpit−j,t+4−j +
∑p
k=1 γkE
HH
t−kpit−k,t+4−k + εt
Country Dependent Variable: βj = 0, ∀j γk = 0, ∀k
Expectations of . . . p-value p-value
Germany Experts 0.000 0.125
Households 0.000 0.000
France Experts 0.000 0.076
Households 0.000 0.000
Italy Experts 0.000 0.010
Households 0.620 0.000
United Experts 0.000 0.149
Kingdom Households 0.009 0.000
Notes: Sample runs from 1989Q4 to 2004Q2. The tests were computed
with p = 2 lags of independent variables.
information updating, λ1. Table 3.2 summarizes the estimation results of
various constrained versions of the following regression:
EHHt pit,t+4 = λ0 + λ1E
EX
t pit,t+4 + λ2E
HH
t−1pit−1,t+3 + λ3pit−5,t−1 + εt . (3.2)
All models are estimated with seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) with
coefficients restricted to be equal across the four countries.9
The format of Table 3.2 follows that of Carroll (2003), Table III. The left
panel (the first four columns) displays the point estimates of λ1s together
with standard errors; the right panel shows specification tests (p-values of
various tests of coefficients). The last column tests whether the coefficients
are the same across countries.10 The models are labeled M1–M6. The first
9Analogous results hold when the models are estimated with equation-by-equation
OLS. However, since the cross-correlation between residuals in our dataset is up to 0.3,
SUR improve efficiency of our estimates. In addition, SUR also make it possible to test
(and impose) cross-equation restrictions and answer questions such as: “Does the speed of
information updating vary across countries?” We report some results unrestricted across
countries below in Table 3.3.
10To conserve space we do not report measures of fit, which of course differ slightly for
each country (and model). R¯2s vary between 0.75 and 0.96. For more information of how
well selected models explain household inflation expectations see Table 3.3 below. Similarly
to Carroll’s findings, the Durbin–Watson statistics detect virtually no autocorrelation
in residuals for models M1–M6: Since it is well-known that OLS estimates in a setup
with lagged dependent variables and autocorrelated residuals are inconsistent, we have
reestimated the models allowing for first-order autocorrelation in disturbances and found
no statistically significant evidence (at the 5 % level) of autocorrelated errors.
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Table 3.2: Restricted Cross-Country Results
EHHt pit,t+4 = λ0 + λ1E
EX
t pit,t+4 + λ2E
HH
t−1pit−1,t+3 + λ3pit−5,t−1 + εt
Test Cross eqn
Model λ0 λ1 λ2 λ3 p-value p-value
M1 0.17∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ λ1 + λ2 = 1 0.04
(0.04) (0.03) 0.912
M2 0.17∗∗∗ 0.83∗∗∗ λ1 = 0.25 0.62
(0.03) (0.03) 0.016
M3 −0.22∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ λ0 = 0 0.15
(0.07) (0.05) (0.03) 0.003
M4 0.31∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.00
∑3
i=1 λi = 1 0.03
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 0.003
M5 −0.22∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.78∗∗∗ −0.01 λ3 = 0 0.13
(0.07) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) 0.900
M6 0.92∗∗∗ 0.05 λ2 + λ3 = 1 0.34
(0.04) (0.04) 0.015
Notes: Sample runs from 1989Q4 to 2004Q2. Seemingly unrelated regressions. Stan-
dard errors in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denotes rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1%
significance level, respectively.
model, M1, estimates the following version of (3.2):
EHHt pit,t+4 =λ1E
EX
t pit,t+4 + λ2E
HH
t−1pit−1,t+3 + εt, (3.3)
in which coefficients λ1 and λ2 are estimated without any restriction. The
estimates of λ1 and λ2 are 0.17 and 0.83, respectively; both are statistically
significant. The summing-up restriction implied by the Carroll model, λ1 +
λ2 = 1, is clearly satisfied.
Model M2 is estimated for the restricted version with the summing-up
restriction imposed. Given how close the restriction is to being met in M1,
it does not come as a surprise that the point estimates of λ1 barely change.
11
Our baseline λ1 = 0.17 suggests that on average, a European household reads
economic updates or consults economic experts roughly once in 18 months.12
In addition, the estimate implies about 47% of households use information
outdated more than one year and about 23% more than two years. Thus
11That the summing up restriction holds is not particularly surprising because it also
holds outside the epidemiology framework. For example, this restriction is met in any
model which implies that the household and expert expectations are cointegrated with a
cointegrating vector (1,−1)> .
12This frequency is calculated as 1/λ1 ≈ 6 quarters.
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household expectations seem to react very sluggishly to the available macroe-
conomic news (that has already been processed by forecasters). In fact, our
estimate λ1 is much lower than one, which suggests the costs of acquiring
new macroeconomic information are substantial (relative to the benefits).13
The speed of adjustment λ1 = 0.17 is lower than Carroll’s baseline coeffi-
cient of 0.27. Because the standard error on λ1 is small, the difference is sta-
tistically significant. However, much of the difference between λ1 in Europe
and the US can be accounted for with different time ranges: Carroll’s sample
(1981Q3–2000Q2) differs from ours (1989Q4–2004Q2). Re-estimating model
M2 with the US data and our sample range gives λ1 = 0.16. This matches
Carroll’s evidence that updating is faster when inflation is in the news, in-
cluding the early period in his sample. In contrast, in the 1990s λ1 has fallen
because inflation (in the US) received less press coverage than before 1985. In
addition, the recent monetary policy leading to low and stable inflation has
reduced uncertainty and, together with smaller exogenous shocks hitting the
economy, has presumably further decreased households’ incentives to update.
Models M3–M6 investigate four alternative structures of household expec-
tations. First, we add a constant to (3.3). This parameter turns out to be
negative and significantly different from zero. As we will see below (in Table
3.3), this result, which contradicts the simple epidemiology model (3.1), is
driven mainly by the early sample in the UK where (around 1991) the actual
inflation rate was falling considerably. In such an environment the epidemi-
ology model (3.1) may not be adequate in that the non-updating (1 − λ1)
households decide to adjust for the falling trend in inflation by adding a neg-
ative number to their past forecasts EHHt−1pit−1,t+3, which may then cause the
negative estimate of λ0 in Table 3.2 (and for the UK in Table 3.3 below).
14
Models M4–M6 allow for the possibility that consumers are at least in
part backward-looking (adaptive) by adding past inflation to the right-hand
side of (3.2). Similarly to the US, there is very little of the backward-looking
element in household inflation expectations: the coefficient λ3 is small both
in terms of its size and significance. Thus, households recognize that when
13The finding that uncertainty about aggregate variables matters little compared with
idiosyncratic uncertainty is in line with the independent evidence on the small cost of
eliminating business cycles, reported, e.g., in Krusell and Smith (1999), and in the sticky
information setup with consumption dynamics by Carroll and Slacalek (2008).
14One piece of evidence that is consistent with this hypothesis is that re-estimating
model M3 for the post-1992 sample gives an insignificant λ0 = −0.05 (with the standard
error of 0.07). (Estimating the same “unrestricted”model of Table 3.3 below for the same
sample also gives for the UK an insignificant constant λ0 = −0.14 with the standard error
of 0.31.)
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reading newspapers it makes more sense to learn from the forward-looking
experts than to naively extrapolate past inflation rates.
Other, more general specifications of the epidemiology model could be
considered. For example, how does augmenting the model (3.3) with more
lags of expert and/or household expectations affect the estimates of λ1? The
results, which we do not reported here, suggest that adding an additional
lag of household expectations does not affect the results much (because the
coefficient is small and statistically indistinguishable from zero). Adding a
lag of expert expectations (EEXt pit−1,t+3) causes the standard error on λ1
to increase considerably and coefficients on expert expectations to become
individually insignificant; jointly, however, they remain very significant and
positive (and sum close to the number implied by the epidemiology model).
Generally, there appears to be a lot of homogeneity across countries. As
indicated in the last column, in four of the six (M1–M6) models considered
the null of equal coefficients in the four countries is satisfied; two models (M1
and M4) yield borderline rejections of homogeneity (at the 5% significance
level).
Cross-Country Differences
Having found supportive evidence for Carroll’s sticky information model in
European data, let us now investigate in more detail how the findings vary
across countries. Table 3.3 summarizes estimation results obtained from
seemingly unrelated regressions, unrestricted across countries, for models
M1–M3.
The findings parallel those in the previous section: First, the speed of
updating λ1 varies between 0.11 and 0.32 (as estimated with models M1
and M2) and is, for all countries except Italy, highly statistically significant.
Second, for all countries, except France, the summing-up restriction, λ1 +
λ2 = 1, implied by the Carroll’s sticky information model, is met. Even for
France, the two coefficients sum up to 0.91. Third, the intercept term λ0 is
insignificant for all countries except the UK.
The estimated speed of updating is only about half as large in Italy as in
the other countries. This finding seems counterintuitive because the benefits
from acquiring information in an environment with a relatively high level
and uncertainty about inflation should actually be larger. We believe the
econometric result is driven by the persistent differences between household
and professionals’ expectations at the beginning of the sample, before 1993
(apparent in Figure 3.1). These deviations then may translate into a lower
estimate of λ1. To investigate this hypothesis, we have re-estimated the
regressions for the post-1992 period and found the Italian λ1 substantially
higher—about 0.25—and more significant.
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Table 3.3: Country-by-Country Unrestricted Results
EHHt pit,t+4 = λ0 + λ1E
EX
t pit,t+4 + λ2E
HH
t−1pit−1,t+3 + εt
Test
Model λ0 λ1 λ2 R¯2 p-value
Germany
M1 0.18∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.91 λ1 + λ2 = 1
(0.06) (0.06) 0.764
M2 0.20∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.91 λ1 = 0.25
(0.06) (0.06) 0.368
M3 −0.21∗ 0.29∗∗∗ 0.80∗∗∗ 0.91
(0.12) (0.08) (0.06)
France
M1 0.32∗∗∗ 0.59∗∗∗ 0.85 λ1 + λ2 = 1
(0.08) (0.09) 0.002
M2 0.18∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.83 λ1 = 0.25
(0.07) (0.07) 0.322
M3 −0.04 0.33∗∗∗ 0.61∗∗∗ 0.80
(0.12) (0.10) (0.09)
Italy
M1 0.14 0.86∗∗∗ 0.96 λ1 + λ2 = 1
(0.11) (0.09) 0.991
M2 0.11∗ 0.89∗∗∗ 0.96 λ1 = 0.25
(0.06) (0.06) 0.022
M3 −0.18 0.25∗ 0.81∗∗∗ 0.95
(0.15) (0.13) (0.09)
United Kingdom
M1 0.23∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.89 λ1 + λ2 = 1
(0.08) (0.08) 0.763
M2 0.23∗∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.89 λ1 = 0.25
(0.08) (0.08) 0.781
M3 −0.67∗∗ 0.53∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.89
(0.30) (0.16) (0.09)
Notes: Sample runs from 1989Q4 to 2004Q2. Seemingly unre-
lated regressions. Standard errors in brackets. ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denotes
rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level,
respectively.
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It is a bit surprising that the speed of updating does not seem to vary more
across countries, which differ very much from each other in many respects.15
Distinct differences may show up more clearly once more data are available.
We could now in principle similarly test how stable λ1 has been over time.
However, due to the limited number of observations the tests of structural
stability have weak power. We looked for differences in the speed on expec-
tation updating by including dummy variables for, e.g., members of the euro
area and inflation-targeters. Unfortunately, these investigations did not lead
to any statistically clear-cut results about the determinants of λ1.
Most of our findings suggest that the epidemiology model of information
diffusion performs similarly well, qualitatively as well as quantitatively, for
the core European countries as it does for the US. Expert inflation expecta-
tions are typically more precise than household expectations. Econometric
tests indicate that the Carroll model is adequate along several dimensions.16
Most models imply that European households update somewhat more slowly
than US households, on average once in 18 months compared with once a
year. Finally, there is strong evidence that, as suggested by the epidemiol-
ogy model, European households update information from the professional
forecasters rather than based on the past inflation rate.17
Econometric Issues: Measurement Error and Endogeneity
One concern about our SUR estimates is that they are affected by measure-
ment errors in household inflation expectations (caused because household
15At least two kinds of institutional differences are potentially relevant for the size of λ1.
First, the monetary policy setup and recent inflation dynamics in various EMU countries,
the UK and the US are quite varied. For example, whereas Germany, under the Bundes-
bank regime, has always had moderate and stable inflation rates, Italy faced considerably
higher inflation rates in the early 1990s and has witnessed pronounced declines in price
level increases over the past decade in the run-up to and after the introduction of the euro.
In addition, different communication strategies of central banks might affect how informa-
tion spreads across households. (See for example Ehrmann and Fratzscher, 2005 and the
literature cited therein.) Second, both the size and structure of the forecasting industry
are dissimilar. This profession is in the US and the UK dominated by private forecasters,
while in much of continental Europe, in particular in Germany, public forecasters play a
more prominent role.
16For example, the speed of updating is positive and statistically significant, the
summing-up restriction holds fairly well and household inflation expectations are not sen-
sitive with respect to the past inflation.
17Consideration might be given to the possibility that households update their expec-
tations by referring directly to other publicly available information, such as foreign prices.
However, in the epidemiology framework this information is already captured and pro-
cessed by professional forecasters, who are assumed to be rational. Moreover, obtaining
such information is presumably much more costly than simply referring to the published
professional forecasts.
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expectations have to be rescaled). In presence of such classical measurement
error coefficients λ2 for model M1 in Table 3.3 are biased toward zero. To
get a feel for how serious this bias is we have reestimated the models of Ta-
ble 3.3 using past household and expert expectations as instruments for (the
potentially mismeasured) EHHt pit−1,t+3. Compared to the SUR procedure the
instrumental variables estimates of λ2 fall roughly from 0.8 to 0.6. Together
with this falling coefficient on lagged household expectations, the estimated
speed of consumers’ information updating λ1 rises from about 0.2 to 0.4.
Another potentially relevant econometric issue with equations like (3.1) is
endogeneity: Because experts presumably take into account households’ ex-
pectations when making forecasts, they are affected by shocks to households’
beliefs, which may induce correlation between EEXt pit,t+4 and the error term
εt. We have attempted to address this issue by estimating the regressions
instrumenting current expert expectations with their lags and found that the
estimates were similar to those shown in Table 3.3.
The Non-Stationary Case: The Vector Error-Correction Form
Having estimated the epidemiology model in the stationary framework, let
us now examine how the implications change when we assume that the ex-
pectation series are I(1) instead. Suppose we collect expert and household
expectations in a vector xt = (E
HH
t pit,t+4,E
EX
t pit,t+4)
> . If the two series are
cointegrated with the cointegrating vector α = (1,−α1)> , the system has the
following vector error correction (VEC) representation:
∆xt = λ1α
> xt−1 + β(L)∆xt + εt, (3.4)
where λ1 = (λ
HH
1 , λ
EX
1 )
> denotes the vector of loading coefficients and β(L)
is a matrix lag polynomial. Similarly to the stationary model (3.1), λ1 de-
termines the speed of adjustment toward the (long-run) equilibrium.18
We are particularly interested in λHH1 , which corresponds to the speed of
adjustment observed for households. Furthermore, note that the theoretical
derivation of the epidemiology model predicts a cointegrating vector α =
(1,−1)> . This is due to the fact that in the long-run households completely
adapt to professional forecasts.
Before estimating the VEC representation (3.4) and its “α-restricted”
counterpart some preliminary specification tests need to be performed. First,
we test whether there exists a valid cointegrating relationship between the
18The adjustment pattern in the partial adjustment version of the model (3.1), however,
differs from the VEC analysis in two ways: First, the adjustment in the VEC is analyzed
in an interdependent system and feedback effects are considered and second, the short-run
dynamics in the VEC might influence the dynamic adjustment path.
PhD-Thesis written by: Jonas Dovern
3.1 Estimating Expectation Formation of Households 47
Table 3.4: Tests for Cointegration between Household and Expert Expectations
Hypothesized Trace 5%
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value p-value†
Germany
None 0.20 16.31 12.32 0.01
At most 1 0.06 3.48 4.13 0.07
France
None 0.22 15.92 12.32 0.01
At most 1 0.03 1.96 4.13 0.19
Italy
None 0.36 21.69 12.32 0.00
At most 1 0.09 3.65 4.13 0.07
United Kingdom
None 0.25 18.90 12.32 0.00
At most 1 0.05 2.60 4.13 0.13
Notes: † MacKinnon–Haug–Michelis (1999) p-values. Samples run
from 1989Q4 to 2004Q2 (Italy: 1992Q4–2002Q4).
expert and household expectations as shown in Table 3.4. The findings show
that, for all four countries, the two series are cointegrated (at the 5% signif-
icance level). In addition, we checked whether the theoretical restriction on
α = (1,−1)> is supported in data. The values for α1 are close to −1 (the
value predicted by the model) and range from −1.21 for the UK to −1.00 for
Germany. As illustrated by the likelihood ratio statistics presented in Table
3.5, we find that α is not significantly different from (1,−1)> (except in the
UK).
The VEC findings are summarized in Table 3.5.19 All estimates of λHH1
are significant (although for the restricted case in France and Italy only at the
10% level) and lie except for the restricted case in Italy in the neighborhood
of 0.25, typically somewhat higher than implied by the “stationary” results
above. We again find a lot of homogeneity among the four countries with
French and Italian households updating presumably somewhat more slowly
than British and German ones. The estimates in Table 3.5 imply updating
frequencies between three and seven quarters.
Carroll’s sticky information model is also supported by how the deviations
from the long-term equilibrium are corrected. The error-correction process is
19The models were estimated based on the sample from 1989Q4 to 2004Q2, except
for Italy, where a valid cointegrating relationship was found between 1992Q4 and 2002Q4
only.
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Table 3.5: Sticky Expectations in the VEC Form
Model Germany France Italy UK
Unrestricted λˆHH −0.30∗∗∗ −0.26∗∗∗ −0.18∗∗ −0.20∗∗∗
std. error (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05)
Restricted λˆHH −0.30∗∗∗ −0.14∗ −0.23∗ −0.27∗∗∗
std. error (0.09) (0.08) (0.12) (0.08)
Test for restriction LR stat. 0.00 2.29∗ 2.97∗ 3.86∗∗
(1,−1) on α p value 0.988 0.070 0.085 0.049
Notes: Samples run from 1989Q4 to 2004Q2 (Italy: 1992Q4–2002Q4). “Un-
restricted” refers to the unrestricted VEC model. “Restricted” refers to the
VEC estimation results under the restriction α = (1,−1)> . ∗, ∗∗, ∗∗∗ denotes
rejection of the null at the 10%, 5% and 1% significance level, respectively.
primarily driven by the adjustment in household rather than expert expec-
tations. This is implied by the estimates of λEX1 , which are not significantly
different from zero or have the wrong (positive) sign.
Our findings thus imply that the epidemiology model of Carroll (2003)
can be easily extended to the “non-stationary world.” The derived VEC epi-
demiology model of information diffusion performs similarly well as compared
to the stationary model. This result is especially useful for the analysis of
European countries, which plausibly have highly persistent inflation rates
(see O’Reilly and Whelan, 2005 and references in ECB, 2005). Thus, even
though it seems to be difficult to draw clear conclusions about the station-
arity properties of the series with the small sample size at hand, the VEC
representation might be preferable once more data are available.
3.1.4 Discussion of Results
Inflation expectations are crucial determinants of future inflation dynamics.
The model estimated here attempts to analyze how these expectations are
formed and how information is transmitted from professional forecasters to
households. Our estimates of the speed of information updating have impor-
tant implications for the persistence of inflation and inflation expectations.
We document that the qualitative and quantitative findings previously re-
ported for the US generalize to major European countries. Most European
households adjust rather sluggishly to new information; they update their in-
formation on average once in twelve to eighteen months. In addition, it turns
out that households are forward-looking in that they use forecasts provided
by experts rather than just past information to update their beliefs about
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future inflation. These findings are robust to the two estimation methods
(suited for data with various stochastic properties) we consider.
The analysis of this section can be extended through a number of avenues.
Survey data can be used to directly estimate the sticky information Phillips
curve in addition to its epidemiological micro-foundations (as in the following
section or Do¨pke et al. (2008b)). Alternatively, it would be possible, in the
spirit of Mankiw et al. (2003), to analyze the evolution of the cross-sectional
distribution of inflation expectations in Europe rather than just their mean
values (as in Section 4.2 or Dovern et al. (2009)). Finally, the epidemiology
model could, in principle, be estimated for additional countries, using cross-
sectional dependence among countries to alleviate problems related to short
samples.
3.2 Estimating the Sticky Information Phillips
Curve20
Several recent papers, including Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2003, 2006), argue
that models in which agents update their information occasionally rather
than instantaneously resolve some stylized business cycle puzzles.21 These
puzzles include the fact that inflation is considerably persistent and em-
pirically disinflations are found to be costly.22 Theoretical foundations for
the new sticky information paradigm were elaborated in the work by Carroll
(2003) on the“epidemiological model of expectations”that has been discussed
in the previous section. Furthermore, Reis (2006a,b) and Mankiw and Reis
(2006) discuss the microfoundations of the sticky information approach and
propose to replace the widely used backward-looking and New Keynesian
Phillips curves with the Sticky Information Phillips curve (SIPC).
Interestingly, there has been relatively little research on estimation the key
parameters of the SIPC empirically. Carroll (2003) and Do¨pke et al. (2008a)
estimate the epidemiological model of transmission of information between
households and forecasters using US and European data, respectively. Among
the few papers we are aware of that estimate the SIPC directly are Khan and
Zhu (2002, 2006). However, due to data limitations Khan and Zhu have to
use inflation and output forecasts generated using a VAR model as a proxy
for the actual forecasts. Similarly, the estimation of the SIPC of Kiley (2007)
20Large Parts of this section of the thesis are based on a paper that I published jointly
with three co-authors (Do¨pke et al., 2008b).
21Compare also the overview in section 1.2 for this point.
22The sticky-information models are related to models of rational inattention (Sims,
2003) and learning (Branch, 2004).
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also proxies for inflation expectations. In contrast to these papers, we use
survey-based inflation expectations directly.
3.2.1 Model
As discussed in Section 1.2, Mankiw and Reis (2002) derive the following
version of the SIPC:
pit =
λα
1− λy˜t + λ
∞∑
j=0
(1− λ)j Et−1−j
(
pit + α∆y˜t
)
+ εt, (3.5)
where pit is the inflation rate and y˜t the output gap. Et(·) denotes the rational
(mathematical) expectation as of time t. Parameter α measures the sensi-
tivity of the optimal relative price to the current output gap and depends
on the structure of the economy (e.g. the preferences, technology, and the
market structure parameters).23 To increase the precision of the estimates
of λ, on which we primarily focus, we impose that α lies between 0.10 and
0.20, a range considered plausible in the literature24.
Note that in contrast to the standard (forward-looking) sticky-price model,
in which current expectations of future state of the economy play an impor-
tant role, what matters in the sticky-information model (3.5) are the past
expectations of present events.
3.2.2 Data Issues
We use quarterly data between 1993Q2 and 2004Q4 for Germany, France,
Italy and the United Kingdom. The actual GDP and inflation series were
obtained from OECD’s Main Economic Indicators database.
The experts’ inflation and output forecasts we use were collected by Con-
sensus Economics, a major London-based macroeconomic survey firm. Each
quarter since 1989 Consensus Economics publishes the consensus forecasts
constructed as the median of 20–30 individual predictions of major banks
and research institutes (in each country). The consensus forecasts are avail-
able up to six quarters ahead, i.e. for quarters t through t+ 6.
We use the GDP growth forecasts to extract estimates of future output
gap, y˜t, as follows. First, we take into account that the expectations reported
23The parameter α can be interpreted as a measure of the degree of real rigidity, see
e.g. Ball and Romer (1990).
24We also estimated both parameters jointly. While the estimates of λ remain about
the same as in Tables 3.6 and 3.7, α is estimated imprecisely. Therefore we impose α as
suggested by, e.g., Mankiw and Reis (2002) and Khan and Zhu (2006).
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in the survey refer to year-on-year changes rather than annualized quarterly
changes as implied by the SIPC model. Second, we proxy the expected output
gap based on expected GDP growth as follows. Denote yt and y
∗
t the log of
output and the log of potential output, respectively. We first recursively con-
struct a prolonged GDP series, y∗S(t) (S = t0, . . . , t, . . . , t+6), for each sample
point t by setting y∗S(t) = yt for S ≤ t and y∗t+1(t) = y∗t−3(t) + Et∆yt−3,t+1,
y∗t+2(t) = y
∗
t−2(t) + Et∆yt−2,t+2, . . . , y
∗
t+6(t) = y
∗
t+2(t) + Et∆yt+2,t+6, where
Et∆yi,j denotes the expectation for GDP growth between time i and j formed
at time t. We then apply the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) full sample
asymmetric band-pass filter to filter out the cyclical component of y∗S(t), say
y˜∗S(t), as a proxy for the output gap. We interpret the last six observations
of this series as the expectation of the output gap for periods t + 1 through
t+ 6 as of time t.
We use the GDP growth forecasts to extract expectations as of time s for
the future output gap, Esy˜t, as follows. First, we have to bear in mind that
the expectations reported in the survey refer to year-on-year changes rather
than annualized quarterly changes as implied by the SIPC model. Second, we
proxy the expected output gap based on the expectations for GDP growth as
follows. Denote yt and y
∗
t the log of output and the log of potential output,
respectively. For each time period, s, in our sample, we construct a prolonged
GDP time series, say yˆs(t), by setting yˆs(t) = yt for t ≤ s and recursively
computing yˆs(t+1) = yt−3+Es∆yt−3,t+1, yˆs(t+2) = yt−2+Es∆yt−2,t+2, . . . ,
yˆs(t+ 5) = yˆs(t+ 1) + Es∆yt+1,t+5, and yˆs(t+ 6) = yˆs(t+ 2) + Es∆yt+2,t+6,
where Es∆yi,j denotes the expectation for GDP growth between time i and
j formed at time s. We then apply the Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003)
full sample asymmetric band-pass filter on this prolonged time series to filter
out y∗s(t) and the cyclical component of yˆs(t), y˜s(t) = yˆs(t) − y∗s(t). We see
the cyclical component as a proxy for the output gap. More specifically, we
interpret the last six observations of this series as the expectation for the
output gap for periods s+ 1 through s+ 6 as of time s.
For the expert expectations of the inflation rate we also face the first prob-
lem mentioned above that the expectations reported in the survey refer to
year-on-year changes rather than annualized quarterly changes. Analogously
to the previous paragraph, we compute annualized expected quarterly infla-
tion rates by prolonging the actual consumer price index time series based
on the expected year-to-year inflation rates and transforming this prolonged
series into expected quarterly inflation rates.
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3.2.3 Results
We assume that the updating firms each period simply adopt professional
forecasts to form rational expectations of inflation and output gap up to six
quarters ahead. Consequently, the infinite sum in (3.5) is truncated alter-
natively at four and six lags.25 We estimate (3.5) first individually for each
country using non-linear least squares (in Table 3.6) and then jointly using
seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) (in Table 3.7).
Equation-by-Equation Estimation
Table 3.6 summarizes the results of estimating (3.5) with truncation lags
n = 4 and 6 for values of α between 0.1 and 0.2 for Germany, France, Italy,
and the United Kingdom. As the theoretical model (3.5) does not have a
constant we exclude it in the empirical estimation and report the uncentered
R2.26
We find the following five key results. First, all estimates of λ are highly
significant for all parameterizations of the model. Second, for France, Ger-
many, and the UK their values lie around 0.20 to 0.30. This is about the
size one would expect and in line with findings in Khan and Zhu (2002) or
Do¨pke et al. (2008a). Third, there is a lot of homogeneity across the latter
three countries. Given the same parametrization, λˆs do not differ by more
than 0.02. Fourth, the results for Italy deviate quite substantially from the
outcomes for the other countries. λ is estimated around 0.5 to 0.6 which im-
plies about twice as high frequency of information updating compared to the
findings for other countries. Furthermore, the estimates for Italy are more
sensitive with respect to the values chosen for α. This is not the case for the
other countries. Finally, the models including up to 6 lags of the sequence of
expectation terms generally show a better fit to the data and smaller λˆ (this
latter result is also evident from the results in Khan and Zhu, 2006).
Our estimates of λ are typically a bit smaller than the estimates for the US
presented in Carroll (2003). This indicates that the information transmission
process is somewhat slower in the three European countries considered here
in this study. This is in line with the evidence of Do¨pke et al. (2008a),
who estimate the Carroll (2003) model for European countries, and find the
information updating process of households to be also somewhat slower than
for the US economy.
25The results with 5 lags do not differ considerably.
26If the constant is included it is insignificant.
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Table 3.6: SIPC: Equation-by-Equation Regression Results
Truncation at lag: 4 6
λ uncent. R2 λ uncent. R2
France α = .10 0.271 0.56 0.188 0.58
5.4 5.4
α = .15 0.268 0.56 0.189 0.59
5.5 5.3
α = .20 0.271 0.56 0.191 0.59
5.4 5.3
Germany α = .10 0.257 0.64 0.181 0.63
5.7 5.4
α = .15 0.258 0.64 0.181 0.63
5.7 5.4
α = .20 0.257 0.64 0.181 0.63
5.7 5.4
Italy α = .10 0.608 0.90 0.456 0.89
6.1 3.4
α = .15 0.577 0.89 0.492 0.90
4.6 3.7
α = .20 0.608 0.90 0.540 0.90
6.1 5.0
UK α = .10 0.271 0.64 0.201 0.72
6.2 6.2
α = .15 0.270 0.64 0.202 0.72
6.2 6.1
α = .20 0.271 0.64 0.202 0.72
6.2 6.1
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics.
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) Estimation
As the residuals of the individual equations are substantially cross-correlated,
we investigate in Table 3.7 how using the SUR affects our baseline results
approach to improve the efficiency of the estimation.
Again, all coefficients were found to be highly significant and to be (with
the exception of Italy) in the range of 0.14 to 0.18 for truncation at lag 6 and
in the range of 0.20 to 0.29 for truncation at lag 4. In addition, likelihood-
ratio tests confirm that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the λ are
equal for France, Germany, and the UK. We only present the test statistic
for one particular value of α as for other specifications the outcomes are very
similar. For α = 0.15 and truncation at lag 4, the LR-statistic is 1.19 (p-
val: 0.55). For α = 0.15 and truncation at lag 6, the LR-statistic is 0.84
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Table 3.7: SIPC: Estimation by Seemingly Unrelated Regressions
Truncation at lag: 4 6
λ uncent. R2 λ uncent. R2
France α = .10 0.213 0.58 0.146 0.57
5.4 5.1
α = .15 0.216 0.58 0.146 0.57
5.5 5.1
α = .20 0.219 0.58 0.144 0.57
5.5 5.1
Germany α = .10 0.296 0.67 0.158 0.63
5.8 5.6
α = .15 0.294 0.66 0.160 0.63
5.8 5.6
α = .20 0.292 0.66 0.160 0.63
5.9 5.6
Italy α = .10 0.451 0.77 0.525 0.69
8.2 5.6
α = .15 0.471 0.77 0.568 0.70
8.0 6.5
α = .20 0.494 0.78 0.571 0.71
7.9 7.2
UK α = .10 0.190 0.57 0.177 0.72
5.1 5.6
α = .15 0.193 0.57 0.177 0.72
5.1 5.6
α = .20 0.195 0.58 0.176 0.72
5.2 5.6
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics.
(p-val: 0.66). Obviously, the hypothesis that λ for Italy is also equal to the
parameters in the other three countries is rejected at any sensible significance
levels. A possible explanation for this finding of a somewhat higher λ in Italy
is a higher level of and uncertainty about inflation in the estimation sample
in Italy compared to the other three countries.
Estimating λ jointly for France, Germany, and the UK with λ being
constrained to be equal across countries (assuming that the price setting
mechanism is the same in all three countries) yields no big surprises. For all
parameterizations λˆ is highly significant and lies in between the individual
country estimates. For truncation at lag 4 we find λˆ = 0.3 and for truncation
at lag 6 we find λˆ = 0.16. The estimates again seem to be very robust to the
particular value chosen for α.
PhD-Thesis written by: Jonas Dovern
3.3 Concluding Remarks 55
3.2.4 Discussion of Results
In this paper, we make the first attempt to estimate the main parameter
of the SIPC developed in Mankiw and Reis (2002) for four large European
countries using survey-based expectations. We find that λ ranges between
0.15 and 0.3 for Germany, France and the United Kingdom and between 0.5
and 0.6 for Italy.
To recapitulate the results of this section: Using recent data from four
major European economies we find that producers in France, Germany and
the United Kingdom update their information sets about once a year, those
in Italy about once every six months. These findings are quite robust to
the two estimation methods we use (equation-by-equation estimation and
seemingly unrelated regressions) and to the number of lags of right-hand side
variables included. The estimates of λ are consistent with those of Do¨pke
et al. (2008a) except for Italy whose λ they pin down to be comparable to
the other countries.27
3.3 Concluding Remarks
In this part of the thesis we have used survey data on (inflation) expectations
of households and firms to assess the empirical validity of two different mod-
els that are based on the sticky information concept. First, we have demon-
strated that the expectation formation process of households in four major
European economies can be characterized by the “epidemiological model of
expectations” proposed by Carroll (2003). Second, we have shown that the
aggregate inflation dynamics in those four countries can be explained – at
least in a partial equilibrium framework – by means of the SIPC proposed
by Mankiw and Reis (2002). All in all, the results support the sticky infor-
mation concept for modeling inflation dynamics. We should note, however,
that recent research has shown that the sticky information framework does
not outperform the conventional sticky price framework when analyzed in a
general equilibrium model (see e.g. Trabandt, 2007; Korenok, 2008).
27Possible extensions of this work include investigating how the frequency of updat-
ing varies across other countries and time periods or more generally what other factors
determine the size of λ.
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Chapter 4
Dispersion of Forecasts
Macroeconomic models often impose homogeneity. Agents have the same
preferences, beliefs, information sets, are hit by the same shocks or process
information in the same way. Such assumptions are convenient because they
make models simple and tractable while keeping them useful for aggregate
policy analysis. However, evidence from micro data and casual observations
show that people differ from each other, and economists have recently put
much effort into constructing and studying models that can account for some
of the differences.1
The extent of disagreement about the future paths of macroecononomic
variables is for instance remarkably high – even among professional forecast-
ers (Zarnowitz and Lambros, 1987; Gallo et al., 2002). The degree of dis-
agreement is sometimes seen as a reflection of the uncertainty of the macroe-
conomic environment that economic agents face. Viewed in this way, it of
high relevance to understand the underlying drivers of dispersion, i.e un-
certainty, since several theories suggest that increased uncertainty leads to
costs in terms of welfare. Friedman (1977) and Ball (1992) demonstrate for
instance how increasing inflation uncertainty leads to higher losses in aggre-
gate output. Consequently, it is desirable for economic agents as well as for
1For example, models in which some households are more impatient than others (or are
subject to liquidity constraints) are useful in studying the monetary policy transmission
mechanism (Iacoviello, 2005). Models with heterogenous beliefs/expectations are becom-
ing popular in asset pricing literature (see Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003 for a survey).
Carroll (1997) and Krusell and Smith (1998) model reaction of agents’ consumption–
saving behavior to idiosyncratic (and aggregate) income shocks. Morris and Shin (2005b)
investigate the value of providing of public information to agents depending on the amount
of private information they have.
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researchers to have at hand a good proxy for the uncertainty attached to a
given forecast of a variable.2
Giordani and So¨derlind (2003) claim that using cross-sectional dispersion
measures from survey data on forecasts constitutes a valuable approach for
estimating uncertainty that is superior or at least complementary to time se-
ries approaches like e.g. conditional volatilities derived from GARCH models.
This approach accentuates the heterogeneity of expectations and is rooted
in the idea that agents have different ideas and models of the functioning of
the economy (Sims, 2003; Branch, 2004; Mankiw and Reis, 2002, 2003). The
assumption is that the differences in predictions derived from these models
are higher the higher the true uncertainty in the economy is.3 Following
Giordani and So¨derlind (2003), measures on the dispersion of predictions
are therefore frequently used to proxy the degree of uncertainty surrounding
point forecasts for macroeconomic variables.
In what follows we analyze the dispersion of forecasts and how it can be
measured using fixed event forecasts. However, we only punctually relate
our findings to the notion of uncertainty. Still, from the perspective of e.g. a
central bank that has a mandate to target a certain inflation rate the issue
of diverging inflation expectation is of interest in itself.
4.1 Measuring Dispersion from Fixed Event
Forecasts4
Practitioners and applied researchers are usually interested in a measure of
uncertainty that is unaffected by changing institutional factors and – more
2See also the recent paper by Bloom et al. (2008) who claim that uncertainty can be
a major cause for recessionary developments.
3It should be mentioned that this view is disputed frequently (Bomberger, 1996; Rich
and Tracy, 2003; Do¨pke and Fritsche, 2006), as a bunch of other theories exist about
the emergence of disagreement, i.e. forecast dispersion. First, models of information
transmission stress the role of time lags in the transmission of “news” to different agents
in the macroeconomy (Carroll, 2003; Mankiw et al., 2003). Second, disagreement can be
explained to some extend by the usage of differing models and the existence of ideological
beliefs (Fuller and Geide-Stevenson, 2003); Unfortunately, there is – with the exception
of Batchelor and Dua (1990) – very little empirical evidence on this issue. Third, it is
sometimes argued, that different forecasters face different incentives to cheat, to seek rents
or to influence the public debate. Hence, forecast accuracy might not be the only aim
of the forecasters (Laster et al., 1999; Ehrbeck and Waldmann, 1996). Finally, another
source of forecasters’ disagreement might be due to forecasting being part of the policy
advising process (Stege, 1989; Kirchga¨ssner, 1999).
4Large parts of this section of the thesis are based on a paper that I wrote jointly with
a co-author (Dovern and Fritsche, 2008).
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importantly – time varying forecast horizons. This is why exclusively survey
data on fixed horizon forecasts have been used when forecast dispersion has
been used as a measure of uncertainty (or for other purposes).
Unfortunately, a good number of data sets provide only fixed event fore-
casts rather than fixed horizon forecasts. And given a scarce data situation
for a particular country or variable, one would like to use these fixed event
forecasts to measure uncertainty. The problem is that every measure of
fundamental dispersion is distorted by the fact that the forecast horizon is
time varying, when it has been derived from fixed event forecasts. It is well
documented, that forecast dispersion in fixed event panels has a remarkable
proportion which is “non-fundamental” in a sense that this part of cross-
section dispersion is driven by the time varying forecast horizons rather than
by macroeconomic uncertainty (Gallo et al., 2002; Patton and Timmermann,
2007). Theoretical justifications can be found in early works by Lucas (1973)
or Townsend (1983).
For empirical researchers and policy makers it would be desirable to be
able to extract the“fundamental” component of dispersion from such data by
controlling for “non-fundamental” factors such as the influence of the forecast
horizon. In this section of the thesis, we suggest some empirical approaches
for this task and assesses their relative performance.
To illustrate the issue treated in this section, Table 4.1 shows the cor-
relation coefficients between the cross-sectional standard deviation for four
US variables derived from fixed event forecasts and those derived from fixed
horizon forecasts for the US economy.5 Two observations are worth pointing
out. First, the correlation between the dispersions derived from fixed horizon
forecasts and those based on predictions for the current year’s annual figures
are in all cases smaller than those with the dispersion based on predictions
for the subsequent year’s annual figures. This is not surprising as one would
expect that the dispersion across panelists is mostly affected by the shrink-
ing forecast horizon when the latter is close to zero, because this implies
that some of the relevant data for the forecast has already been in the infor-
mation set of the forecasters. Patton and Timmermann (2007) indeed show
that much of the reduction of cross-sectional dispersion is observed when the
forecast horizon becomes smaller than one year. Second, the correlations are
especially low for forecasts for the growth rate of real GDP.
5We use the well-known U.S. data set of quarterly macroeconomic forecasts from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters (see below).
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Table 4.1: Correlation of dispersion measures calculated from different types of forecasts
CY NY 12M CY NY 12M
GDP Growth Unemployment Rate
Current year 1.00 1.00
Next year 0.65 1.00 0.75 1.00
12-Month 0.58 0.61 1.00 0.63 0.85 1.00
CPI Inflation T-Bill Rate
Current year 1.00 1.00
Next year 0.82 1.00 0.81 1.00
12-Month 0.82 0.94 1.00 0.74 0.85 1.00
Notes: Displayed are linear correlation coefficients. CY refers to the
forecasts made for the current calendar year, NY refers to the forecasts
made for the next calendar year, and 12M refers to the 12 months ahead
forecasts.
4.1.1 Approaches
In this part, we present different modeling frameworks that are potentially
adequate to estimate the “fundamental” component of cross-sectional disper-
sion derived from fixed event forecasts. Throughout the remainder of this
section we adopt the following notation: Let E0t,i(y˜) denote the forecast for a
variable for the current calendar year made by forecaster i at time t. Anal-
ogously, E1t,i(y˜) denotes her forecast for next year’s annual figure. In case of
growth rates being forecasted, the forecast for the quarter-to-quarter growth
rate at time s made by the same forecaster at time t is given by Est,i(y).
We compute the twelve-months-ahead growth forecast of each panelist as
E12t,i(yˆ) =
[∏3
k=0
(
Et+kt,i (y)/100 + 1
)− 1] ∗ 100.
The different cross-sectional dispersions at each sample point are calcu-
lated as the standard deviation across all N forecasts or their interquartile
range. We denote them as D
E0(y˜)
t , D
E1(y˜)
t , and D
E12(yˆ)
t respectively. Since
E12t,i(yˆ) is unaffected by seasonal influences and the forecast horizon is fixed
over time, we do not expect D
E12(yˆ)
t to show any seasonal patterns. Rather,
it should only reflect disagreement due to the prevailing macroeconomic un-
certainty.
From the six candidate approaches which we will consider in this paper,
one differs fundamentally from the remaining five approaches. This approach
is non-parametric, intuitive, and simple; it involves the approximation of
the twelve-months-ahead forecasts in a first step, and the calculation of a
dispersion measure across those approximative fixed horizon forecasts in a
second step. In contrast, all other methods take the dispersion measured
over fixed event forecasts as input and use different parametric time-series
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approaches to decompose this dispersion into different components one of
which represents the fundamental degree of dispersion we are interested in.
Estimation via Approximation of Fixed Horizon Forecasts
If someone is interested in the dispersion across (unobserved) fixed horizon
forecasts, a natural way of calculation is based on an approximation of those
unknown forecasts. To this end, we construct simple proxies for the twelve-
months-ahead forecasts by taking a weighted moving average of fixed event
forecasts (Heppke-Falk and Hu¨fner, 2004; Smant, 2002), namely the forecasts
for two subsequent calendar years.
Eˆ12t,i(yˆ) =
4− q + 1
4
E0t,i(y˜) +
q − 1
4
E1t,i(y˜) , (4.1)
where q is equal to one in each first quarter of the year, equal to two in each
second quarter of the year, and so on. As an example, consider the situation
in the second quarter of 2007. We would compute a proxy for the twelve-
months-ahead forecast with target date 2008Q1 by taking 3/4 of E0707Q2,i(y˜)
and adding 1/4 of E0807Q2,i(y˜).
In a second step, we compute a measure of dispersion, let’s say DEˆ
12
t (yˆ),
like the standard deviation or the interquartile range, across all individual
forecasters at each point in time.
Estimation via Time-Series Decompositions
The other methods take a different route and start from the dispersion cal-
culated across fixed event forecasts. Formally, we assume that we can write
D
Ek(y˜)
t , k ∈ {0, 1}, as the sum of two components and a residual term
D
Ek(y˜)
t =D
Ek(y˜) f
t +D
Ek(y˜)h
t + ²t . (4.2)
Here D
Ek(y˜)h
t denotes the component that is driven by the time varying fore-
cast horizon and contains no valuable information about the fundamental
disagreement among forecasters. On the other hand, D
Ek(y˜) f
t is the funda-
mental component. It is driven by the same underlying factors as D
E12(yˆ)
t
and should follow a sample path with similar dynamic properties. It is this
component that we want to use as a proxy for the (in case of survey data on
fixed event forecasts) unobserved process D
E12(yˆ)
t .
In the remainder of this section, we present different time series models
that serve to extract the fundamental component, D
Ek(y˜) f
t , from the observed
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time series, D
Ek(y˜)
t . The basic idea behind all five approaches is to determine
the seasonal (forecast horizon dependent) component. The methods differ
most crucially in the way residual terms are treated, i.e. whether they are
assumed to be part of the fundamental component or not.
Seasonal Adjustment by X12-ARIMA
One natural approach to filter out the component, D
Ek(y˜)h
t , which moves
over the year in a repetitive way due to the varying forecast horizon, is
the application of a standard seasonal adjustment method. We have chosen
the widely used X12-ARIMA procedure (US-Census-Bureau, 2007) for this
purpose.
Constant Forecast-Horizon-Effects
Another very simple approach is to assume that the reduction of dispersion
caused by a shrinkage of the forecast horizon is constant over time, i.e. there
is one D
Ek(y˜)h
t for all first quarters of the years, one for all second quarters
of the years, and so on. We can estimate those fixed forecast-horizon-effects
by regressing D
Ek(y˜)
t on a set of quarter-dummies each of them being equal
to one only in one specific quarter of the year. The regression equation takes
on the form
D
Ek(y˜)
t =
4∑
i=1
βiDumi + υt . (4.3)
One can argue that the residuals, υˆt, of this kind of regression should be
a good approximation to D
Ek(y˜) f
t . Note that the first two time series ap-
proaches simply filter out a deterministic seasonal component; all residual
shocks are attributed to the fundamental component. This will be different
for the following two approaches.
Univariate Unobserved Components Model
Yet another approach is to specify an unobserved components model (Har-
vey, 1989; Durbin and Koopman, 2001) for D
Ek(y˜)
t . This requires some as-
sumptions about the processes behind D
Ek(y˜) f
t and D
Ek(y˜)h
t . Since it is not
unreasonable to assume that D
Ek(y˜) f
t exhibits some degree of persistence, we
assume here that it follows a random walk process:
D
Ek(y˜) f
t =D
Ek(y˜) f
t−1 + υt , (4.4)
where we assume that υt ∼ NID(0, σ2υ) is independently distributed from ²t
above.
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ForD
Ek(y˜)h
t , we assume that it follows a stochastic seasonal pattern. More
specifically, we specify it in such a way that it has a trigonometric form:
D
Ek(y˜)h
t =
s/2∑
i=1
γj,t , (4.5)
where s is the number of seasonal frequencies in a given year (e.g. 4 for
quarterly data) and each of the γj,t follows:[
γj,t
γ∗j,t
]
=
[
cosλj sinλj
− sinλj cosλj
] [
γj,t−1
γ∗j,t−1
]
+
[
ωj,t
ω∗j,t
]
.
Here λ = 2pij/s is the frequency and the disturbances ωj,t and ω
∗
j,t are mutu-
ally uncorrelated and NID(0, σ2ω). The filtered state estimates (conditional
on past information only) of D
Ek(y˜) f
t constitute a proxy for the fundamental
dispersion.
Bivariate Unobserved Components Model
Whereas we used data on D
E0(y˜)
t and D
E1(y˜)
t only separably in the approaches
so far, it might be worth specifying a bivariate model to use a richer infor-
mation set to extract one fundamental component from data on both of the
dispersion time series. Such an approach is proposed in this paragraph. More
specifically, we assume that D
E0(y˜) f
t and D
E1(y˜) f
t are equal at each point in
time. Hence, we require the fundamental component of disagreement among
forecasters to be identical for both the disagreement on the current calendar
year’s annual growth rate and the disagreement on next year’s growth rate.
Given that these two kinds of forecasts are made by forecasters at the same
point in time and facing the same information set about the stance of the
economy this is a natural assumption. We denote this common fundamental
component by D
E(y˜) f
t . The appropriate specification of the data generating
process for this fundamental component is data driven and has to be spec-
ified for each set of forecasts analyzed. Some restrictions have to be made,
however, to limit the number of possible models. We assume that it follows
a stationary autoregressive process with a maximum lag order of q.
We capture the changes in dispersion induced by changing forecast hori-
zons by including dummies for the number of quarters of each forecast hori-
zon. Formally, the model is given by[
D
E0(y˜)
t
D
E1(y˜)
t
]
=D
E(y˜) f
t
[
1
1
]
+
4∑
i=0
([
βi
βi+4
]
Dumi
)
+
[
²1t
²2t
]
, (4.6)
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where D
E(y˜) f
t evolves according to
D
E(y˜) f
t =L(β)D
E(y˜) f
t + ζt .
L(β) is a lag polynomial of order q and the three error terms ²1t , ²
2
t , and ζt
are assumed to be uncorrelated and independently identically normally dis-
tributed with different but fixed variances. Again, the filtered state estimates
for D
E(y˜) f
t will serve as a proxy for the fundamental degree of dispersion.
Note that in both the univariate and the bivariate unobserved components
approach we do not add the residual terms to the fundamental component;
this is a conceptual difference to the first two time series approaches above.
4.1.2 Data Issues
As the Consensus data set provides only fixed event forecasts, we cannot use
it to evaluate the performance of the various proposed methods. Instead, we
use data from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF)6 for this purpose,
since it has the big advantage for the purpose of this section that it simul-
taneously provides fixed event and fixed horizon forecasts. The forecasters
are asked to report not only their predictions for the quarterly development
over the next five quarters (from which e.g. four-quarter-ahead forecasts can
be deduced) but also their predictions for the annual figures of the current
calendar year and those for the next calendar year.
The data set reports forecasts on macroeconomic variables from profes-
sional forecasters collected through surveys among the panelists. The SPF
is the oldest survey in the US that reports forecasts on macroeconomic vari-
ables at a quarterly frequency. Its beginning dates back to 1968, although
the set of variables has been continuously extended in later years, such that
the samples do not reach back to 1968 for all variables.7 Forecasters are
anonymous which should minimize the problem of distorted forecasts due
to incentive issues (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Ehrbeck and Waldmann,
1996; Batchelor, 2007).
We concentrate in this section on the most prominent macroeconomic
variables of the data set, namely the growth rate of the real gross domestic
product (drgdp), the inflation rate (cpi), the unemployment rate (unemp),
and the treasury-bill rate (tbill). We use a sample that spans the period from
1981Q1 to 2007Q2.
6The data can be downloaded at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/spf/. See
Croushore and Stark (2001) and http://www.philadelphiafed.org/econ/forecast/ for
details on the survey.
7The cross-section dimension, i.e. the number of forecasters who take part in the
survey, is currently around 30. For more details on the survey see e.g. Croushore (1993).
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Figure 4.1: Cross Sectional Standard Deviation of Forecasts in the SPF
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Notes: The figures show the dispersion of forecasts for the current and next calendar year
respectively together with the dispersion of the 12-months ahead forecasts from the SPF.
To get an impression about the data and the problem one is facing when
estimating cross-sectional dispersion from fixed event forecasts, we plot the
cross-sectional standard deviations over time in Figure 4.1. The plots show
the dispersion of the forecasts for the current and next calendar year respec-
tively together with the dispersion of the 12-months ahead forecasts. It is
evident that those dispersion measures based on the fixed event forecasts in-
herit saisonal patterns. These are naturally more pronounced for the results
based on the forecasts for the current calendar year. Another observation is
that the saisonal effect seems to be weakest for the dispersion of interest rate
forecasts.
4.1.3 Empirical Results
In this part, we show the empirical results obtained using the cross-sectional
standard deviation (s.d.) and the interquartile range (iqr) respectively. We
use the linear correlation between the different potential proxies and the
dispersion derived from the fixed horizon forecasts as performance criterion.
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Table 4.2: Labeling of Different Methods
Label Method
M1 Approximation of fixed horizon FCs
M2 Bivariate unobs. components model
M3 Univ. unobs. comp. model based on FCs for current cal. year
M4 Univ. unobs. comp. model based on FCs for next cal. year
M5 Extr. of sais. comp. with dummies based on FCs for current cal. year
M6 Extr. of sais. comp. with dummies based on FCs for next cal. year
M7 Saisonal adjustment of FCs for current cal. year by X12-ARIMA
M8 Saisonal adjustment of FCs for next cal. year by X12-ARIMA
M9 Unprocessed dispersion across FCs for current cal. year
M10 Unprocessed dispersion across FCs for next cal. year
Notes: FCs refers to forecasts.
To ease references to the different methods in tables and in the description
of results, we introduce the labeling scheme presented in Table 4.2. Given
its prominence against the other methods – not to mention its intuitiveness
–, we will treat M1 as the reference method.
Table 4.3 contains a bunch of information that describes the empirical
results. In what follows, we discuss the different aspects represented in the
table. The most important information is given by the first number in each
column. Those numbers are the linear correlation coefficient of the proxy ob-
tained by the different methods and the dispersion measure derived directly
from the fixed horizon forecasts given in the SPF. Ultimately, we would like
to know whether the differences in performance according to the correla-
tion coefficient of the different methods are statistically significant. To this
end, we use a test based on Fisher’s z-transformation (Fisher, 1925) to infer
whether we can reject the Null hypothesis that two correlation coefficients
are statistically different from each other.8 Information on the test outcomes
are given in the table by the numbers in parenthesis. They refer to the p-
value of testing the Null hypothesis that the correlation of the corresponding
method is equal to the correlation of M1. Values above 5% indicate that
we cannot reject the hypothesis of equal correlation coefficients and, hence,
equal performance of the two methods.
The test results indicate that the correlation coefficient in the overwhelm-
ing number of cases is statistically different. However, only in a minority of
8The test takes into account that we are dealing with dependent correlation coefficients
in the sense that for three random variables x1, x2, and y we test whether corr(x1, y) −
corr(x2, y) = 0, i.e. both correlations are computed against the same random variable.
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cases sophisticated methods outperform the simple reference method M1.
This result holds for the standard deviation as a common measure of disper-
sion; it does not hold when using the interquartile range to measure dispersion
of forecasts. Considering that the interquartile range is a more appropriate
measure of dispersion in those cases where the distribution of forecasts is
not symmetric, this could indicate weaknesses of the sophisticated methods
relative to M1 when the distribution is non-normal (for instance skewed).
The methods which indicate a higher correlation with the cross-section
dispersion of fixed horizon forecasts compared to M1 are: method M2 in two
out of eight cases, method M6 in four out of eight cases, and method M8 in
two out of eight cases. In general this does not indicate a clear gain when
using quite sophisticated methods. In fact, only M6 looks like a method which
is a serious competitor to M1. In case of the interquartile range measure,
there is no method which beats the moving-average transformation M1 in
terms of a significantly higher correlation coefficient for three out of the four
variables.
To test for the best-performing model more rigorously, we made use of
the idea outlined by Granger and others for estimating the optimal weights
in forecast combination exercises (Bates and Granger, 1969; Granger and
Ramanathan, 1984). To that end, we used a panel regression (SUR) of the
following form:
Dyˆ
12
it = αi +
8∑
j=1
βjD
y˜j f
it + εit,
8∑
j=1
βj = 1 (4.7)
where Dyˆ
12
it denotes the dispersion from the fixed horizon forecasts and D
y˜j f
it ,
j = 1, . . . , 8 are the different dispersion approximations based on the com-
peting models (except the unprocessed dispersion measures); the subscript i
refers to the different variables analyzed in this section.
We estimated the regressions in levels and first differences of the series
and for both dispersion measures. The results are summarized in Table 4.4.
Once more it becomes clear, that M1 is by far the most promising method.
Although, the results suggest that combining the proxy derived by M1 with
other proxies (especially from M4 and M8) can improve the quality, we
conclude that for practical work M1 constitutes a fairly good approach to
proxy the fundamental dispersion from panels of fixed event forecasts.9
9While the dynamics are well captured by the well-performing proxies, the results show
sizable deviations in the level of dispersion relative to the dispersion derived from fixed
horizon forecasts. We leave the discussion on re-scaling the level of the proxies for future
research. In most applications, practitioners and policy makers are likely to be interested
primarily in the variation of dispersion measures.
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Table 4.3: Correlation Results
GDP-Growth Inflation
s.d. iqr s.d. iqr
M1 0.82 0.76 0.92 0.60
M2 0.80 (0.74) 0.74 (0.72) 0.94* (0.05) 0.59 (0.88)
M3 0.78 (0.32) 0.64 (0.06) 0.84* (0.00) 0.34* (0.00)
M4 0.74 (0.08) 0.63* (0.05) 0.86* (0.01) 0.63 (0.78)
M5 0.67* (0.00) 0.53* (0.00) 0.84* (0.00) 0.24* (0.00)
M6 0.62* (0.00) 0.83* (0.05) 0.94* (0.04) 0.68 (0.20)
M7 0.54* (0.00) 0.54* (0.00) 0.82* (0.00) 0.28* (0.00)
M8 0.70* (0.00) 0.82 (0.10) 0.94 (0.08) 0.70 (0.10)
M9 0.58* (0.00) 0.40* (0.00) 0.82* (0.00) 0.21* (0.00)
M10 0.61* (0.00) 0.83* (0.05) 0.94 (0.07) 0.68 (0.25)
Unempl. Rate T-Bill Rate
s.d. iqr s.d. iqr
M1 0.83 0.65 0.89 0.88
M2 0.90* (0.00) 0.50* (0.02) 0.85* (0.04) 0.75* (0.00)
M3 0.80 (0.38) 0.26* (0.00) 0.75* (0.00) 0.67* (0.00)
M4 0.82 (0.91) 0.44* (0.01) 0.90 (0.61) 0.76* (0.00)
M5 0.24* (0.00) 0.66* (0.00) 0.37* (0.00) 0.79* (0.00)
M6 0.89* (0.00) 0.67 (0.64) 0.93* (0.00) 0.88 (0.75)
M7 0.56* (0.00) 0.31* (0.00) 0.80* (0.00) 0.73* (0.00)
M8 0.91* (0.00) 0.66 (0.82) 0.94* (0.00) 0.88 (0.92)
M9 0.62* (0.00) 0.27* (0.00) 0.69* (0.00) 0.54* (0.00)
M10 0.83 (0.94) 0.63 (0.68) 0.90 (0.60) 0.86 (0.45)
Notes: Numbers refer to the correlation to the dispersion of the actual twelve-
months-ahead predictions. Number in parenthesis show the p-values corresponding
to H0: Correlation of corresponding method is equal to correlation of M1. An
* indicates rejection of H0 at a 95% confidence level. We marked those cases
with bold numbers for which an alternative method delivers a significantly higher
correlation coefficient than M1 rather than a significantly lower one.
To recapitulate the results of this section: We can conclude that a moving-
average transformation of the fixed event predictions on the level of individual
forecasters (M1) performs extremely well for interquartile range and standard
deviations measures. There are some other methods that perform compara-
bly well in the case of the standard deviation measure, namely a bivari-
ate unobserved components model (M2), the seasonal dummy method (M5,
M6), and seasonal adjustment using a standard procedure like X12-ARIMA
(M8). Also the forecast combination exercise reveals that the moving-average
method seems to outperform all other candidates. It has by far the largest
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Table 4.4: Results of Forecast Combination Regressions
β coefficients
Measure s.d iqr
Specification Difference Level Difference Level
M1 0.468∗∗∗ 0.506∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗ 0.741∗∗∗
M2 0.216∗ 0.177 -0.058 −0.338∗∗∗
M3 0.128 -0.120 0.303∗∗ 0.111
M4 0.120 0.273∗∗∗ -0.006 0.242∗∗∗
M5 −0.305∗∗∗ −0.206∗ −0.085∗ −0.143∗∗∗
M6 0.106 -0.061 0.156∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
M7 0.175∗∗∗ 0.139∗ 0.035 0.095∗
M8 0.092 (NA) 0.293 (NA) 0.123 (NA) 0.094 (NA)
Notes: “NA” refers to non-availability of an estimated coefficient value due
to the fact that an adding-up constraint was imposed on the sum of the
coefficients.*,**,*** denotes significance at 10, 5, 1 % levels.
weight associated with any method, which clearly speaks in favor of this
method. All in all, our results are quite useful for practitioners and re-
searchers as a tested benchmark to calculate dispersion measures from panels
of survey data on fixed event forecasts.
4.2 Dispersion of Macroeconomic Forecasts
in the G710
4.2.1 Introduction
Expectations are known to be a crucial determinant of economic dynam-
ics.11 Although the available micro data sets make it possible to measure
and test many aspects of heterogeneity (e.g., differences in income, portfo-
lios, demographics, shocks or labor force status), they typically contain little
information about expectations. In addition, even when such information
exists, the length and frequency of the series do not allow to adequately
investigate how the cross-sectional distribution of expectations varies over
time, business cycles, and with economic policy. Consequently, there has
10Large parts of this section of the thesis (except Section 4.2.5) are based on a paper
that I wrote jointly with two co-authors (Dovern et al., 2009).
11See for instance Bernanke (2004), Morris and Shin (2005a), Woodford (2005) and the
discussion in Section 1.2.
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been little work on joint analyses of individual survey expectations across
countries and variables with micro data.
We investigate determinants of disagreement (cross-sectional dispersion
of forecasts) for six key economic indicators in G7 countries roughly over the
past twenty years. Using a unique data set with individual expert forecasts
from Consensus Economics (see Section 2.1), we provide a set of statistics
that capture the key features of dynamics of disagreement and are consis-
tently calculated across countries and variables. Although it is often chal-
lenging in large data sets like ours to find consistent results, to summarize
them, and to interpret the findings, a number of findings emerge quite clearly
from our analysis.
We find that disagreement about real variables (GDP, consumption, in-
vestment and unemployment) has a distinct dynamic from disagreement
about nominal variables (inflation and interest rate). Disagreement about
real variables intensifies strongly (by about 40 percent) during recessions.
Disagreement about nominal variables rises with their level, has fallen af-
ter 1998 or so (by 30 percent), and is considerably lower under independent
central banks (by 35 percent). For both groups cross-sectional dispersion in-
creases with uncertainty about the underlying indicators, and disagreement
is more strongly cross-correlated among variables within the groups than
between them.
While we provide simple and transparent reduced-form estimates, we be-
lieve our statistics also suggest a causal relationship: central bank indepen-
dence reduces disagreement about nominal variables. Country-by-country
regressions for inflation and interest rates reveal that both the level of dis-
agreement and its sensitivity to macroeconomic variables tend to be larger in
Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, where central banks became indepen-
dent only around the mid-1990s. These findings suggest that more credible
monetary policy can substantially contribute to the anchoring of expecta-
tions about nominal variables. In contrast, its effects on disagreement about
real variables are moderate.
We believe our results could be of interest to both policy-makers and
researchers. A key consensus result of the large literature on monetary theory
and policy is that anchored inflation expectations are of utter importance for
safeguarding of price stability. Much work – including Cogley and Sargent
(2001) and Stock and Watson (2005) – has documented that the inflation
and GDP processes in G7 countries became more stable in the late 1980s
and their volatility has fallen further until recently.12
12More precisely, the work typically finds that the variance of the permanent component
of inflation and GDP was declining before 2006.
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Our data set confirms the existing finding that consensus (mean) expec-
tations have become more stable for most countries and variables. How-
ever, for expectations to be perfectly anchored it is necessary that also
their cross-sectional dispersion—disagreement—disappears. Our results doc-
ument, across several countries and variables, the extent to which this has
been the case and suggest how economic shocks and monetary policy settings
contributed to the fall in disagreement we often find after 1998. Researchers
can use the stylized facts we report to calibrate, test and improve mod-
els with heterogenous beliefs, learning or information processing constraints,
which have recently become quite widespread.
Our work builds on two strands of literature on survey expectations. The
first and larger area analyzes the central tendency in expectations about
inflation, GDP and interest rates.13
A large literature exists on extracting inflation expectations from prices of
indexed bonds. For example, Gu¨rkaynak et al. (2006), Ehrmann et al. (2007)
and Beechey et al. (2008) provide evidence similar to ours, on anchoring of
long-run inflation expectations in the US, the euro area, the UK and Sweden
using high-frequency financial data.
The second, more recent and more closely related body of work investi-
gates heterogeneity in expectations, often using micro data. The key inspi-
ration for our work is a recent seminal paper of Mankiw et al. (2003), which
analyzes central tendency and dispersion of inflation expectations using sev-
eral US survey data sets. In this work the authors test some theories of
disagreement.
Separate work of Souleles (2004) uses the Michigan Survey Consumer Sen-
timent to examine the ability of various groups in the population to forecast
consumption expenditure. Blanchflower and Kelly (2008) study determinants
of inflation expectations in the Bank of England’s Inflation Attitudes Survey
and the European Commission’s consumer survey. Carroll (2003) bridges
13Branch (2004) estimates a model of boundedly rational agents on inflation expecta-
tions from the Survey of Consumer Attitudes and Behavior of the University of Michigan.
Ang et al. (2007) find that survey expectations provide better inflation forecasts than
macro variables or asset markets. Using consensus forecasts from the same data set as
ours, Levin et al. (2004) investigate the degree to which inflation expectations are an-
chored in industrial countries. Also in the Consensus Economics data set, Patton and
Timmermann (2008a) study how uncertainty about macroeconomic variables is resolved
using forecasts of the US inflation and GDP growth. Bernanke and Boivin (2003) and
Faust and Wright (2007) compare the Greenbook inflation and GDP forecasts (produced
by the US Federal Reserve) to predictions generated by reduced-form econometric models.
Kim and Orphanides (2005), Piazzesi and Schneider (2008) and others use interest rate
expectations from the US Survey of Professional Forecasters to improve on existing yield
curve models.
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the two strands of literature by proposing and testing a model of average
inflation and unemployment expectations in which households interact with
experts. But joint analyses of individual survey expectations across countries
and variables are non-existent.
4.2.2 Data Issues
The Data Set
For the analysis in this section we use data from the Consensus survey data
set on professional macroeconomic forecasts that has been described in more
detail in Chapter 2.
In this section, we focus on forecasts for the following six principal macroe-
conomic indicators: consumer-price inflation, nominal three-month interest
rate, GDP growth, consumption growth, investment growth and unemploy-
ment rate.14 Although the survey contains information on other variables
(most importantly, industrial/manufacturing production, producer prices,
wages, current account and budget balance), their coverage in terms of time
period, countries and number of respondents is less complete. These ad-
ditional indicators are also arguably less important and often less closely
followed by forecasters than those we focus on.
Fixed Event and Fixed Horizon Forecasts
Except for interest rates, the respondents answer questions about their ex-
pectations over the current and the next calendar year; the survey data thus
provide series of fixed event forecasts.15 However, we believe fixed horizon
(e.g., one-year-ahead) forecasts are preferable for the analysis of disagree-
ment because the forecasting horizon of fixed event forecasts varies from
month to month and consequently uncertainty and cross-sectional dispersion
are strongly seasonal.16
Following the method suggested in the previous section, we approximate
fixed horizon forecasts as a weighted average of fixed event forecasts as fol-
14We have also investigated expectations about industrial production. These results
are broadly consistent with those for GDP and not reported here.
15Once every quarter the survey includes additional questions for selected variables (CPI
inflation, GDP, consumption) on the fixed horizon predictions for roughly the following two
years (we used this data for the analysis presented in Section 3). However, these questions
are not useful for the analysis of disagreement because only the consensus (mean) forecasts
are published.
16In addition, we use fixed horizon forecasts, because we want to provide comparable
results to much of the literature, including Mankiw et al., 2003.
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lows. Denote f fey0,m,y1(x) the fixed event forecast of variable x for year y1
made in month m of previous year y0 = y1−1, and f fhy0,m,12(x) the fixed hori-
zon, twelve-month-ahead forecast made at the same time. For example, the
November 2008 forecast for year 2009 is f fe2008,11,2009(x). Our approximation
of the fixed horizon forecast is:
f fhy0,m,12(x) =
12−m+ 1
12
f fey0,m,y0(x) +
m− 1
12
f fey0,m,y0+1(x). (4.8)
This means that we compute the fixed horizon forecast for the next twelve
months as an average of the forecasts for the current and next calendar years
weighted by their share in the forecasting horizon. For example, the Novem-
ber 2008 forecast of the inflation rate between November 2008 and November
2009 is approximated by the sum of f fe2008,11,2008(pi) and f
fe
2008,11,2009(pi) weighted
by 2
12
and 10
12
respectively.
We use this procedure for all variables except the interest rate, which is
reported as the fixed horizon forecast for the interest rate between now and
three months from now.
Because the disagreement series is typically used only as the dependent
variable, the remaining approximation/measurement error in series f fhy0,m,12(x)
from (4.8) does not affect the consistency of the regression estimates obtained
below as long as the error is not correlated with the regressors. Such cor-
relation should be relatively low also given the monthly frequency of the
data.
Ultimately, it is an empirical question how well our approximation per-
forms. Dovern and Fritsche (2008) investigate the ability of approach (4.8)
to capture cross-sectional dispersion of predictions in the US Survey of Pro-
fessional Forecasters, which contains both fixed event and fixed horizon fore-
casts. Dovern and Fritsche find that approximation (4.8) captures well the
heterogeneity in fixed horizon forecasts.17
As the final issue, we need to decide about our preferred measure of
cross-sectional dispersion of forecasts. For most parts of the remainder of
this section, we use the interquartile range (IQR). We do so to be consistent
with the previous work (Mankiw et al., 2003) and because the IQR is also less
likely to be subject to outliers than the cross sectional standard deviation.
The results for disagreement measured with standard deviation are consistent
17Correlation between cross-sectional dispersion in (4.8) and the true dispersion of fixed
horizon forecasts is roughly 0.8–0.9 when measured with standard deviation and 0.6–0.9
for the interquartile range. The remaining nine methods that Dovern and Fritsche (2008)
investigate, including several specifications with unobserved components and seasonal ad-
justment, typically correlate with the true dispersion at 0.5–0.9 for standard deviation and
0.2–0.8 for the interquartile range.
PhD-Thesis written by: Jonas Dovern
74 Dispersion of Forecasts
Table 4.5: Correlation between the Two Disagreement Measures
Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Inflation 0.75 0.61 0.58 0.82 0.68 0.92 0.70
Interest Rate 0.87 0.78 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.86 0.73
GDP 0.79 0.62 0.78 0.69 0.76 0.66 0.83
Consumption 0.78 0.51 0.69 0.68 0.76 0.72 0.82
Investment 0.72 0.67 0.77 0.80 0.78 0.71 0.75
Unemployment 0.79 0.66 0.93 0.84 0.75 0.85 0.71
Notes: Numbers denote the correlation between the cross sectional standard devi-
ation and the cross sectional IQR computed over the full sample.
with those presented below, which is not surprising given the relatively high
correlation between the two measures shown in Table 4.5.18
Descriptive Statistics
In Appendix C, Figures C-1–C-6 give a first visual impression of the be-
havior of expectations as obtained by the method explained in the previous
section. They compare the reported forecasts and actual variables over time.
The actual series are shifted backward by twelve months so that the vertical
difference between them and the expectations is the expectation error (for
example, for November 2003, the dots denote expectations of one-year ahead
inflation rate and the actual series is inflation between November 2003 and
November 2004.) The shaded areas denote recessions as identified by the
Economic Cycle Research Institute (using the business cycle method, which
mirrors the NBER procedure).
Three findings appear for all six expectation series. First, expectations
are more stable than the actual series as the actual series contain substantial
unpredictable and volatile components.
Second, expectations are sensitive to current conditions. This is perhaps
not surprising in case of inflation, interest rate and unemployment, which
are generally thought to be quite persistent (so that the last observation is
a good predictor for the future one(s)). However, the sensitivity to current
conditions is also apparent – although to a lesser extent – for variables like
GDP growth, which are not highly serially correlated.
18For a normal distribution standard deviation (std) is proportional to the interquartile
range, std = 1.349× IQR because the 75th percentile of the standard normal distribution
is 0.6745. This scaling on average roughly holds in our data, e.g. for inflation in Canada
average IQR = 0.34 and std×1.349 = 0.26× 1.349 = 0.35.
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Third, expectations are sluggish in that they typically overestimate the
developments when the underlying variable is falling. This finding is appar-
ent for example during the disinflations of the early 1990s when inflation
expectations errors were on average positive. The result is clearer for more
persistent variables – inflation, interest rates and unemployment – than for
those subject to large transitory fluctuations (GDP, consumption and invest-
ment).
Table 4.6 summarizes the key descriptive statistics about the fixed horizon
forecasts obtained by the method described in the previous section and the
actual series.
The average number of forecasters, displayed in the first line of each panel,
typically ranges between 15 and 35. It shows little systematic variation over
time: while in Canada, Japan and the US it is approximately constant, it rises
somewhat in France, Germany and Italy and falls in the UK. The number of
respondents does not correlate with the phase of the business cycle, and varies
little across variables (in a given country). Observations for each forecaster
are available for about half of the time on average.
The second line in each panel shows the mean expectation error averaged
across forecasters and time periods. The individual forecasts are not biased
significantly, partly because the standard deviation of expectation errors is
quite large (the bias of consensus, or mean, forecasts is significant for a
few variables in some countries). Average expectation errors are typically
positive, which may reflect forecasters’ optimism or sluggishness (where the
trend in the underlying variable is falling most of the time, such as in the
case of inflation and interest rates).19 There are few systematic differences
across countries (for example, while the US respondents do well in case of
interest rate, they are doing worst for consumption).
The lines three, four and five give the average mean squared errors of
forecasts, average levels of the underlying variable and its variance respec-
tively (taken over the sample period October 1989–October 2006). Level
and variance of economic variables are likely to be positively correlated. 20
Both are positively correlated with the mean squared error (MSE) and also
disagreement across forecasters. However, the evidence in Table 4.6, based
on variables averaged over the sample and summarized in the top panels of
Figure C-7 implies if anything a negative correlation between MSE and level
19Bias of inflation forecasts tends to be quite high and positive before 1999 and negative
afterwards.
20For empirical and theoretical investigation for inflation, see Ball and Cecchetti (1990)
and Ball (1992), who proposes a model in which the level of inflation and its uncertainty
are positively correlated because when inflation is high, policy-makers face a dilemma:
they would like to disinflate but fear the resulting recession.
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Table 4.6: Summary Statistics on Individual Forecasts and Targeted Variables
Statistic Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
INFL
Average # Forecasters 16.40 18.07 28.02 14.53 18.27 32.84 28.16
Average Forecast Error† 0.21 0.15 −0.01 0.04 0.14 0.28 0.05
Average MSE 1.87 0.43 0.81 0.75 0.66 1.19 0.92
Average Level of INFL 2.31 1.89 2.19 3.49 0.59 3.20 2.94
Variance of INFL 2.05 0.59 1.73 2.62 1.76 3.96 1.08
R3M
Average # Forecasters 16.36 17.98 25.61 11.99 19.09 31.05 26.77
Average Forecast Error† 0.55 0.03 0.25 0.20 0.48 0.57 0.35
Average MSE 2.71 1.39 0.93 2.53 1.00 1.60 2.14
Average Level of R3M 5.35 5.20 4.72 6.76 1.78 6.75 4.55
Variance of R3M 7.76 8.64 5.97 16.29 6.37 9.08 3.77
GDP
Average # Forecasters 16.41 18.18 27.65 14.56 18.39 33.03 28.19
Average Forecast Error† −0.02 0.45 0.17 0.59 0.38 −0.26 −0.25
Average MSE 3.52 2.06 3.10 2.82 3.63 1.90 2.59
Average Level of GDP 2.65 1.85 1.85 1.37 1.46 2.33 2.89
Variance of GDP 3.98 1.49 3.38 1.90 3.34 2.02 2.03
CONS
Average # Forecasters 16.40 18.16 27.90 14.51 18.37 32.65 28.00
Average Forecast Error† −0.23 0.16 −0.06 0.40 0.18 −0.26 −0.54
Average MSE 2.23 1.66 2.38 3.90 2.19 2.46 1.86
Average Level of CONS 2.68 2.03 1.71 1.43 1.71 2.59 3.23
Variance of CONS 2.39 1.54 2.77 2.91 2.55 2.71 1.46
INV
Average # Forecasters 16.29 17.81 27.64 14.53 17.98 31.99 27.86
Average Forecast Error† 2.43 1.38 2.61 1.35 1.74 −0.57 1.31
Average MSE 46.67 20.90 32.41 22.20 42.06 16.89 23.66
Average Level of INV 3.66 2.26 1.67 1.81 −0.19 2.89 4.13
Variance of INV 35.83 15.07 19.73 22.32 13.84 23.31 20.11
UN
Average # Forecasters 16.41 18.07 27.65 13.99 17.98 32.32 28.12
Average Forecast Error† −0.02 0.43 0.04 0.79 −0.01 0.63 0.07
Average MSE 0.81 0.89 1.29 0.97 0.18 1.21 0.42
Average Level of UN 8.54 9.98 9.58 9.95 3.75 5.34 5.50
Variance of UN 2.50 1.30 2.99 2.06 1.28 5.88 0.93
Notes: Averages taken across forecasters and time periods. † : {*,**,***}=Statistical significance at
{10,5,1} percent.
of the underlying variable. 21 In contrast, imprecision of expectations tends
to increase with the variance of the underlying variable. While Figure C-7 is
subject to many criticisms – such as that the relationship is only bivariate
21Note that investment, being an outlier due to large MSEs, is excluded from the figure
to be able to assess if the positive relationship between MSE and variance holds even
without it.
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and based on time-averaged statistics – we believe it is an interesting starting
point for more careful regression analyses of disagreement below.22
4.2.3 Drivers of Disagreement
The previous section summarizes some key properties of the proxies for indi-
vidual fixed horizon forecasts. As opposed to this, this section focuses on the
disagreement among forecasters its evolution over time and its relationship
to the business cycle and monetary policy.
A First Look at Disagreement
Table 4.7 summarizes the average disagreement by country and variable.23
Disagreement about inflation is relatively low for France, Germany and Italy.
Cross-sectional dispersion of interest rates is quite high in Canada and the
US, relatively low in France and Germany, and extremely low in Japan.
The last finding is driven by effectively zero interest rates for much of the
time since 2000. Forecasters in France, Germany and Italy agree to a large
extent on GDP growth, compared to their counterparts in the UK, Canada
and in particular in Japan (where the dynamics are again dominated by the
recession part of the sample). While the series for consumption growth is
smoother than that for GDP growth, disagreement about consumption tends
to be somewhat higher, driven perhaps by the lower attention that some
forecasters pay to the consumption series.24
However, the two disagreement series correlate quite strongly, which is
perhaps not surprising given the large share of consumption in GDP (see also
Figures C-10–C-11 for the time perspective). Disagreement about investment
is substantially larger than for other series because of its high volatility. Un-
employment on the other hand is smooth (and predictable), which translates
into little disagreement.25
Figures C-8–C-13 illustrate the evolution of disagreement over time. Per-
haps unsurprisingly given the monthly frequency of our sample, disagreement
22Because the focus of this paper is on disagreement, we will not investigate the deter-
minants of MSEs below.
23Detailed results for recessions, booms, pre-1999 and post-1998 are given in Table B-13
Appendix B.
24Similarly, probably for the same reason average disagreement about industrial pro-
duction (not reported in the table) is much higher (more than twice as high) than about
GDP.
25The somewhat higher mean for Germany is driven by the uncertainty about labor
market statistics during the re-unification.
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Table 4.7: Average Disagreement across Countries and Variables
Variable Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Inflation 0.34 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.38 0.33
Interest Rate 0.76 0.50 0.46 0.58 0.27 0.71 0.56
GDP 0.46 0.30 0.34 0.26 0.69 0.43 0.38
Consumption 0.47 0.31 0.40 0.34 0.65 0.55 0.38
Investment 2.60 1.17 1.56 1.01 2.42 1.66 1.93
Unemployment 0.29 0.24 0.41 0.33 0.25 0.31 0.22
Notes: Averages are based on the cross sectional IQR and taken across all time
periods.
is subject to much transitory variation. However, two findings arise in sev-
eral countries and series. First, disagreement tends to rise during recessions.
Second, there is a downward time trend in disagreement.
Disagreement about inflation in Figure C-8 is roughly constant in France
and Germany but falls steadily after 1992 in Italy (as the country was ex-
pected to join the euro area), in Japan, and in the UK. The series is quite
strongly anti-cyclical (in terms of the difference between its average in reces-
sions and booms) in Canada, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US.
As shown in Figure C-9, disagreement about interest rates tends to trend
downward in all countries except for the US and its dynamics are strongly
anti-cyclical (except for Japan where there was little disagreement when the
interest rates were close to zero).
Except for France, disagreement about GDP growth in Figure C-10 is
again anti-cyclical and typically 30–50% higher in recessions than in booms.
Disagreement about the remaining real variables (consumption, investment
and unemployment) broadly tracks that of GDP.
One can think of at least two structural breaks in our sample: the intro-
duction of the euro in January 1999 and the German re-unification in October
1990. The expectations of the first event seem to have affected disagreement
about inflation in Italy, which started to fall following the breakdown of the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism in September 1992. Disagreement in
the remaining two euro area members, France and Germany, has been roughly
constant, perhaps because the inflation rate in these two countries has been
low and stable (see also Table 4.8 below). Figures C-8–C-13 show, the struc-
tural break due to the German re-unification in October 1990 temporarily
elevated disagreement about real variables (GDP, consumption, investment
and unemployment), but not about inflation and interest rates. To a large
extent unrelated to these two events, there have been much dynamics in dis-
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Table 4.8: Descriptive Statistics about Inflation, GDP Growth and Interest Rates
Variable Statistic Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Time Range: 1970–2007
CPI Inflation Mean 4.76 5.14 3.04 7.93 3.19 6.87 4.67
Variance 11.51 17.78 3.99 39.24 23.25 31.30 9.04
GDP Growth Mean 3.38 2.05† 2.14 2.23 2.87 2.46 3.09
Variance 6.43 1.49† 3.91 5.39 8.27 4.40 4.59
Short-term IR Mean 7.63 7.55 6.79‡ 9.95 4.51 8.92 7.03
Variance 14.26 13.23 3.67‡ 28.72 13.60 12.91 12.53
Time Range: 1970–1989
CPI Inflation Mean 7.14 8.27 3.92 12.29 5.72 10.24 6.35
Variance 9.08 13.99 4.63 34.92 30.76 34.29 10.94
GDP Growth Mean 3.63 2.24† 2.34 2.85 4.26 2.45 3.33
Variance 5.45 1.24† 4.49 7.20 8.09 6.69 7.10
Short-term IR Mean 9.81 9.79 7.98‡ 13.21 7.09 11.02 9.22
Variance 10.73 7.63 1.90‡ 19.39 6.46 8.08 10.11
Notes: Calculated from quarterly data. †: GDP data for France start in 1978, ‡: interest rate data for
Germany start in 1973:Q2. All numbers are given in percentages. The data has been obtained from
the OECD Main Economic Indicators, the IMF International Financial Statistics, and the Deutsche
Bundesbank.
agreement on various series, in particular the clear downward trend in the UK
and cyclical dynamics in most countries. We investigate these developments
in more detail below using simple regression analyses.
Disagreement over Time
To provide quantitative insights Tables B-1–B-6 use the fixed effects panel es-
timator (in which coefficients other than the constant are restricted to be the
same in all countries26) to assess general trends common in all countries. We
discuss the results for the three most important indicators – inflation, interest
rates and GDP – in more detail and summarize the results for the remaining
variables (consumption, investment and unemployment) only briefly.
The top panel (Panel A) of each of Tables B-1–B-6 investigates how dis-
agreement (“disagr”) varies over time and during recessions using four ver-
sions of regression:
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + εt,
where “rec” denotes the recession dummy and “post-1998” is the dummy for
the second part of the sample.
26The constant term β0 in the tables is normalized to the average of country-specific
intercepts.
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Disagreement about inflation is analyzed in Table B-1. Row 1 reports that
the cross-sectional interquartile range averaged across countries and time is
about 0.3, which suggests that half of the forecasters typically lie within 0.15
percentage points of the consensus. Row 2 shows that disagreement rises by
about 20 percent during recessions, a fact that can be due to the increase in
general macroeconomic uncertainty. Row 3 documents that disagreement is
much lower – by 25% – in the second part of the sample, after 1998.
Qualitatively similar findings are obtained for disagreement about interest
rates and GDP growth and reported in Tables B-2 and B-3 respectively.
For both variables, disagreement rises during recessions and falls after 1998.
While the effects for interest rates are quantitatively similar to those for
inflation, the increase in disagreement about GDP during recessions is almost
twice as large – 44 percent (and the fall after 1998 is less pronounced). This
seems reasonable as macroeconomic uncertainty during a recession is skewed
toward GDP (and less evident for inflation and interest rates).
The results for consumption growth, investment growth and unemploy-
ment rate in Tables B-4, B-5 and B-6 are again qualitatively in line with
those findings.
Qualitatively, the estimates (together with those of Tables B-1–B-2) sug-
gest that the recession differential in disagreement – the difference between
average disagreement in a recession and in a boom – is generally larger for
real variables (GDP, consumption, investment and unemployment) than for
the two nominal variables. In contrast, the fall in disagreement after 1998
tends to be smaller for real variables than for nominal ones.
Two important broad factors behind the variation in disagreement can be
the shocks to economic variables and economic policy. Larger shocks boost
the volatility of the underlying variables and make them less predictable. As a
result, forecasters are more likely to disagree about future outcomes (because
of using different models, priors, subjective probabilities or data). More
credible economic policies can make economic indicators easier to forecast.
An obvious example is the introduction of an explicit numerical inflation
target, which can contribute to a better anchoring of inflation expectations.
Similarly, independent central banks are often perceived as better safeguards
to price stability (and can indirectly also contribute to the stabilization of
output). We investigate these two factors – economic shocks and policies –
in a simple reduced-form setup below.
Disagreement and Macro Variables
The middle panel (Panel B) of Tables B-1–B-6 investigates how disagreement
correlates with the underlying variables, its squared change – a proxy of
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uncertainty about the series –, the output gap27, and the squared change in
the policy interest rate (∆policy rate2t ) – a proxy of the variation in monetary
policy:
disagrt = β0+β2×xt+β3×∆12x2t+β4×output gapt+β5×∆policy rate2t+εt,
where xt denotes the level of the underlying variable and ∆12x
2
t ≡ (xt−xt−12)2
denotes its uncertainty.
Disagreement about inflation increases with its level: one percentage point
increase in inflation raises the cross-sectional interquartile range by 0.026, or
by about 10 percent (with respect to the mean 0.299). The direct effect
of inflation uncertainty (the term ∆12INFL
2
t ), which is also highly signifi-
cant but smaller, suggests large changes in inflation rate disproportionately
increase disagreement. The coefficient on output gap is negative, which is
in line with the previous evidence that disagreement increases during reces-
sions. Finally, disagreement about inflation rises when monetary policy rates
change, which again tends to coincide with recessions. (But the positive co-
efficient on interest rates is significant even when output gap is included.) In
addition, including interest rates among the explanatory variables substan-
tially increases the explanatory power of the regression.
Disagreement about interest rates shown in Table B-2 rises with the level
and squared change of the interest rates. These findings are in line with
the fact reported in panel A that disagreement about interest rates fell after
1998, as both level and variation in rates is much lower in the second part
of the sample (see also Figure C-2). In addition, disagreement also tends to
move inversely to the output gap. While the coefficients in these regressions
are comparable to those of inflation and of GDP growth, their explanatory
power is considerably higher.
Table B-3 analyzes drivers of disagreement about GDP growth. In con-
trast to inflation and interest rates but in line with the evidence of panel
A, disagreement about GDP growth moves inversely with its level: disagree-
ment rises in periods of weak economic growth. Arguably, the effects of GDP
growth on disagreement are non-linear: disagreement can be expected to rise
during periods of heightened uncertainty, which likely occur during reces-
sions, but also when economic growth accelerates considerably (however, the
latter periods are virtually absent in our sample as GDP growth only rarely
exceeds 5 percent). To proxy economic uncertainty in the fifth model for
GDP, the model includes the squared change in GDP growth over the last
27The output gap used here is the ex post estimate taken from OECD’s Economic
Outlook. The series is quarterly, interpolated constant within each quarter, and starts in
1991:Q1.
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year, which turns out to to be positive but insignificant. As for disagree-
ment about inflation and interest rates, variation in interest rates analyzed
in model 7 also improves the performance of the regression (measured with
adjusted R2).
Given the large share of consumption expenditure in output, it is not
surprising that the findings for consumption in Table B-4 mirror those for
GDP quite closely. The results are qualitatively similar for investment and
unemployment rate although the explanatory power of investment regressions
is smaller (as disagreement about investment tends to move more, much of
which is unrelated to macro variables).
The results in panel B are also broadly agree with the bivariate illustration
of the relationship between time-averaged disagreement and level/variance of
the underlying variable in the bottom panels of Figure C-7. While the first
correlation is close to zero (for reasons outlined above), the correlation to
the variance, which proxies better for underlying uncertainty, is positive and
quite strong.
Our findings in this and the previous sections are in line with Mankiw
et al. (2003) and Do¨pke and Fritsche (2006). Mankiw et al. (2003) report that
in the US disagreement about inflation increases with its level and absolute
value of its change. This is true, in particular when the change is sharp, and
though it shows an anti-cyclical pattern after 1975 for consumers, its depen-
dence on the phase of the business cycle is less clear for experts. Do¨pke and
Fritsche (2006) find that dispersion of inflation and growth expectations in
Germany is high before and during recessions and that it correlates positively
with macroeconomic uncertainty.
Disagreement and Central Bank Independence
It might be a priori expected that better macroeconomic policy alleviates
economic uncertainty and disagreement. Without going in much detail into
measuring the quality of economic institutions, panel C of Tables B-1–B-6
provides a simple illustration of how a better and more credible monetary
policy affects disagreement about various variables. We attempt to capture
credibility of monetary policy using an indicator of central bank independence
as defined in Table 4.9.28
28We intentionally use a simple indicator, which transparently tracks central bank in-
dependence throughout our sample. The indicator is broadly in line with a measure of
political autonomy of central banks newly calculated by Arnone et al. (2007), who use the
methodology proposed by Grilli et al. (1991) and Cukierman (1992). Their approach de-
fines political autonomy as the ability of central banks to select the objectives of monetary
policy. They measure independence using a combination of eight criteria related to how
the governor and board of directors are appointed, the relations with government and the
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Table 4.9: Central Bank Independence in G7 Countries, 1989–2006
Fraction of Sample
Country Monetary Policy Setting Dummy Variable with Indep. CB
Canada De facto independent central
bank;∗
1 full sample 1
France† Independent central bank
since August 4, 1993
0 before August 1993,
1 otherwise
159
205 = 0.78
Germany† Independent central bank
since August 1, 1957
1 full sample 1
Italy† Independent central bank ef-
fectively since January 1,
1994‡
0 before January
1994,
1 otherwise
154
205 = 0.75
Japan Independent central bank
since June 18, 1997
0 before July 1997,
1 otherwise
112
205 = 0.55
UK Independent central bank
since June 1, 1998; inflation
targeting since October 1992
0 before June 1998,
1 otherwise
101
205 = 0.49
US Independent central bank
since December 23, 1913
1 full sample 1
Notes: *: Bank of Canada was technically independent until 1967 and has been de jure
dependent on the Minister of Finance since then. (Inflation targeting since February
1991.) †: Refers to the period before the country joined the euro area. ‡: Formally
since February 7, 1992, however, granting of independence was effectively not completed
until 1994. Information has been obtained from the web pages of the respective central
banks.
We estimate two versions of the following regression
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 × xt + β3 ×∆12x2t +
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 ×∆policy rate2t + εt.
The dummy for central bank independence (CB Independencet) is negative,
large and highly statistically significant for all six variables.29 Quantitatively,
the reduction in disagreement related to central bank independence is largest
for the two nominal variables, interest rates and inflation, 41% and 35%
respectively; for real variables it ranges between 5% and 20%. In addition,
the explanatory power of these regressions is substantially larger than of those
with recession dummies of model 2 (and even marginally larger than those
nature of the laws relevant for central banks. Appendix Table 8 of Arnone et al. (2007)
implies that political autonomy of central banks was relatively low in Japan, the UK,
France, Canada and Italy in the late 1980s, has generally risen in G7 countries between
the late 1980s and 2003, but still remained relatively low in 2003 in Japan, Canada and
the UK.
29The dummy is only marginally significant for investment.
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with recession and post-1998 dummies of model 3) for nominal variables. The
opposite is true, however, for real variables (where adjusted R2s of model 8
lie below those of model 2).
Model 9 attempts to separate the effects of central bank independence
and other factors (by including macroeconomic control variables of Panel B
jointly). The estimates imply that the monetary policy indicator remains
overwhelmingly significant for nominal variables, but less so for real indica-
tors. For most variables, the point estimate of β1 changes only modestly
(relative to model 8). At the same time some other regressors, in particular
economic uncertainty turns out to be statistically significant (and broadly
comparable in size to estimates of β3 in Panel B).
These findings suggest that (i) higher central bank independence coincides
with a substantial decline in disagreement and (ii) the effect is particularly
pronounced for nominal variables. While the first result, the quantification
of effects of central bank independence on disagreement, is to our knowledge
new, it bears some relation to the large literature on economic effects of cen-
tral bank independence (Rogoff, 1985; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Alesina
and Gatti, 1995 and many others). Most empirical work in the field agrees
that central bank independence promotes price stability although its effects
on real economic performance are hard to pin down, which is broadly in line
with our second finding.
The second result can also be explained with the introduction of inflation
targeting (in several countries in our sample) and more generally with the
adoption of more predictable monetary policy and increased and improved
communication of central bankers with other economic agents. The effect
of these developments is stronger for nominal variables, which are directly
affected by explicit inflation targets or communication about possible future
paths of policy rates. On the other hand, disagreement about real variables,
whose future dynamics are typically communicated less extensively, is less
sensitive to the institutional setting of monetary policy.
The explanatory power of our regressions is quite low; the adjusted R2
often ranges between 0.1 and 0.2. This is perhaps not surprising because
Figures C-1–C-6 show that disagreement is subject to much transitory vari-
ation, which cannot easily be captured with our explanatory variables and
simple models. The disagreement series we construct is subject to much mea-
surement and sampling uncertainty: First, questions that aim at capturing
expectations about economic variables can be challenging to answer even for
professional forecasters. Second, we use monthly data, which are generally
known to be noisy. Finally, we attempt to extract cross-sectional variation
from a sample of only about 20–30 experts. However, we believe the data
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still do provide interesting information because many of the coefficients we
estimate are overwhelmingly significant and reasonable in size.
4.2.4 Disagreement Across Countries
While panel analysis is useful in summarizing the general trends in determi-
nants of disagreement, averaging wipes out information about cross-country
heterogeneity. The analysis of this section attempts to capture and interpret
such heterogeneity.
Country-by-Country Regression Analysis
Tables B-7–B-12 summarize the cross-country differences in the drivers of
disagreement by estimating models 3 and 7 (of Tables B-1–B-6) separately
country by country.
The results are broadly consistent with the panel analysis of the previous
section. While most coefficients are signed in line with our priors, some of
them are insignificant because of their smaller size and because of their larger
standard errors caused in part by fewer observations (roughly 200 compared
to roughly 7× 200 for panel estimates).
The top panel of Table B-7 divides countries into two groups depending
on how much the disagreement about inflation varies over time. In Canada,
France, Germany and the United States this variable is rather insensitive to
the phase of the business cycle and constant over the two time periods (pre-
1999 and post-1998). Hence, while the coefficients β1 and β2 are sometimes
significant (and almost always have the correct sign), the explanatory power
of the regressions in these countries is rather low (about 0.1 or less in terms
of adjusted R2), because the coefficients tend to be smaller than in the re-
maining countries. In contrast, in Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom the
two variables explain up to 40 percent of the variation in disagreement about
inflation (in adjusted R2 terms). Findings consistent with the top panel are
shown in the bottom panel: Disagreement in Italy, Japan and the UK is
much more sensitive to macro variables (inflation level and its variation, out-
put gap and variation in policy interest rates) than in the rest of the sample,
where coefficients are often insignificant or small.
Analogous regressions for short-run interest rates shown in Table B-8
are broadly consistent with those for inflation, even though the difference
in sensitivity of disagreement for the two country groups is less pronounced.
Adjusted R2s for Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom range around 0.4–
0.5; those for other countries average to about 0.25. This finding seems
reasonable, as the existence of independent central banks and explicit nu-
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meric inflation targets can help stabilize inflation expectations and reduce
disagreement about inflation. In contrast, such targets are not announced
for interest rates (or other variables).
The results for the remaining, real variables – GDP, consumption, in-
vestment and unemployment rate, shown in Tables B-9, B-10, B-11 and B-12
respectively – exhibit little systematic variation across countries. The finding
that the link between monetary policy institutions and sensitivity of disagree-
ment about real variables is not particularly pronounced is explained by the
fact that the key (and typically sole) goal for monetary goal for monetary
policy is safeguarding of price stability. In contrast, central banks usually
affect output stability only indirectly.
The level and sensitivity of disagreement about inflation and interest rates
relate quite closely to the fraction of the sample with an independent central
bank, displayed in the right-most column of Table 4.8. Canada, France,
Germany and the United States have had an independent monetary authority
for most of the sample period, Japan and the U.K. only for about half of the
time.
Credibility of monetary policy affects disagreement through (at least)
two channels: First, it stabilizes inflation rates, so that economic shocks
do not affect prices. Second, given inflation volatility, it anchors inflation
expectations, so that the shocks which are reflected in inflation do not affect
inflation expectations (and disagreement). The first channel could be the
reason why in model 9 of Tables B-7 and B-8 macroeconomic indicators
remain significant.
However, the case of Italy suggests that the measure is not good enough
to capture the whole story. Italy had, according to our measure, credible
monetary policy for three quarters of the sample, but its level and sensitivity
of disagreement is high. In our view, it is likely that disagreement could be
affected by current and past economic uncertainty.
Although it is beyond the scope of this analysis to investigate this hypoth-
esis more formally, we would like to provide some suggestive evidence. Table
4.8 shows averages and variances of some key economic variables (inflation,
GDP growth and interest rates).30 The two countries with high volatility
of inflation and interest rates are Japan and, in particular, Italy where the
two variances are almost twice as large as in any other country (except for
inflation in the UK). In contrast, economic conditions have generally been
30The top panel displays the baseline statistics for 1970–2007. The bottom panel shows
that the statistics calculated for the period before the beginning of our estimation sample
(October 1989) are broadly consistent.
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stable in France, Germany and the US. Consequently, the history of economic
shocks seems to affect the dynamics of disagreement.
Cross-Variable and Cross-Country Links between Disagreement
We have also investigated the cross-country and cross-variable links in dis-
agreement. We only summarize them briefly as our results are not clear-cut
enough to justify a more detailed exposition.31 First, for a given variable,
disagreement is typically moderately positively correlated across countries
with correlation of around 0.2 (at monthly frequency).32 Cross-country cor-
relations tend to be higher for more persistent variables: interest rates and
unemployment.
Cross-variable correlations (within a given country) are in the same ball-
park as the cross-country ones and suggest that disagreement about inflation
and GDP growth is strongly correlated with other variables. Disagreement
is more synchronized in the UK and the US. Multivariate analyses of condi-
tional correlations – regressions of disagreement about one variable on dis-
agreement about the remaining variables – suggest that disagreement tends
to co-move for real variables. This holds especially for GDP, consumption
and unemployment, and for nominal variables, inflation and interest rate.
Links between real and nominal variables are less important (conditional on
correlations between variables from the same group). We found little sys-
tematic patterns between countries in cross-country conditional multivariate
regressions (i.e., regressions of disagreement in one country on disagreement
in others for a given variable).
4.2.5 Robustness Check Using Non-Transformed Raw
Data33
Although in Section 4.1 we have shown for data from the Survey of Profes-
sional Forecasters that a moving average of fixed event forecasts is a good
proxy for corresponding (implied) fixed horizon forecasts (see also Dovern and
Fritsche, 2008), the work presented in the previous section (see also Dovern
et al., 2009) might be challenged by the critique that this result may not
apply automatically to every other survey data set. To address this concern,
we provide some additional evidence on the determinants of disagreement
31Cross-variable and cross-country correlations in disagreement are given in Tables B-14
and B-15 in the Appendix.
32Correlations increase to around 0.3–0.4 once the data are aggregated to quarterly
frequency by averaging.
33This section of the thesis is based on an unpublished note (Dovern, 2009b).
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among forecasters using the non-transformed raw data from the Consensus
Forecast data set in this section. The results are based on an empirical study
that analyzes the forecasts for GDP, consumption, industrial production, and
the inflation rate.
The Horizon-Effect
It is a well known fact that the dispersion of a cross-section of fixed event
forecasts decreases as the forecast horizon shrinks, since more and more in-
formation becomes available and the forecasts tend towards the realized out-
come. Depending how much information about an outcome of a variable
is revealed during the period for which the forecast is made this decline in
disagreement might be more or less pronounced.
We capture this horizon effect by regressing the time series of cross-
sectional standard deviations (derived from forecasts for one variable), σit,
on a constant and a trend variable, horizont, that captures the decline of the
forecast horizon:
σit = c+ αhorizont + ²t , (4.9)
where ²t denotes the residual term and α is the effect of a one month change
on the degree of disagreement. horizont is equal to the remaining forecast
horizon in each month, e.g. equal to 12 in January or equal to 2 in November.
Note that we run separate regressions for the forecasts with forecast hori-
zon of one year or less and those with forecast horizon of more than one year.
The reason why we do this, is that a visual inspection of the disagreement
data shows that disagreement declines sharply during the year for which the
forecast is made, while it is fairly constant if there is more than one year to
go until the outcome is released.
In Appendix B, we show the estimates for α for all variables and countries
in the sample. Table B-16 shows the results for the forecasts with a horizon
of more than a year and Table B-17 shows the results for the forecasts with
a horizon of one year or less. The corresponding t-statistics show that the
effect is highly significant for the current year forecasts in all cases. While
this is also true for inflation forecasts, for forecasts with a horizon of more
than a year, the effect is not significant for the wide majority of next year
forecasts in case of the three other variables.
To see how important the decline in disagreement is relative to the average
degree of disagreement about the outlook for a specific variable, we compute
how large the change of disagreement in a given month is as a percentage of
the average level of disagreement. The numbers are presented in Table B-18
and Table B-19. While the numbers are quite low for the forecasts with a
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horizon of more than a year, they are substantially high for lower horizon
forecasts. Two observations are worth noting: First, the relative reduction of
disagreement is highest for inflation forecasts. Second, the relative reduction
of disagreement is highest in the US.
To see whether the decline in disagreement occurs in a linear fashion or
whether there is a nonlinear effect, we run a similar regression, in which we
include a quadratic trend in addition:
σit = c+ α1 horizont + α2 horizon
2
t + ²t (4.10)
Note that α2 > 0 (α2 < 0) would imply that the reduction of disagreement
follows a concave (convex) pattern, as the forecast horizon shrinks.
The results in Tables B-20 and B-21 show a significant result for forecasts
for the next year only in one case (Inflation in Germany). The effects of
the quadratic term are somewhat larger for the forecasts for the current year
though they remain insignificant in most cases. A general feature is, however,
that they tend to be negative with the exception of the US where all estimates
of α2 are positive.
34 That means that the reduction of disagreement evolves
in a convex way, i.e. it starts slowly and accelerates the closer the forecast
horizon shrinks to zero. These shapes are broadly in line with what Patton
and Timmermann (2008a) find for inflation and growth forecasts. Figure
C-14 in Appendix C visualizes the typical pattern on hands of an example.
To see whether there are secular trends in disagreement over the years
(that we could show to exist in the previous section), we included a time trend
in (4.9). The results are given in Tables B-22 and B-23. The results show that
in some cases a significant decline in the level of disagreement can be observed
for the forecasts for the current year as well as for the forecasts for the next
year. This might be interpreted as a side-effect of the Great Moderation.
The economy has become less volatile, there is a better understanding of
implications of economic policy actions, and monetary policy has become
more transparent. All this has led to more agreement among forecasters
about the economic outlook, i.e. the relative importance of idiosyncratic
forecasting errors has declined.
The same kind of analysis can be conducted with a measure of disagree-
ment that simultaneously takes all four variables into account. The develop-
ment of the vector variances for all countries are shown in Figure C-15.35 A
34In fact, with one exception (Inflation in the US) all significant effects are negative
without exception.
35The vector variance at time t is the norm of the vectorized covariance matrix of all
forecasts made at that point in time. Formally, if Σt denotes the covariance matrix in
month t, the vector variance, V Vt is given by V Vt = ‖vec(Σt)‖, where vec(·) denotes the
vec-operator (see e.g. Djauhari, 2007).
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visual inspection reveals that also for the multivariate measure the horizon-
induced time-variability is much more apparent for the forecasts with a fore-
cast horizon of one year or less. This is also confirmed by a formal regression;
Table B-24 shows all estimates for the horizon effect in (4.9). Again, as one
would expect there is not much of such an effect for the forecasts with horizon
of more than a year, while the effect is highly significant for the forecasts with
horizon of one year or less. The relative change per month is again found to
be highest for the US forecasts.
Also here, we checked for a quadratic effect using (4.10). The results
show, however, that no such nonlinear effect is significantly estimated in the
multivariate setup.
Dispersion and the Business Cycle
To measure the sensitivity of disagreement to the stance of the economy, we
can augment (4.9) by a measure of the output gap:
σit = c+ αhorizont + β (yt − y∗t ) + ²t , (4.11)
where yt is the log of industrial production at time t and y
∗
t is the log of
a measure of potential production that we estimate by a simple HP-filter.
The results are shown in Tables B-25 and B-26. An increase (decrease) in
the output gap tends to decrease (increase) dispersion about the outlook
of the economy for forecasts with a horizon of one year or more while the
opposite (though not significantly in most cases) is true for forecasts with a
lower forecast horizon. In addition, there are also some significant differences
across variables. While the disagreement across forecasts for the real variables
– especially GDP and industrial production – seems to have a strong counter-
cyclical element, we find less of such evidence for disagreement across inflation
forecasts. This finding is in line with our results from Section 4.2.3 and the
evidence that Patton and Timmermann (2008b) provide for disagreement
across GDP and inflation forecasts in the US.
To cross-check these results – which might be influenced by the way we
construct the output gap – we include a variable that is equal to 1 if there is
at most one month of recession in the year for which a forecast is made, and
0 otherwise (instead of the output gap measure).36 Using this variable, we
can check whether the occurrence of a recession during the time, for which
the forecast is targeted, influences the degree of disagreement. The results
are given in Tables B-27 and B-28. They show that disagreement about the
outcome of variables for the ongoing year tends to be higher in almost all
36The recession dating was taken from the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI).
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cases if there is a recession during that year. On the contrary, there is no
such clear-cut result for longer horizon forecasts. Only some of the results are
significant; in two cases (inflation Canada and Italy) the effect is negative,
and the magnitude of the effect is much lower than in Table B-28 in most
cases.
We analyze the correlation between business cycle and dispersion also us-
ing the multivariate measure of dispersion. If we replace σit in (4.11) by the
multivariate measure V Vt, we obtain again the results that while a negative
output gap increases disagreement about the outlook for the next year, it
tends to lower disagreement for the current year (though again not signif-
icantly in about half of the cases). Detailed estimates are shown in Table
B-29.
All in all, the results support the widely expressed perception that it is
notoriously hard to forecast turning points which are usually only foreseen
by a minority of forecasters. Instead, once facing a recession it is relatively
easier to anticipate the trajectory of the recovery such that forecasters mostly
agree on the figures for the recession year.
4.3 Concluding Remarks
In Section 4.1, we have shown how well different methods perform that can be
used to extract a measure of disagreement from fixed event forecasts, which
is not distorted by horizon-effects. We concluded that the approach via a
simple moving average of fixed event forecasts performs best in general and
is easily applicable and transparent.
Using this method in Section 4.2 to construct and analyze forecast disper-
sion in the G7 countries, we document a dichotomy between disagreement
about real variables (GDP, consumption, investment and unemployment),
which is more strongly affected by real factors, and disagreement about
nominal variables (inflation and interest rate), which react to the institu-
tional setting of monetary policy (in particular central bank independence).
Disagreement about real variables intensifies strongly during recessions. Dis-
agreement about nominal variables is considerably lower under independent
central banks. Cross-sectional dispersion for both groups increases with un-
certainty about the underlying indicators. Country-by-country regressions
for inflation and interest rates reveal that both the level of disagreement and
its sensitivity to macroeconomic variables tend to be larger in Italy, Japan
and the United Kingdom, where central banks became independent only
around the mid-1990s.
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Our findings also suggest that more credible monetary policy can sub-
stantially contribute to anchoring of expectations about nominal variables;
its effects on disagreement about real variables are moderate. While our
analysis uses data on expectations of professional forecasters, qualitatively
similar results maybe obtained also for other economists (in industry, govern-
ment and academia) and households. This could be the case if our data are
viewed as a proxy for expectations of the rest of population, or if news spread
epidemiologically from experts to other agents (as proposed by Carroll, 2003).
Some of these findings were tested for robustness in Section 4.2.5 using a
different approach that does not rely on transformed data; the results usually
supported the findings qualitatively. We interpret this as evidence in favor of
the proposed way of working with the transformed measures of disagreement
to circumvent the horizon-effect. In addition, using the non-transformed
data, we find some features of the horizon-effect that are in line with findings
of other papers on single countries.
To our knowledge, the results of the studies presented in this part of the
thesis are one of the first joint analyses of dispersion of individual survey
expectations across countries and variables using micro data. The strength
of some signals we use to investigate disagreement has been relatively weak:
Following the Great Moderation, economic shocks in our sample (1989–2006)
have been quite modest. Further insights about expectations and disagree-
ment will be gained once data covering the recent global turbulences become
available.
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Summary
In this thesis we use survey data to analyze expectations about macroeco-
nomic variables and the way these expectations are formed. Thereby, we
concentrate on inflation (expectation) dynamics and the analysis of forecast
dispersion. Most of the analysis is based on a newly constructed data set
that covers individual forecasts for a bunch of macroeconomic variables for
all G7 countries.
Using a new approach for modeling forecast errors in a structural way,
we show that most of the individual forecasts in the Consensus survey data
set have fairly good properties with respect to unbiasedness and efficiency.
We provide empirical evidence in favor of partial equilibrium models of the
sticky information type that explain the development of inflation dynamics
and the formation process of inflation expectations of households respectively.
The model proposed by Carroll (2003) as well as the SIPC proposed by
Mankiw and Reis (2002) fit European data reasonably well.
In the last part of the thesis, we present an innovative analysis of the
determinants of forecast dispersion that is unique in the literature. We show
how forecast dispersion can be estimated from fixed event data and use the
method that was found to outperform the other methods to analyze the
behavior of forecast dispersion in the G7 countries. We show that there is a
dichotomy between disagreement about real variables, which is more strongly
affected by real factors, and disagreement about nominal variables, which is
related to the institutional setting of monetary policy. Disagreement about
real variables intensifies strongly during recessions, while disagreement about
nominal variables is considerably lower under independent central banks.
In all those analyses, we present evidence for several countries – thus
increasing the reliability of our findings. By analyzing data for multiple
countries, we were able to present more general evidence than would have
been the case if we had concentrated only on a specific country.
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There are several directions for extensions to some of the issues covered
in this thesis. First, the structural form by which we modeled the forecast
errors in section 2.3 is still based on some strong assumptions (e.g. linear
accumulation of individual shocks) and could certainly be generalized once
data over a longer time span becomes available.1 Second, using our findings
that the average forecasts – while usually outperforming individual forecasts
in terms of forecast accuracy – show a high degree of inefficiency, one could
use the autocorrelation of revisions to generate “modified” consensus fore-
casts that have better forecasting precision. Third, survey data might also
help to assess the validity of different concepts for modeling inflation dynam-
ics in a general equilibrium framework which is done so far only under the
assumption of model consistent rational expectations (e.g. Trabandt, 2007;
Korenok, 2008). Fourth, while we analyze the determinants of dispersion in
a two-steps procedure (first we generated a measure of dispersion and then
we used is a the regressand in the regression analysis), one could imagine
that analyzing the effects in one model might bring efficiency gains. The
latter could maybe implemented as some form of heteroscedasticity model
with exogenous drivers of the conditional dispersion of forecasts. Finally,
once some stylized facts about the development of dispersion of expectations
and its relation to uncertainty have been established, it may be worthwhile
to incorporate this heterogeneity into theoretical general equilibrium models
as recently demonstrated by Bloom et al. (2008). This way, the models could
potentially reflect the heterogeneity of agents and the impact of uncertainty
on investment decisions better than current macroeconomic models.
1See also the discussion in Dovern (2009a).
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Appendix
A Carlson-Parking-Method for Quantifying
Survey Data
In section 3.1, we have to re-scale the balance statistics from the qualitative survey on
households’ inflation expectations to obtain a measure of inflation expectations. The
standard method follows Carlson and Parkin (1975) and its extensions. In our case, the
observed data are from a pentachotomous survey, i.e., they classify the responses into five
subgroups:
Consumer prices will:
• Increase more rapidly,
• Increase at the same rate,
• Increase at a slower rate,
• Stay about the same,
• Fall.
Batchelor and Orr (1988) derive how responses from a pentachotomous survey can be
transformed into a measure of inflation expectations: tµt+1 = µ˜t×f (tAt+1, tBt+1, . . . , tEt+1),
where tAt+1, . . . , tEt+1 are the fractions of respondents answering each option and f is a
known function (see Batchelor and Orr, 1988, p. 322, formula (11)) and µ˜t is the current
perceived inflation rate that has to be specified.
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B Detailed Results about Determinants of
Disagreement
Table B-1: Disagreement and Business Cycle – Panel Results for Inflation
Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 R¯2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + εt
1. 0.299∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.003)
2. 0.287∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.034
(0.002) (0.011)
3. 0.327∗∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗ −0.082∗∗∗ 0.133
(0.013) (0.014) (0.023)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagrt = β0 + β2 × INFLt + β3 ×∆12INFL2t + β4 × output gapt +
+ β5 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
4. 0.237∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.081
(0.007) (0.003)
5. 0.237∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.082
(0.008) (0.003) (0.000)
6. 0.232∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.015 0.077
(0.006) (0.004) (0.001) (0.011)
7. 0.232∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ −0.014∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.095
(0.007) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.010)
Panel C: Disagreement and Central Bank Independence
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 × INFLt + β3 ×∆12INFL2t+
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
8. 0.420∗∗∗ −0.152∗∗∗ 0.173
(0.007) (0.009)
9. 0.388∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗∗ 0.007 0.002∗∗∗ −0.017∗∗∗ 0.032 0.229
(0.025) (0.011) (0.008) (0.001) (0.004) (0.026)
Notes: Fixed effects estimators, clustered standard errors (groups of countries: (i)
France, Germany, Italy, UK, (ii) Canada, US, (iii) Japan). β0 denotes the average
of country-specific intercepts. “post-1998t”denotes a dummy variable which equals
0 before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which
equals 1 during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI)
and 0 otherwise. “output gapt” denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the
OECD Economic Outlook quarterly output gap revisions database (in August
2008). ∆12INFL2t ≡ (INFLt− INFLt−12)2. “MP Independencet” denotes a 0–1
indicator of independent monetary policy defined in table 4.9.
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Table B-2: Disagreement and Business Cycle – Panel Results for the Interest Rate
Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 R¯2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + εt
1. 0.549∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.007)
2. 0.519∗∗∗ 0.161∗ 0.057
(0.016) (0.083)
3. 0.624∗∗∗ 0.124∗ −0.214∗∗∗ 0.236
(0.022) (0.070) (0.024)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagrt = β0 + β2 ×R3Mt + β3 ×∆12R3M2t + β4 × output gapt +
+ β5 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
4. 0.319∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ 0.279
(0.013) (0.003)
5. 0.321∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.274
(0.006) (0.002) (0.001)
6. 0.330∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗ −0.018 0.225
(0.032) (0.007) (0.003) (0.024)
7. 0.333∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.227
(0.012) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.017)
Panel C: Disagreement and Central Bank Independence
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 ×R3Mt + β3 ×∆12R3M2t +
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
8. 0.783∗∗∗ −0.294∗∗∗ 0.169
(0.013) (0.007)
9. 0.540∗∗∗ −0.180∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ −0.022 0.042 0.278
(0.088) (0.059) (0.009) (0.001) (0.014) (0.029)
Notes: Fixed effects estimators, clustered standard errors (groups of coun-
tries: (i) France, Germany, Italy, UK, (ii) Canada, US, (iii) Japan). β0 de-
notes the average of country-specific intercepts. “post-1998t” denotes a dummy
variable which equals 0 before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a
dummy variable which equals 1 during recession set by the Economic Cycle
Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 otherwise. “output gapt” denotes the ex-
post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook quarterly output
gap revisions database (in August 2008). ∆12R3M2t ≡ (R3Mt − R3Mt−12)2.
“MP Independencet” denotes a 0–1 indicator of independent monetary policy
defined in table 4.9.
PhD-Thesis written by: Jonas Dovern
110 Appendix
Table B-3: Disagreement and Business Cycle – Panel Results for GDP
Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 R¯2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + εt
1. 0.410∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.004)
2. 0.378∗∗∗ 0.165∗∗∗ 0.130
(0.007) (0.038)
3. 0.394∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗ 0.138
(0.013) (0.041) (0.015)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagrt = β0 + β2 ×GDPt + β3 ×∆12GDP 2t + β4 × output gapt +
+ β5 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
4. 0.482∗∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ 0.111
(0.010) (0.005)
5. 0.463∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ 0.004 0.117
(0.027) (0.006) (0.005)
6. 0.453∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.002 0.099
(0.024) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
7. 0.447∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ −0.002 0.047∗∗∗ 0.103
(0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.013)
Panel C: Disagreement and Central Bank Independence
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 ×GDPt + β3 ×∆12GDP 2t +
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
8. 0.458∗∗∗ −0.061 0.015
(0.010) (0.054)
9. 0.494∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.005 0.036∗∗∗ 0.120
(0.004) (0.022) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.013)
Notes: Fixed effects estimators, clustered standard errors (groups of coun-
tries: (i) France, Germany, Italy, UK, (ii) Canada, US, (iii) Japan). β0 de-
notes the average of country-specific intercepts. “post-1998t” denotes a dummy
variable which equals 0 before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a
dummy variable which equals 1 during recession set by the Economic Cycle
Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 otherwise. “output gapt” denotes the ex-
post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook quarterly output
gap revisions database (in August 2008). ∆12GDP 2t ≡ (GDPt − GDPt−12)2.
“MP Independencet” denotes a 0–1 indicator of independent monetary policy
defined in table 4.9.
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Table B-4: Disagreement and Business Cycle – Panel Results for Consumption
Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 R¯2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + εt
1. 0.445∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.004)
2. 0.414∗∗∗ 0.164∗∗∗ 0.131
(0.008) (0.040)
3. 0.419∗∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗ −0.012 0.132
(0.008) (0.040) (0.011)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagrt = β0 + β2 × CONSt + β3 ×∆12CONS2t + β4 × output gapt +
+ β5 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
4. 0.512∗∗∗ −0.031∗∗∗ 0.077
(0.018) (0.008)
5. 0.491∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ 0.004 0.092
(0.018) (0.007) (0.003)
6. 0.477∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.001 0.076
(0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
7. 0.472∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ −0.001 0.052∗∗∗ 0.082
(0.010) (0.003) (0.001) (0.003) (0.013)
Panel C: Disagreement and Central Bank Independence
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 × CONSt + β3 ×∆12CONS2t+
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
8. 0.469∗∗∗ −0.031 0.004
(0.018) (0.032)
9. 0.492∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.019∗∗∗ 0.004 −0.002 0.047∗∗∗ 0.088
(0.010) (0.009) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
Notes: Fixed effects estimators, clustered standard errors (groups of countries:
(i) France, Germany, Italy, UK, (ii) Canada, US, (iii) Japan). β0 denotes the
average of country-specific intercepts. “post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable
which equals 0 before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy
variable which equals 1 during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research
Institute (ECRI) and 0 otherwise. “output gapt” denotes the ex-post output
gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook quarterly output gap revi-
sions database (in August 2008). ∆12CONS2t ≡ (CONSt − CONSt−12)2.
“MP Independencet” denotes a 0–1 indicator of independent monetary policy
defined in table 4.9.
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Table B-5: Disagreement and Business Cycle – Panel Results for Investment
Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 R¯2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + εt
1. 1.764∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.017)
2. 1.701∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.035
(0.004) (0.024)
3. 1.702∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ −0.002 0.034
(0.045) (0.010) (0.101)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagrt = β0 + β2 × INVt + β3 ×∆12INV 2t + β4 × output gapt +
+ β5 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
4. 1.784∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ 0.032
(0.023) (0.009)
5. 1.700∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ 0.059
(0.038) (0.010) (0.001)
6. 1.704∗∗∗ −0.019 0.002∗∗ −0.003 0.048
(0.055) (0.014) (0.001) (0.048)
7. 1.697∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗ −0.002 0.092 0.044
(0.025) (0.004) (0.000) (0.013) (0.075)
Panel C: Disagreement and Central Bank Independence
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 × INVt + β3 ×∆12INV 2t +
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
8. 1.833∗∗∗ −0.086 0.001
(0.023) (0.086)
9. 1.720∗∗∗ −0.028 −0.018 0.002∗∗ −0.003 0.088∗∗ 0.048
(0.111) (0.093) (0.013) (0.001) (0.046) (0.035)
Notes: Fixed effects estimators, clustered standard errors (groups of countries: (i) France,
Germany, Italy, UK, (ii) Canada, US, (iii) Japan). β0 denotes the average of country-specific
intercepts. “post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0 before 1999 and 1 after
1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1 during recession set by the
Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 otherwise. “output gapt” denotes the ex-
post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook quarterly output gap revisions
database (in August 2008). ∆12INV 2t ≡ (INVt − INVt−12)2. “MP Independencet” denotes
a 0–1 indicator of independent monetary policy defined in table 4.9.
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Table B-6: Disagreement and Business Cycle – Panel Results for Unemployment
Model β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 R¯2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagrt = β0 + β1 × rect + β2 × post-1998t + εt
1. 0.293∗∗∗ −0.004
(0.005)
2. 0.261∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 0.129
(0.011) (0.059)
3. 0.297∗∗∗ 0.156∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗ 0.173
(0.004) (0.049) (0.030)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagrt = β0 + β2 × UNt + β3 ×∆12UN2t + β4 × output gapt +
+ β5 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
4. 0.299∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.001
(0.098) (0.013)
5. 0.324∗∗∗ −0.009 0.054∗∗∗ 0.085
(0.090) (0.013) (0.012)
6. 0.413∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ 0.109
(0.031) (0.005) (0.013) (0.004)
7. 0.414∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ 0.020 0.106
(0.028) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.014)
Panel C: Disagreement and Central Bank Independence
disagrt = β0 + β1 × CB Independencet + β2 × UNt + β3 ×∆12UN2t +
+ β4 × output gapt + β5 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
8. 0.344∗∗∗ −0.064 0.016
(0.098) (0.064)
9. 0.535∗∗∗ −0.081∗ −0.029∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ 0.006 0.128
(0.106) (0.049) (0.010) (0.009) (0.002) (0.023)
Notes: Fixed effects estimators, clustered standard errors (groups of countries:
(i) France, Germany, Italy, UK, (ii) Canada, US, (iii) Japan). β0 denotes the
average of country-specific intercepts. “post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable
which equals 0 before 1999 and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy
variable which equals 1 during recession set by the Economic Cycle Research
Institute (ECRI) and 0 otherwise. “output gapt” denotes the ex-post output
gap estimated in the OECD Economic Outlook quarterly output gap revisions
database (in August 2008). ∆12UN2t ≡ (UNt−UNt−12)2. “MP Independencet”
denotes a 0–1 indicator of independent monetary policy defined in table 4.9.
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Table B-7: Determinants of Disagreement – Country-by-Country Results for Inflation
Country β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 R¯2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × recessiont + β2 × post-1998t + εt
CN 0.353∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ 0.112
(0.012) (0.026) (0.017)
FR 0.212∗∗∗ 0.007 −0.006 −0.007
(0.008) (0.015) (0.011)
GE 0.224∗∗∗ 0.005 0.041∗∗∗ 0.056
(0.009) (0.011) (0.011)
IT 0.310∗∗∗ 0.096∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗ 0.349
(0.012) (0.027) (0.016)
JP 0.376∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ −0.145∗∗∗ 0.321
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016)
UK 0.503∗∗∗ −0.005 −0.268∗∗∗ 0.414
(0.017) (0.037) (0.023)
US 0.324∗∗∗ 0.105∗∗∗ −0.005 0.088
(0.009) (0.023) (0.013)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × INFLt + β2 ×∆12INFL2t +
+ β3 × output gapt + β4 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
CN 0.191∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.009∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.124
(0.043) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.020)
FR 0.118∗∗∗ −0.008 −0.005 0.004 0.005 0.089
(0.027) (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.049)
GE 0.225∗∗∗ −0.007 0.001 −0.013∗∗∗ 0.027 0.036
(0.027) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.084)
IT 0.038 0.048∗∗∗ 0.002 −0.019∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 0.463
(0.040) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.022)
JP 0.136∗∗∗ 0.017 0.012∗∗ 0.010 0.014 0.337
(0.043) (0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.014)
UK −0.046 −0.002 0.002 −0.138∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗ 0.512
(0.057) (0.010) (0.002) (0.011) (0.062)
US 0.199∗∗∗ 0.010 0.002 −0.014∗∗∗ 0.108∗ 0.078
(0.034) (0.008) (0.003) (0.005) (0.058)
Notes: Fixed effects estimators. β0 denotes the average of country-specific
intercepts.“post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0 before 1999
and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1 during
recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 other-
wise. “output gapt” denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD
Economic Outlook quarterly output gap revisions database (in August 2008).
∆12INFL2t ≡ (INFLt − INFLt−12)2.
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Table B-8: Determinants of Disagreement – Country-by-Country Results for the Interest
Rate
Country β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 R¯2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × recessiont + β2 × post-1998t + εt
CN 0.885∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗ −0.328∗∗∗ 0.295
(0.032) (0.067) (0.044)
FR 0.514∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ −0.101∗∗∗ 0.221
(0.018) (0.037) (0.026)
GE 0.477∗∗∗ 0.110∗∗∗ −0.126∗∗∗ 0.191
(0.018) (0.024) (0.023)
IT 0.720∗∗∗ 0.149∗∗∗ −0.341∗∗∗ 0.405
(0.024) (0.055) (0.034)
JP 0.417∗∗∗ −0.052∗∗∗ −0.267∗∗∗ 0.513
(0.015) (0.019) (0.019)
UK 0.827∗∗∗ 0.208∗∗∗ −0.299∗∗∗ 0.399
(0.024) (0.052) (0.033)
US 0.549∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗∗ 0.008 0.031
(0.017) (0.043) (0.024)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagreementt = β0 + β1 ×R3Mt + β2 ×∆12R3M2t +
+ β3 × output gapt + β4 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
CN −0.030 0.024∗∗ −0.003 −0.048∗∗∗ 0.055 0.356
(0.087) (0.012) (0.004) (0.010) (0.046)
FR 0.221∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.054∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.278
(0.051) (0.005) (0.003) (0.012) (0.114)
GE 0.045 0.044∗∗∗ 0.010 −0.031∗∗∗ −0.052 0.323
(0.047) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.160)
IT 0.089 0.048∗∗∗ −0.001 −0.047∗∗∗ 0.020 0.392
(0.070) (0.005) (0.002) (0.013) (0.049)
JP 0.044 −0.005 0.003 0.071∗∗∗ 0.021 0.414
(0.044) (0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.015)
UK 0.138∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ 0.090 0.495
(0.061) (0.007) (0.003) (0.015) (0.079)
US 0.452∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ −0.004 0.037 0.135
(0.039) (0.007) (0.003) (0.009) (0.106)
Notes: Fixed effects estimators. β0 denotes the average of country-specific
intercepts.“post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0 before 1999
and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1 during
recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 other-
wise. “output gapt” denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD
Economic Outlook quarterly output gap revisions database (in August 2008).
∆12R3M2t ≡ (R3Mt −R3Mt−12)2.
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Table B-9: Determinants of Disagreement – Country-by-Country Results for GDP
Country β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 R¯2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × recessiont + β2 × post-1998t + εt
CN 0.492∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ −0.114∗∗∗ 0.240
(0.017) (0.037) (0.024)
FR 0.283∗∗∗ 0.027 0.036∗∗∗ 0.037
(0.009) (0.018) (0.013)
GE 0.340∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ −0.086∗∗∗ 0.214
(0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
IT 0.241∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.025 0.076
(0.012) (0.028) (0.017)
JP 0.589∗∗∗ 0.207∗∗∗ 0.029 0.141
(0.027) (0.035) (0.035)
UK 0.477∗∗∗ 0.189∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗ 0.387
(0.014) (0.031) (0.019)
US 0.348∗∗∗ 0.255∗∗∗ 0.015 0.211
(0.013) (0.034) (0.019)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagreementt = β0 + β1 ×GDPt + β2 ×∆12GDP 2t +
+ β3 × output gapt + β4 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
CN −0.002 −0.012∗ 0.008∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗ 0.020 0.376
(0.052) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.030)
FR 0.204∗∗∗ −0.015∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.061 0.126
(0.027) (0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.060)
GE 0.145∗∗∗ −0.016∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗ −0.016 0.196 0.164
(0.048) (0.008) (0.002) (0.010) (0.145)
IT 0.041 −0.035∗∗∗ 0.009∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗ 0.002 0.163
(0.039) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007) (0.021)
JP 0.435∗∗∗ −0.037∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ −0.004 0.024 0.087
(0.086) (0.014) (0.004) (0.011) (0.031)
UK 0.236∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗ 0.173∗∗∗ 0.318
(0.047) (0.008) (0.004) (0.011) (0.058)
US 0.115∗∗ −0.051∗∗∗ 0.000 0.023∗∗∗ 0.474∗∗∗ 0.259
(0.047) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.077)
Notes: Fixed effects estimators. β0 denotes the average of country-specific
intercepts.“post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0 before 1999
and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1 during
recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 other-
wise. “output gapt” denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD
Economic Outlook quarterly output gap revisions database (in August 2008).
∆12GDP 2t ≡ (GDPt −GDPt−12)2.
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Table B-10: Determinants of Disagreement – Country-by-Country Results for Consump-
tion
Country β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 R¯2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × recessiont + β2 × post-1998t + εt
CN 0.478∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ −0.071∗∗∗ 0.208
(0.019) (0.041) (0.027)
FR 0.285∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗ 0.031∗∗ 0.038
(0.010) (0.019) (0.013)
GE 0.377∗∗∗ 0.088∗∗∗ −0.013 0.079
(0.015) (0.020) (0.019)
IT 0.321∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.006 0.166
(0.014) (0.031) (0.019)
JP 0.561∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗ 0.016 0.170
(0.025) (0.031) (0.031)
UK 0.548∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ −0.043∗ 0.146
(0.017) (0.036) (0.023)
US 0.364∗∗∗ 0.213∗∗∗ 0.003 0.182
(0.012) (0.031) (0.018)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × CONSt + β2 ×∆12CONS2t +
+ β3 × output gapt + β4 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
CN 0.095 −0.026∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ −0.008 0.008 0.214
(0.069) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007) (0.030)
FR 0.189∗∗∗ −0.003 −0.001 −0.008 0.029 0.053
(0.034) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.068)
GE 0.210∗∗∗ −0.001 0.004 −0.007 0.023 0.072
(0.051) (0.009) (0.003) (0.011) (0.151)
IT 0.118∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗∗ 0.039 0.168
(0.049) (0.006) (0.001) (0.008) (0.026)
JP 0.288∗∗∗ −0.022 −0.004 0.001 0.041 0.145
(0.084) (0.018) (0.003) (0.011) (0.029)
UK 0.294∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.005 0.202∗∗∗ 0.127
(0.057) (0.007) (0.003) (0.013) (0.070)
US 0.140∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.246∗∗∗ 0.183
(0.047) (0.009) (0.003) (0.008) (0.080)
Notes: Fixed effects estimators. β0 denotes the average of country-specific
intercepts.“post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0 before 1999
and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1 during
recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 other-
wise. “output gapt” denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD
Economic Outlook quarterly output gap revisions database (in August 2008).
∆12CONS2t ≡ (CONSt − CONSt−12)2.
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Table B-11: Determinants of Disagreement – Country-by-Country Results for Investment
Country β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 R¯2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × recessiont + β2 × post-1998t + εt
CN 2.929∗∗∗ −0.369∗ −0.619∗∗∗ 0.083
(0.099) (0.209) (0.137)
FR 1.170∗∗∗ 0.001 −0.004 −0.010
(0.041) (0.081) (0.057)
GE 1.284∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 0.374∗∗∗ 0.201
(0.049) (0.066) (0.063)
IT 1.027∗∗∗ 0.224∗ −0.085 0.024
(0.051) (0.118) (0.072)
JP 2.141∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗ 0.346∗∗∗ 0.061
(0.093) (0.119) (0.117)
UK 1.641∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ −0.147∗∗ 0.224
(0.051) (0.113) (0.072)
US 1.845∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗ −0.003 0.217
(0.053) (0.134) (0.076)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × INVt + β2 ×∆12INV 2t +
+ β3 × output gapt + β4 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
CN 2.027∗∗∗ 0.017 0.001 −0.069∗ 0.081 0.093
(0.349) (0.014) (0.001) (0.041) (0.179)
FR 0.820∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.043∗ 0.039 0.084
(0.147) (0.008) (0.001) (0.025) (0.260)
GE 0.938∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ 0.001 0.048∗ −0.083 0.135
(0.182) (0.009) (0.001) (0.027) (0.496)
IT −0.242 −0.035∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.007 0.246
(0.175) (0.008) (0.001) (0.030) (0.088)
JP 1.087∗∗∗ 0.036 −0.005∗ −0.179∗∗∗ 2.103 0.104
(0.328) (0.025) (0.003) (0.048) (6.029)
UK 1.128∗∗∗ −0.049∗∗∗ 0.001 0.053 0.291 0.117
(0.197) (0.007) (0.001) (0.035) (0.195)
US 0.565∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008 0.925∗∗∗ 0.214
(0.220) (0.009) (0.001) (0.029) (0.341)
Notes: Fixed effects estimators. β0 denotes the average of country-specific
intercepts.“post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0 before 1999
and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1 during
recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 other-
wise. “output gapt” denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD
Economic Outlook quarterly output gap revisions database (in August 2008).
∆12INV 2t ≡ (INVt − INVt−12)2.
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Table B-12: Determinants of Disagreement – Country-by-Country Results for Unem-
ployment
Country β0 β1 β2 β3 β4 R¯2
Panel A: Disagreement over Time
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × recessiont + β2 × post-1998t + εt
CN 0.330∗∗∗ 0.121∗∗∗ −0.112∗∗∗ 0.375
(0.011) (0.023) (0.015)
FR 0.238∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗ −0.004 0.011
(0.009) (0.017) (0.012)
GE 0.410∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗∗ −0.261∗∗∗ 0.395
(0.028) (0.038) (0.036)
IT 0.344∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗∗ −0.066∗∗ 0.100
(0.021) (0.048) (0.029)
JP 0.208∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.086
(0.011) (0.015) (0.014)
UK 0.337∗∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ −0.113∗∗∗ 0.498
(0.010) (0.022) (0.014)
US 0.217∗∗∗ 0.098∗∗∗ −0.013 0.121
(0.007) (0.018) (0.010)
Panel B: Disagreement and Macro Variables
disagreementt = β0 + β1 × UNt + β2 ×∆12UN2t +
+ β3 × output gapt + β4 ×∆policy rate2t + εt
CN 0.032 0.022∗ 0.026∗∗∗ −0.009 0.003 0.347
(0.037) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.019)
FR 0.172∗∗∗ −0.028∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.134
(0.026) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008) (0.055)
GE 0.085 −0.172∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ −0.054∗∗∗ 0.442∗ 0.356
(0.094) (0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.245)
IT −0.025 0.023∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗ −0.022 0.236
(0.064) (0.011) (0.018) (0.011) (0.040)
JP 0.241∗∗∗ −0.011 0.064∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.011 0.127
(0.031) (0.014) (0.038) (0.008) (0.012)
UK 0.152∗∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.446
(0.033) (0.005) (0.005) (0.011) (0.038)
US 0.140∗∗∗ −0.018∗∗ 0.038∗∗∗ −0.002 0.014 0.137
(0.024) (0.008) (0.009) (0.006) (0.045)
Notes: Fixed effects estimators. β0 denotes the average of country-specific
intercepts.“post-1998t” denotes a dummy variable which equals 0 before 1999
and 1 after 1998. “recessiont” denotes a dummy variable which equals 1 during
recession set by the Economic Cycle Research Institute (ECRI) and 0 otherwise.
“output gapt”denotes the ex-post output gap estimated in the OECD Economic
Outlook quarterly output gap revisions database (in August 2008). ∆12UN2t ≡
(UNt − UNt−12)2.
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Table B-13: Average Disagreement Across Countries and Variables
Variable Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK US
Full Sample
Inflation 0.34 0.21 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.38 0.33
Interest Rate 0.76 0.50 0.46 0.58 0.27 0.71 0.56
GDP 0.46 0.30 0.34 0.26 0.69 0.43 0.38
Consumption 0.47 0.31 0.40 0.34 0.65 0.55 0.38
Investment 2.60 1.17 1.56 1.01 2.42 1.66 1.93
Unemployment 0.29 0.24 0.41 0.33 0.25 0.31 0.22
IP 1.24 0.75 0.81 0.75 1.71 0.89 0.84
Pre-1999
Inflation 0.37 0.21 0.23 0.33 0.40 0.50 0.33
Interest Rate 0.93 0.55 0.52 0.75 0.40 0.87 0.56
GDP 0.53 0.29 0.38 0.26 0.67 0.52 0.37
Consumption 0.53 0.29 0.41 0.36 0.64 0.58 0.38
Investment 2.85 1.17 1.39 1.07 2.26 1.79 1.93
Unemployment 0.36 0.24 0.53 0.38 0.22 0.38 0.22
IP 1.40 0.72 0.76 0.70 1.60 0.98 0.79
1999+
Inflation 0.30 0.21 0.27 0.17 0.25 0.24 0.33
Interest Rate 0.56 0.44 0.39 0.38 0.13 0.53 0.57
GDP 0.38 0.32 0.29 0.27 0.71 0.34 0.39
Investment 2.31 1.17 1.76 0.94 2.61 1.49 1.94
Consumption 0.41 0.32 0.39 0.33 0.67 0.50 0.39
Unemployment 0.22 0.24 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.22 0.21
IP 1.05 0.79 0.86 0.81 1.84 0.79 0.91
Booms
Inflation 0.32 0.21 0.24 0.24 0.31 0.37 0.32
Interest Rate 0.71 0.47 0.42 0.55 0.30 0.67 0.55
GDP 0.43 0.30 0.30 0.25 0.60 0.41 0.36
Consumption 0.44 0.30 0.37 0.32 0.57 0.53 0.37
Investment 2.61 1.17 1.46 0.98 2.30 1.57 1.84
Unemployment 0.27 0.24 0.29 0.31 0.23 0.28 0.21
IP 1.20 0.74 0.74 0.75 1.53 0.85 0.82
Recessions
Inflation 0.43 0.22 0.25 0.41 0.36 0.50 0.43
Interest Rate 1.07 0.71 0.53 0.87 0.24 1.04 0.68
GDP 0.66 0.32 0.42 0.36 0.81 0.67 0.61
Consumption 0.71 0.34 0.46 0.52 0.78 0.72 0.58
Investment 2.56 1.17 1.74 1.25 2.60 2.37 2.86
Unemployment 0.45 0.27 0.63 0.51 0.27 0.52 0.31
IP 1.52 0.81 0.93 0.74 1.96 1.25 1.08
Notes: Numbers are based on the cross sectional IQR as the disagreement
measure. Averages taken across time periods.
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Table B-14: Correlation of Disagreement Across Countries
Variable Country Canada France Germany Italy Japan UK
INFL France 0.16
Germany 0.01 −0.05
Italy 0.28 0.25 −0.18
Japan 0.16 0.18 0.03 0.48
UK 0.35 0.23 −0.04 0.64 0.56
US 0.16 0.24 0.07 0.19 0.09 0.07
GDP France 0.12
Germany 0.25 0.08
Italy 0.19 0.21 0.32
Japan 0.13 0.15 0.26 0.15
UK 0.55 −0.04 0.12 0.15 0.02
US 0.37 0.29 0.01 0.26 −0.07 0.31
R3M France 0.27
Germany 0.38 0.38
Italy 0.34 0.42 0.41
Japan 0.41 0.22 0.28 0.52
UK 0.52 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.54
US 0.28 0.01 0.25 0.01 −0.05 0.09
CONS France 0.17
Germany −0.02 0.15
Italy 0.14 0.04 0.22
Japan 0.05 0.17 0.18 0.37
UK 0.32 0.13 0.13 0.06 0.06
US 0.40 0.10 0.10 0.16 0.06 0.30
INV France 0.01
Germany 0.00 0.20
Italy 0.31 0.30 0.27
Japan 0.11 0.10 0.30 0.19
UK 0.06 0.03 −0.02 0.03 0.03
US 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.29 0.22 0.36
UN France 0.09
Germany 0.39 0.02
Italy 0.13 0.33 0.34
Japan −0.13 0.19 −0.23 0.08
UK 0.53 −0.01 0.54 0.26 −0.29
US 0.36 −0.03 0.07 0.00 −0.01 0.27
Notes: Numbers are based on the cross sectional IQR as the disagreement
measure.
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Table B-15: Correlation of Disagreement Within Countries
Country Variable Inflation GDP Int. Rate Cons Inv
CN GDP 0.19
Interest Rate 0.22 0.27
Consumption 0.22 0.53 0.27
Investment 0.11 0.25 0.05 0.15
Unemployment 0.31 0.57 0.34 0.48 0.28
FR GDP 0.16
Interest Rate 0.26 0.14
Consumption 0.04 0.41 0.12
Investment 0.20 0.39 0.19 0.28
Unemployment 0.05 0.23 0.27 0.16 0.11
GE GDP −0.03
Interest Rate 0.09 0.18
Consumption 0.14 0.44 0.28
Investment 0.07 0.17 0.11 0.32
Unemployment −0.04 0.34 0.22 0.23 −0.08
IT GDP 0.17
Interest Rate 0.56 0.12
Consumption 0.25 0.39 0.16
Investment 0.29 0.36 0.23 0.32
Unemployment 0.31 0.32 0.12 0.32 0.26
JP GDP 0.26
Interest Rate 0.47 0.06
Consumption 0.24 0.57 0.08
Investment 0.13 0.53 −0.03 0.38
Unemployment 0.04 0.50 −0.14 0.39 0.26
UK GDP 0.49
Interest Rate 0.66 0.53
Consumption 0.31 0.59 0.33
Investment 0.37 0.56 0.41 0.52
Unemployment 0.47 0.63 0.61 0.45 0.56
US GDP 0.41
Interest Rate 0.31 0.22
Consumption 0.36 0.74 0.05
Investment 0.32 0.55 0.11 0.50
Unemployment 0.18 0.48 0.12 0.50 0.37
Notes: Numbers are based on the cross sectional IQR as the disagreement
measure.
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Table B-16: Horizon Effect for Disagreement across Forecasts for the Next Year
GDP Consumption Inflation Ind.Prod.
Germany 0.007 0.011 0.010 -0.010
(2.8∗∗∗) (3.0∗∗∗) (6.4∗∗∗) (−1.9∗)
Canada 0.005 0.005 0.008 -0.006
(1.8∗) (1.4) (4.1∗∗∗) (−0.6)
France 0.001 0.002 0.004 -0.009
(1.0) (1.0) (3.2∗∗∗) (−1.7∗)
Italy 0.003 0.000 0.011 -0.013
(1.9∗) (0.2) (3.4∗∗∗) (−2.4∗∗)
Japan -0.007 0.011 0.014 -0.025
(−1.3) (2.4∗∗) (4.1∗∗∗) (−1.8∗)
United Kingdom 0.003 0.004 0.017 0.001
(1.1) (0.9) (2.9∗∗∗) (0.2)
United States 0.001 -0.001 0.011 0.025
(0.5) (−0.5) (6.5∗∗∗) (4.2∗∗∗)
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics.
Table B-17: Horizon Effect for Disagreement across Forecasts for the Current Year
GDP Consumption Inflation Ind.Prod.
Germany 0.017 0.017 0.015 0.027
(9.0∗∗∗) (5.8∗∗∗) (21.6∗∗∗) (5.1∗∗∗)
Canada 0.032 0.030 0.021 0.066
(17.1∗∗∗) (12.9∗∗∗) (17.8∗∗∗) (9.0∗∗∗)
France 0.017 0.012 0.013 0.025
(13.3∗∗∗) (9.0∗∗∗) (13.4∗∗∗) (6.0∗∗∗)
Italy 0.012 0.009 0.017 0.016
(6.6∗∗∗) (4.4∗∗∗) (10.7∗∗∗) (3.5∗∗∗)
Japan 0.034 0.029 0.022 0.110
(10.3∗∗∗) (10.2∗∗∗) (11.5∗∗∗) (14.1∗∗∗)
United Kingdom 0.028 0.031 0.025 0.057
(12.5∗∗∗) (10.3∗∗∗) (10.7∗∗∗) (13.3∗∗∗)
United States 0.030 0.027 0.024 0.065
(16.7∗∗∗) (18.2∗∗∗) (19.4∗∗∗) (16.8∗∗∗)
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics.
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Table B-18: Rel. Change of Disagreement per Month for Forecasts for the Next Year
GDP Consumption Inflation Ind.Prod.
Germany 1.9 2.3 3.4 -1.3
Canada 1.1 1.0 2.2 -0.6
France 0.5 0.6 1.8 -1.2
Italy 1.3 0.1 3.5 -1.9
Japan -1.0 1.7 3.6 -1.6
United Kingdom 0.6 0.6 3.3 0.1
United States 0.3 -0.3 2.8 2.6
Notes: Numbers indicate the change in disagreement per month
relative to the average level of disagreement calculated across all
forecasts with a horizon of more than a year.
Table B-19: Rel. Change of Disagreement per Month for Forecasts for the Current Year
GDP Consumption Inflation Ind.Prod.
Germany 7.1 5.2 11.5 4.0
Canada 11.8 9.4 11.0 7.8
France 8.2 5.4 8.4 4.1
Italy 5.8 3.3 10.7 2.5
Japan 7.1 6.6 10.0 10.0
United Kingdom 9.8 7.8 12.5 9.4
United States 13.2 11.7 13.1 12.7
Notes: Numbers indicate the change in disagreement per month
relative to the average level of disagreement calculated across all
forecasts with a horizon of less than a year.
Table B-20: Quadratic Trend Effect per Month for Disagreement across Forecasts for
the Next Year
GDP Consumption Inflation Ind.Prod.
Germany 0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0013 -0.0002
(0.9) (−0.6) (−2.5∗∗) (−0.1)
Canada -0.0004 -0.0009 0.0008 0.0012
(−0.4) (−0.8) (1.3) (0.4)
France 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0000 0.0032
(0.4) (−0.3) (0.0) (1.9∗)
Italy 0.0007 0.0008 -0.0006 -0.0006
(1.1) (1.1) (−0.6) (−0.4)
Japan -0.0011 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0009
(−0.7) (0.0) (−0.4) (0.2)
United Kingdom -0.0002 -0.0007 0.0001 0.0007
(−0.2) (−0.5) (0.0) (0.4)
United States 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0014
(0.6) (0.5) (−1.3) (0.7)
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics.
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Table B-21: Quadratic Trend Effect per Month for Disagreement across Forecasts for
the Current Year
GDP Consumption Inflation Ind.Prod.
Germany -0.0011 -0.0022 0.0001 -0.0034
(−1.8∗) (−2.5∗∗) (0.3) (−2.0∗∗)
Canada -0.0005 -0.0012 0.0001 -0.0070
(−0.8) (−1.5) (0.4) (−2.3∗∗)
France -0.0001 -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0015
(−0.3) (−1.8∗) (−0.6) (−1.1)
Italy -0.0007 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0021
(−1.2) (0.1) (−0.1) (−1.4)
Japan -0.0024 -0.0019 -0.0008 -0.0025
(−2.3∗∗) (−2.0∗∗) (−1.5) (−0.8)
United Kingdom -0.0013 -0.0005 0.0009 -0.0033
(−1.8∗) (−0.6) (1.2) (−2.5∗∗)
United States 0.0006 0.0005 0.0007 0.0011
(1.0) (1.0) (1.9∗) (0.9)
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics.
Table B-22: Time Trends in Disagreement across Forecasts for the Next Year
GDP Consumption Inflation Ind.Prod.
Germany -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0001 0.0013
(−6.0∗∗∗) (−3.3∗∗∗) (−0.6) (4.0∗∗∗)
Canada -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.0011 -0.0022
(−6.4∗∗∗) (−5.8∗∗∗) (−7.6∗∗∗) (−2.5∗∗)
France 0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0013
(2.7∗∗∗) (0.2) (−3.8∗∗∗) (4.0∗∗∗)
Italy 0.0002 0.0003 -0.0018 0.0031
(2.2∗∗) (2.1∗∗) (−14.0∗∗∗) (10.4∗∗∗)
Japan -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0018 0.0047
(−0.6) (0.8) (−12.2∗∗∗) (7.2∗∗∗)
United Kingdom -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0049 -0.0001
(−1.3) (−1.7∗) (−16.8∗∗∗) (−0.5)
United States -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0006
(−3.5∗∗∗) (−0.6) (−2.3∗∗) (1.7∗)
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics.
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Table B-23: Time Trends in Disagreement across Forecasts for the Current Year
GDP Consumption Inflation Ind.Prod.
Germany -0.0011 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001
(−13.1∗∗∗) (−0.6) (2.7∗∗∗) (−0.4)
Canada -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0001 -0.0036
(−5.8∗∗∗) (−4.6∗∗∗) (−1.5) (−5.6∗∗∗)
France -0.0003 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0010
(−4.2∗∗∗) (−5.6∗∗∗) (0.3) (−3.5∗∗∗)
Italy -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0006 -0.0001
(−1.5) (0.6) (−5.7∗∗∗) (−0.4)
Japan -0.0014 -0.0008 -0.0007 -0.0009
(−6.5∗∗∗) (−4.1∗∗∗) (−6.5∗∗∗) (−1.4)
United Kingdom -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0009 -0.0004
(−2.1∗∗) (−3.5∗∗∗) (−7.2∗∗∗) (−1.1)
United States -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0002 -0.0005
(−5.8∗∗∗) (−5.0∗∗∗) (−2.2∗∗) (−1.9∗)
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics.
Table B-24: Horizon Effects for Multivariate Measure of Disagreement
Germany Canada France Italy Japan UK US
Next Year
αˆ -0.0061 -0.0140 -0.0088 -0.0091 -0.0726 0.0075 0.0477
(−0.5) (−0.6) (−1.0) (−1.1) (−1.2) (0.6) (3.0∗∗∗)
rel.change -0.0070 -0.0088 -0.0133 -0.0137 -0.0199 0.0061 0.0419
Current Year
αˆ 0.0468 0.1342 0.0409 0.0220 0.2836 0.0905 0.0853
(5.3∗∗∗) (7.9∗∗∗) (5.5∗∗∗) (3.3∗∗∗) (10.4∗∗∗) (9.7∗∗∗) (12.1∗∗∗)
rel.change 0.0772 0.1281 0.0874 0.0455 0.1641 0.1592 0.2154
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics. The numbers in rows labeled rel.change
indicate the change in disagreement per month relative to the average level of disagreement
calculated across all forecasts with a horizon of more than a year or less than a year respec-
tively. All results are based on the concept of vector variance (V V ).
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Table B-25: Business Cycle Effect on Disagreement across Forecasts for the Next Year
GDP Consumption Inflation Ind.Prod.
Germany -1.8868 -1.1901 -0.3193 -4.5207
(−2.6∗∗∗) (−0.9) (−0.7) (−3.7∗∗∗)
Canada -2.8134 -2.7834 1.3343 -6.4181
(−3.5∗∗∗) (−3.4∗∗∗) (2.6∗∗) (−2.8∗∗∗)
France -1.1913 -0.9505 -0.4457 -7.1767
(−2.2∗∗) (−1.7∗) (−1.1) (−4.3∗∗∗)
Italy -1.3665 -2.4018 -0.8878 -3.4127
(−2.8∗∗∗) (−3.5∗∗∗) (−1.1) (−2.3∗∗)
Japan -3.4107 -1.7145 -0.6963 -10.3581
(−3.3∗∗∗) (−1.8∗) (−1.3) (−3.7∗∗∗)
United Kingdom 1.1201 -0.4951 0.4811 -5.6249
(0.9) (−0.3) (0.2) (−2.9∗∗∗)
United States -3.3163 -1.4689 0.1139 -6.0481
(−2.4∗∗) (−1.0) (0.1) (−2.7∗∗∗)
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics.
Table B-26: Business Cycle Effect on Disagreement across Forecasts for the Current Year
GDP Consumption Inflation Ind.Prod.
Germany 0.4240 0.0755 0.5488 7.1651
(0.7) (0.1) (2.8∗∗∗) (4.2∗∗∗)
Canada 0.9088 0.9110 -0.1969 4.0694
(2.0∗) (1.5) (−0.6) (1.6)
France 1.3360 1.6560 1.0148 3.3790
(2.1∗∗) (3.0∗∗∗) (3.2∗∗∗) (2.1∗∗)
Italy 0.8345 0.6930 1.1788 1.1645
(1.6) (1.1) (2.4∗∗) (0.9)
Japan 0.0717 0.4988 -0.0923 2.5940
(0.1) (1.0) (−0.2) (1.4)
United Kingdom 0.1317 -0.5301 -0.1910 2.0097
(0.1) (−0.4) (−0.2) (1.0)
United States 1.9230 0.5513 -0.3288 4.5154
(2.7∗∗∗) (0.7) (−0.7) (2.8∗∗∗)
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics.
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Table B-27: Effect of Recession in Next Year on Disagreement of Forecasts for the Next
Year
GDP Consumption Inflation Ind.Prod.
Germany 0.0550 0.0879 0.0740 0.1667
(4.1∗∗∗) (3.1∗∗∗) (7.7∗∗∗) (4.8∗∗∗)
Canada 0.0461 0.0371 -0.0664 0.0730
(1.8∗) (1.1) (−3.1∗∗∗) (0.6)
France 0.0330 0.0448 -0.0024 0.0212
(2.5∗∗) (3.3∗∗∗) (−0.3) (0.6)
Italy 0.0229 0.0669 -0.0177 -0.0480
(1.1) (1.5) (−0.5) (−0.9)
Japan 0.0035 0.0519 0.0082 -0.2348
(0.1) (1.6) (0.5) (−2.6∗∗∗)
United Kingdom 0.0251 0.1678 -0.2480 0.2388
(0.8) (4.3∗∗∗) (−6.2∗∗∗) (5.2∗∗∗)
United States 0.0240 0.0575 0.0370 0.0123
(1.0) (2.6∗∗∗) (1.7∗) (0.2)
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics.
Table B-28: Effect of Recession in Current Year on Disagreement of Forecasts for the
Current Year
GDP Consumption Inflation Ind.Prod.
Germany 0.0288 0.0197 0.0104 0.1449
(3.4∗∗∗) (1.0) (2.3∗∗) (3.9∗∗∗)
Canada 0.0607 0.1001 0.0389 0.1427
(3.5∗∗∗) (4.1∗∗∗) (2.7∗∗∗) (1.4)
France 0.0462 0.0263 -0.0021 0.0810
(3.2∗∗∗) (2.3∗∗) (−0.4) (2.1∗∗)
Italy 0.1120 0.1352 0.0425 0.0298
(5.2∗∗∗) (4.4∗∗∗) (2.1∗∗) (0.6)
Japan 0.0882 0.0391 0.0190 0.1649
(3.8∗∗∗) (2.0∗∗) (1.7∗) (2.7∗∗∗)
United Kingdom 0.1234 0.1889 0.0624 0.2331
(5.5∗∗∗) (8.0∗∗∗) (2.6∗∗) (4.8∗∗∗)
United States 0.0868 0.0502 0.0406 0.1216
(6.1∗∗∗) (3.2∗∗∗) (3.9∗∗∗) (3.7∗∗∗)
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics.
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Table B-29: Business Cycle Effect on Multivariate Measure of Disagreement
For Next Year
Germany Canada France Italy Japan UK US
βˆ -7.86 -16.27 -10.78 -6.04 -44.57 -8.68 -15.90
(−2.7∗∗∗) (−3.0∗∗∗) (−4.3∗∗∗) (−2.7∗∗∗) (−3.4∗∗∗) (−1.9∗) (−2.6∗∗∗)
For Current Year
βˆ 12.12 10.05 7.57 3.34 5.30 3.01 5.72
(3.5∗∗∗) (1.5) (2.4∗∗) (1.8∗) (0.8) (0.7) (2.2∗∗)
Notes: Numbers below the estimates are t-statistics. All results are based on the
concept of vector variance (V V ).
PhD-Thesis written by: Jonas Dovern
130 Appendix
C Graphical Appendix
Figure C-1: Expected and Actual Inflation Rate
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Figure C-2: Expected and Actual Short-term Interest Rates
051015
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
C
N
051015
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
FR
0246810
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
G
E
05101520
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
IT
0246810
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
JP
051015
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
U
K
0246810
19
90
19
95
20
00
20
05
U
S
Notes: All series are measured in percent. The solid line represents the actual history of the
series (shifted by 12 months to ease the comparison with the forecasts). Each individual
forecast is represented by one grey dot.
PhD-Thesis written by: Jonas Dovern
132 Appendix
Figure C-3: Expected and Actual GDP Growth
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Figure C-4: Expected and Actual Consumption Growth
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Figure C-5: Expected and Actual Investment Growth
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Figure C-6: Expected and Actual Unemployment Rate
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Figure C-14: Typical Shape of Horizon Effect
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Notes: The Example refers to disagreement across GDP forecasts in Germany. The solid
line refers to the disagreement across GDP forecasts for the current year in Germany
(measured as the cross sectional standard deviation), while the dashed line are the fitted
values that correspond to equation 4.10.
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